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ABSTRACT
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by
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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on
June 23, 1975 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This study examines the impact of racial transition in government on city
operations and on efforts at managerial level changes affecting services
in older central cities. It evaluates two current hypotheses of the
response of city governments to racial change. One suggests that racial
change resulting in black electoral victories will make little or no
difference in government operations or benefits. A combination of insti-
tutional, legal and political barriers and declining resources will pre-
vdnt any significant response by new black elected officials to the per-
ceived needs or equity questions raised by black voters.
A contrasting hypothesis suggests that there is no present option to use
by nonwhites of the political process. On the contrary, the increasing
concentrations of nonwhites in cities make possible the legitimizing of
wants and grievances through electoral victories. Further, some benefits
may be possible. Public service employment, changes in qualitative di-
mensions of services, relief from public actions felt to be discrimina-
tory or abusive and finally, the opportunity for administrative and man-
agerial experience are among potential benefits. Secondly, as with white
immigrants, public resources may be used to capitalize other community
based economic development activities, or stabilize those of most bene-
fit to nonwhites. While resources are declining and much of local
government expenditures are stabilized over long periods of time, gains
can be significant in poverty communities where outward movement and
economic opportunities are limited.
This study looks at some of the impacts of racial transition on city
government operations by assessing changes which tQok place in Newark,
New Jersey during the first term of Kenneth Gibson, a black mayor
elected in 1970. Newark as a city is a case of extremes. The economic,
social and political extremes posed pressures which aggregated a dis-
organized poor community to press for electoral victories in 1970.
These same pressures, however, remain, strong barriers to instituting
change in government by new leadership. While current political
theories suggest U.S. government institutions respond to shifts in
demands and pressures from citizen voters through elected officials, the
Newark case suggests that new nonwhite administrations are faced with a
highly stable institutional structure basically resistant-to change and
hostile to new authority.
This study hypothesizes that political resources of government and
especially the authority and prestige of the mayor and new government
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leadership, however, can be used to reshape public services to help poor
constituencies. Keys to effectiveness lie with understanding of the
established political arrangement, assertion of central control and
aggressive pursuit of strategies however unpopular within government.
The case focuses on goals, efforts and outcomes of attempts to change
three government areas. These areas are critical to shaping the distri-
bution of resources in older cities. Included are the structural organ-
ization of city government, including the city's service array, city
employment and finally, city fiscal policy including resource generation
and budgeting. Structural reorganization can achieve the greatest mag-
nitude of impact on existing resources. By-products of reorganization
include significant task and programmatic change, accelerated growth of
nonwhite employment and qualitative changes in service output. Moreover,
given the propensity of stable growth of budgets in cities, once set, new
components of government can compete with older activities for allocation
of city expenditure. Change in personnel policy is critical to accelerat-
ing racial integration of a city workforce. While inhibited by union
contracting and civil service entry and promotional practices, policy
which capitalizes on the psychological 'expectation' for change to favor
nonwhite employment may undercut some of these barriers. Finally, gen-
erating new resources and asserting control over automatic and fragmented
budgeting practices are critical to effectiveness of most other change
efforts.
Evidence from this study suggests that a fundamental barrier to change
is the fragmentation of authority in older government on one hand, and
the failure of higher levels of government to respond to the changing
requirements of citics on the other. In the first case, administrations
which desire change are faced with overcoming the dispersal of authority
which reinforces internal benefit systems at the expense of public ser-
vices. Even when fragmentation is overcome by new governments, however,
in the long run, higher resource requirements than presently available
in cities will be required to resolve service problems. Here, shifts
in state and federal policies are critical. Creation of additional
resources where pressures for reallocation of existing resources are
greatest may achieve more rapid gains by nonwhites where concentrations
are high enough to elect nonwhite administrations to office.
Thesis Supervisor: Bennett Harrison
Title: -Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Recent gains by blacks in U.S. mayoralities have increasingly raised
questions about the value of nonwhite political participation as a
means to gai.n equality in U.S. society. The question of what kinds of
goals ought nonwhites address is not explored well by current arguments
over the value of participation. Assumptions, however, generally relate
actions to 'gains', betterment or equality in U.S. society.
Two key arguments contrast in general support of black control in older
cities. One set of observers suggests that gains are at best symbolic
and relative to the resource costs to nonwhites of participation in
electoral politics may be harmful in raising expectations. Pointing to
the economic decline in cities and the obsolescence of political govern-
mental institutions, there are real doubts that cities can distribute
more than a very small pie. Another problem is that the causes of
decline probably lie outside city jurisdictions and the restricted insti-
tutional control of local government. Thus, while there may have been
possibilities for utili'zing the city as a political-economic benefit
system in a less suburbanized society of pre-war times as European
immisgrants did, the dramatic changes during the past decades have made
this nearly impossible. The combination of wealth decline and rising
standards for American life have virtually removed the city political
apparatus as a mechanism for upward mobility of lower status people.
These observers also see potential harm in a focus by nonwhites on
electoral politics in cities, Here it is suggested the politics may be
yet another 'diversion' game designed to dissipate unrest and frustration
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2of nonwhites over their failure to achieve in the larger economic and
political marketplace of metropolitan America. By 'playing the game'
nonwhites may be bought off with the cheaper rewards of city hall while
the rest of the society enjoys the big rewards outside cities.
A contrasting set of observations argue less about the objectives of
obtaining equal participation for nonwhites in U.S. society as with the
means, constraints and timing which they suggest play a much larger role
in setting limits on nonwhite strategies of using the ballot and city
hall. First, they suggest that every road must be tested, including the
well-trod route of white European immigrants. While the rewards for
black participation today relative to today's standards may be less than
those of 70 years ago, blacks should take advantage of their freedom to
repeat the experience. At the least, there may be gains in the experi-
ence of organizing and focusing on specific goals which are obtainable
with collective effort. Given the extreme discrimination exerted
agai-nst nonwhites in participating in politics in the past, this gain may
already be a significant one in restoring the confidence in self-action
of disadvantaged groups. Another direct gain possible is in experienc-
ing administrative, executive, planning and managerial roles. Again,
few blacks have obtained the experience of control over organizational
resources and institutions outside of government and the expansion of
opportunities provided by black control over city hall can provide this.
Secondly, a strong economic argument is put forward over the value of
tangible rewards available from political participation. Local government
rewards, it is suggested, can be utilized in a variety of ways for politi-
3cal and economic development. The disadvantaged black communities can
benefit, for example, from direct services produced by government.
While present qualitative dimensions of services may limit their value
to nonwhites, some opportunities for reorganization are available under
black control. Changes in the quality of education, for example, could
improve economic opportunity considerably. Black control might also
arrest discrimination in services perceived to exist in nonwhite communi-
ties. Services such as environmental control, inspectional services,
public housing maintenance, infrastructure maintenance, etc., are areas
where an end to discrimination would generate visible benefits.
Spillout benefits, another area, conceivably could improve under
black control. Benefits generated by'government production such as
employment and contracting, if shared by blacks in proportion to their
numbers could reduce black unemployment and generate skills useful else-
where in the economy. Finally there are potentials for capitalizing
the expenditure of government contracting of services in community.
development. Through the use of nonprofit corporations, development
banking and a variety of other devices, nonwhite communities can expand
and improve local economies.
While both sides of the debate have argued from economic and ideological
perspectives, very few have considered the limits or potential offered
by governments under black control for black improvement, There are
clearly major constraints and limits of black government's influence
on reallocating benefits in older city systems where they are most
likely to be elected. Constraints are many and varied but they can be
I A
4grouped roughly into two types; internal government and political
constraints, including the legal and structural organization of city
government; and the expectations and demands placed on such administra-
tions from service and political constituents and various non govern-
mental interests.
A. Internal Government and Political Constraints
Institutions of government and existing political arrangements in cities
pose major constraints on the exercise of mayoral power for new black
regimes. Black mayors are handicapped in entering government with not
understanding executive roles and political authority since they have
rarely achieved familiarity with such roles in business, institutions
or public agencies. Development of executive roles is further hampered
by the shared authority system of cities and the problem of 'racially'
defined roles in U.S. society. On the one hand, authority is shared
outside the city with state institutions which severely limit local
authority to act. Internally, mayors share authority with city legisla-
tive bodies and permanent civil servants. Frequently, sentiments of
control between state actors and city actors are shared. Sometimes
common bonds of 'racial hostility' further reinforce conceptions of need
to control mayors and inhibit the exercise of legitimate mayoral power.
In some cases these sentiments go very deep into the past parochial
concepts of what city governments ought to do. For example, states can
exercise severe and crushing authority over taxation and borrowing or
issues such as public employment in ways which ignore local effort, or
the magnitude and urgency of a local crisis. The strong tradition of
5'pay as you go' government, of budgetary stringency without reference to
real costs of government operation, and an unrealistic philosophy of
'effort' to improve tax positions still characterize many states' legis-
lative patterns. Such attitudes may reflect shifts in sentiment from
cities and rural areas to suburbs, where representation has grown most
rapidly in recent years. State attitudes over control may be matched
on the local level by hostile local councilmen and civil servants for
different reasons. City councils which black mayors have faced generally
have minimal responsibilities in government, are frequently uninformed
about operations of modern government and sometimes racially divided.
Representing narrow ward or other political base interests, such
legislative bodies frequently take little interest in overall operations
of city government and may have little idea of how resources are actually
distributed among competing service areas. Limited by their own insti-
tutional roles frequently to a 'veto', many councils appear ceremonial
at best, at worst obstructionist.
The power of local legislative bodies though limited in terms of policy
actions, i-s nonetheless large in the ability to veto. This places
particularly difficult burdens on black mayors, The council veto is
exercised frequently in cities such as Newark, Gary and Atlanta over
key policy issues of appointments, structural reorganization, expendi-
ture and taxation. Where councils and boards of aldermen share common
interests and values with mayors, executive authority can be consider-
ably enhanced. Where there are divisions in loyalties, values, race,
there may be major obstacles to the exercise of office,
. A-
6City bureaucracies and their permanent civil servant workforces also
pose obstacles to the exercise of mayoral power and may be particularly
limiting on black mayors. In general terms, city functions have tended
to develop less in response to environmental pressures or voter prefer-
ences than in response to the needs of economic interests in cities.
Locked in long ago to this basic interest origin, marginal shifts which
do take place are seldom adequate to reshape the institution. In many
cases, the initial purpose of the activity may be obsolete even to
represent business or economic interests in contemporary terms. Lacking
a mechanism to fundamentally restructure government functions, most
cities tend to get more institutionalized over time. About the best
temporal political regimes can do is to add on new functions while
ignoring the old. Where there are large staffs involved, the tendency
towards stability may be even stronger.
In older cities bureaucracies may be characterized as 'classics' in
the tradition of 'stabilized' organizations. Established norms, well
defined hierarchies and divisions of labor and strong social control
may seriously internalize operations. Strong and highly visible
mechanisms may exist for self-preservation and autonomy from control or
interference of outsiders. The unit may reflect this internalization
in reduction of output to a highly routinized set of tasks and a general
hostility to external service publics. Much of the problem stems from
the role of the semi-permanent staff. Civil servants may be highly
integrated into the organizational norm structure. If the organization
has ethnic or racial divisions, these may be reflected in task and
work divisions, separation of interests and the like. The civil service
7system may operate to reinforce all these tendencies through the "job
title", which reflects an externally defined status, role and frequently
salary position rather than the functions of the organization.
The reality of older cities' staffs are that they are primarily white.
This seriously affects organizational responsiveness to new demands,
whether from a black mayor or from his disadvantaged constituency.
With the turnover in service clientele and chief administrator, and the
serious loss of status that black government assumes in white society,
a city staff may exhibit open hostility as has been the case frequently
in Newark. The threat of loss of jobs, of preferences given to lower
status blacks are also very important generators of staff hostility.
In addition to city government operating institutions, the tax and
finance systems of older cities pose enormous impacts on black mayors.
A combination of legal constraints on types of taxes allowed and erosion
of taxable wealth have contributed to the fiscal crises which most black
mayors face. Where the present institutional framework of government
has failed most is, coincidently, where black mayors are likely to come
to power. Examples are visible in cities such as Gary, Newark, East
St. Louis or Baltimore which are characterized by grave problems. In
these cities, tax base erosion is linked to racial change. While busi-
ness interests have traditionally resisted changes in city tax systems
which would force more government support burden on economic enterprise
and high income groups, traditionally, middle income residents were
less able to escape. With suburbanization, however, many households
have left to settle in jurisdictions with lower taxes. For the households
8which remain -- many of them nonwhite and poorer white homeowners --
the higher costs of city government remain a burden because of the
unreformed tax system.
One of the key constraints to tax reform lies on the state level. States
do have the ultimate authority to equalize tax burdens between economic
activities and households and between income groups. States, however,
have been systematically unresponsive to defects in the tax systems
which inhibit adequate support of local government. States have tended
to limit changes in taxation and revenue sharing to those forms and
objects where at least equal, if not superior, benefits can be allocated
to better-off suburbs along with poorer cities. Few states have
enacted distributional tax systems which take into account income distri-
bution of taxpayers, or alternatively, absorb special services associated
with poverty, such as public assistance.1  The black mayor is not only
in a poor position to increase his tax base, he cannot even depend on
temporary relief for extra service costs.
B. Expectations and Demands
A second group of limitations on the exercise of-office by black mayors
falls in the category of expectations and demands from constituents and
forces outside organized government. Two types pose contrasting problems.
The voting electorate is generally heavily weighted towards the disad-
vantaged who have voted in the first place to express demands for change.
Frequently, the change takes the form of demands for redistribution and
reallocation of government benefits to improve the lives of the disadvan-
9taged in concrete ways. Another issue raised in elections may be an
end to the more coercive or discriminatory practices of government
such as police harassment or urban renewal dislocation. 2 A second
strong kind of demand is frequently made for more general reform of
institutions, including fiscal reform, increased efficiency or produc-
tivity in government or structural reorganization of functions. The
reform demands may come in part from the voting electorate, particularly
on the issue of taxation and services. Other important forces, however,
shape these demands substantially. These include local press, regional
and Federal government officials, public interest and civic and business
elites. Black mayors are frequently faced with responding to demands
essentially in conflict with each other.
The voting electorate pressure form changes substantially when it com-
prises a nonwhite majority. While black voters have traditionally voted
for 'race' and charismatic political personalities, a combination of
shifts in ideology and the growth of conception of executive control has
dramatically shifted expectations. Blacks now expect something for their
vote in addition to symbolic gains. Perceiving of the resources of
city hall, black voters expect a redistribution of the benefits both
in the service and non service sides. They may expect qualitative and
quantitative service improvements and an end to discriminatory distribu-
tion of services. They may assume that past discrimination ought to
be made up through establishment of service priorities in black neighbor-
hoods. Entirely new services -- to fill gaps perceived as important --
may be well articulated by voters, trained and educated in the program-
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matically oriented 'poverty' arena. More importantly, however, nonwhites
expect to share in the traditional spoils of city hall, contracting
and employment. Perceiving discrimination in the past, and that deliber-
ate exclusion was made possible through organized labor and well estab-
lished political linkages of whites, blacks expect that strong priori-
ties, quotas, etc., will be instituted quickly to increase their share.
Response to this kind of demand poses major problems for black govern-
ments. Changes in urban services and in the distribution of employment
and contracting require direct confrontations with the institutional-
legal system and well established political relationships cultivated
over many years. The one option available -in the past, a by-passing of
existing government structure, is prohibited by the absence of new
resources in a stagnant economy and rigid tax system. Most black
mayors have relied heavily on intergovernmental help and have become
genuine professionals at 'grant getting'. At best, however, additional
resources are limited and temporary. Finally, new resources fail in
meeting one constituent objective, the end to institutionalization of
white values in government.
Response to black constituency demands is also n1ade more difficult by
the time frame of expectations. Some expectations are for short-run,
visible change; some for longer-range changes. Frequently there are
tradeoffs between a short-run response to a problem and longer-run, more
stable solutions, involving more fundamental legal or structural change.
Many long-run changes also are highly invisible. While administrative
reorganization, new legislation, etc., may take more time and be less
11
visible, final impacts may be greater in contributing to community
improvement. Reconciling and communicating these distinctions is a
major task of black mayors running for re-election.
A second type of demand for more general reform in local government,
while not limited to black mayors, tends to exaggerate their problem
by forcing somewhat higher standards of leadership than that normally
expected of white mayors. With an absence of identifiable linkages
to strong traditional political forces such as labor, business, or
political parties, black mayors may find themselves scrutinized by all
of them as well as civic groups, the press, etc. As 'political
unknowns', they may be limited to a strong 'identification with government
reform as the only means of appeal to broader support. In cities where
black mayors have campaigned, furthermore, the issue of corruption has
tended to loom large, focusing attention even more on reforms.
Black mayors often find themselves committed heavily during campaigns
to key reform changes in government, in part to solicit wider support,
in part to "cover themselves' with a protective shield as political
unknowns with little identity outside black or civil rights arenas.
Reforms include structural reorganization of government, general admini-
strative reforms, and reforms in fiscal policy, or a very broad range.
Traditional concepts of efficiency and productivity in public services,
whi'le useful in appeals to such interests as the regional press, busi-
ness groups and middle income white householders, may be in direct
conflict with other goals, or the capacity of mayors to carry out
change, particularly those which require increasing expenditures. Fre-
12
quently the choice falls between reform and redistributive goals. On
the one hand, there are urgent demands from nonwhite communities for
service improvements. On the other side is a demand to halt spending
and reduce tax burdens on poorer households. In attempting to balance
the two, frequently the black mayor is criticized by both sides.
The decision by many black mayors to accept reform goals generally is
predicated on other considerations than those of immediate electoral
support. Most black mayors try to keep reform goals prominent even at
the expense of other redistributive goals. In the United States system
it is particularly important to establish an image of 'clean government'
to court the sympathy of decisionmakers in state and federal government.
This helps in guaranteeing that assistance from higher authorities can
be neutrally made without the problem of support of suspected local
abuse of power. Black mayors are limited in the magnitude of actual
redistributive actions they can make and must depend on higher authori-
ties with superior resources for redistributive policies, With other
interests, particularly the press and the broader regional society, the
image of clean government may be important in overcoming the handicaps
of being "black', and inexperienced in the rough. and tumble of political
decisionmaking. Since many forces may be hostile to black mayors because
they, are black, clean government tends to undercut other types of criti-
cism which may reflect racial hostility and conflict as with public
labor conflicts.
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C. Political Events and Crises
A final pressure faced by black mayors is the less predictable one of
political events and crises. In addition to the 'genuine' crisis of
public labor unrest or deterioration of tax base faced by all mayors,
many events become translated into 'crises' because of racial conflict
in black administrations. In part this tendency stems from the use of
many events by black constituents and leadership as a means for airing
long held racial grievances. In part it is also the product of percep-
tions of black government by external forces, particularly the press,
regional political interests, etc. These external forces may interpret
events as racial crises in they occur in black government and strong
lines are drawn between a black mayor and the 'other side' as in the
case of public labor disputes.
Political event crises faced by black mayors in office have been of a
very wide variety and seem to explode almost upon entry into office.
Initial challenges to mayoral power of appointment and dismissal are
commonplace as the case of Hatcher, Gibson and Jackson in confronting
leadership for the police establishment have attested. Another
characteristic of the political crisis with seri.ous racial overtones
is that where mayors are 'held responsible' despite the fact that
they have no direct control such as with low income housing sites.
In contrasting the two major low income housing controversies of
Forest Hills under Lindsay in New York and Kawaida Towers in Newark
under Gibson, it is clear that the crisis of Newark reached far more
devastating politico-racial dimensions in government. The most
14
frequent and serious crisis-confrontation with black mayoral power,
however, has been with organized public employees. While public
employee organizing and strikes are not limited to black government,
such strikes.obtain severe racial and ideological dimensions locking
black mayors between mainly white civil servants in his employ with
minority constituent-consumers of government services. Given the
perceived mayoral loyalties, mayoral prestige is almost impossible to
use effectively in strikes.
D. Newark: The Case and Mayor Kenneth Gibson
This study examines the general question of the impact of a black mayor
on city government in addressing goals of improvement of the disadvan-
taged. It looks at more specific questions of a black mayor's influence
on government resource allocation in an older declining city, where
constraints on mayoral action are severely limited. The study itself
is constrained in examining these issues fully by the limited time- frame:
while that of Kenneth Gibson in Newark does have the longest. experience of a
black mayor in power in a major U.S. city, it is still limited to only
four years. Many impacts of current change attempts cannot be fully
evaluated for some years to come. At the same time, however, Newark
has advantages in testing some key issues which are more fully visible
in short run terms, including forces which contributed to a black
electoral victory in the first place and the constraints on exercise
of mayoral power. These factors tend to be complex and interrelated;
the shorter time frame holds some advantage over longer range studies
or comparative analysis in addressing these issues.
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Before examining some questions central to the broader question of
black mayoral influence on city expenditures and other issues of alloca-
tion, it is useful first to look at some of the constraints and oppor-
tunities posed by the case city Newark. As with many mostly black
cities in the U.S., Newark, N.J. represents extremes of political,
social-demographic and economic dimensions. While these extremes limit
generalization of the case more broadly to all U.S. cities, they can
be very typical of cities likely to elect black governments. It may be
more likely that blacks will come to power where extremes demonstrated
by the Newark case exist and have developed over a long period of time,
reflecting some real outcomes of the failures of urban government. It
is also possible that some of the contributing factors to government
institutional failure exist, but are simply less visible in other cities
where an absence of the extremes of poverty have served to disguise
them.
1) Newark as a Case of Extremes
During the past decade, Newark has grown to symbolize the older city
problem environment in the United States. In the popular press, Newark
becomes the 'worst': the most corrupt, the poor.est, the oldest, the
most deteriorated, the ugliest, the most severely in decline, the most
lacking in civic and cultural interest, the worst crime rate, the
highest welfare rate, the highest infant mortality and disease rate,
the highest delinquency rate, the highest rate of illiteracy and so
forth.3 Much of the empirical evidence supports the popular and
journalistic conceptions although causes may be obscured. While press
16
reports tend to blame Italian power and corruption and nonwhite concen-
trations for Newark's ills, some of the deeper problems in the U.S.
system of government and power orderings are ignored.
Extreme social and economic changes took place in the post war period
in Newark, resulting in one of the major social problem concentrations
of U.S. cities. Between 1950 and 1970, the city demographic structure
shifted from around 70% white to around 70% nonwhite and from a predom-
inately lower middle and working class population to a distinctly lower
class, low skilled and less socially integrated population. While a
strong component of household heads resident in the city in 1970 were
skilled workers and craftsmen with relatively high incomes by regional
standards, the more typical household head was an unskilled factory
operative or service worker earning half the income of the regional
blue collar household head.4 Moreover, a higher proportion of the
city's workers were employed in sectors of the economy characterized by
seasonal or business cycle fluctuations in employment, or in temporary
and part time work situations. The number of dependents, moreover,
increased with a shift in the age structure; higher numbers of unskilled
youth were pushed into a shrinking job pool. 5
Demographic and workforce changes undoubtedly contributed to a swelling
of the ranks of the unemployed to well over 20% of the city's workforce
and a family public assistance rate of over 30% during the early 1970's. 6
Another effect of demographic and workforce change was in the increased
transiency and social disorganization of Newark's families. Housing
moves increased dramatically over the census period between 1960 and 1970
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as did divorce and separation rates along with other disorganization
indicators such as health deficiency rates and juvenile crime.7  The
effects of racial discrimination undoubtedly contributed to the
problems of adjustment of Newark families. In employment, in housing
and probably in areas of important public services such as health, educa-
tion and police services, discrimination limited social and economic
adjustments. In employment, for example, older white workers and minority
newcomers competed frequently for the same jobs. The advantaged white
workers assisted in lowering competition by encouraging discriminatory
hiring practices by employees and instituting rigid entry rules in trade
unions. Newark's nonwhites were forced out of the city's job market
to search for employment in the broader region, making Newark by the
1970's one of the most extreme reverse commutation workforces in the
nation. 8
Newark's economic activities underwent very dramatic shifts in the post-
war period and were particularly strong in influencing the employment
contraction and ensuing competition mentioned above. The city's
economy literally changed overnight from a highly diversified industrial
manufacturing base to a largely white collar service base. While many
observers suggest that racial change fostered the decline in industry,
another explanation is more likely. 9 As the post-war period approached,
Newark's economy was inflated by wartime activities which generated
support for an extremely large number of smaller manufacturing and
service firms. This was in direct contrast to the pre-war period,
when the depression had removed the bulk of consumer oriented manufactur-
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ing from the employment sector and depressed growth of service activities
such as transportation and utilities. With an end to the wartime boom,
a shift took place in managerial corporate organization as well as
consolidation of consumer goods production in the region. The combination
probably accounts more than any other for the high rates of attrition
and migration of Newark industry out of the city. The total impact
was to reduce available employment in blue collar categories and increase
competition among workers for the remains.
Another key economic shift which accompanied the attrition of manufactur-
ing was the growth in service employment. This phenomenon had equally
dramatic effects on the city's economic base and employment. The
decline in manufacturing employment was largely offset during the first
two decades of the post-war period by growth of white collar service
industries such as insurance, finance and banking. As early as the
1920's, Newark's superior location in the East coast region- coupled with
its proximity to New York City had made it an attractive location for
corporate activities. Even during the depression when most activities
in the city declined, these service industries actually expanded and
assisted in financing a building boom in Newark'.s central business
area. 10 In post war times the advantages of location remained and once
again corporate office expension and employment growth took place in the
service sector. While some employment declined during the late 1960's,
regional white collar activities are still overwhelmingly concentrated
in Newark.11  This extreme concentration has contributed to yet another
extreme of 'external commutation' of workforce. The city's workforce
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literally changes during the daytime when approximately 100,000 -
150,000 mainly white suburbanites enter the city for white collar
service employment and half as many blue collar and service workers.
resident in the city leave for employment outside the city.
The effects of economic change on the workforce have already been
mentioned. As important, however, were effects on the city's tax base.
With a shift outward of higher income residents, taxable investments
in housing declined and taxable retail sales by consumers tumbled. With
migration or attrition of the city's manufacturing sector, a further
erosion in the tax base took place. At the same time, however, there
was little decline in the public costs for support of services related
to business activities.
2) Public Response to Economic and Social Changes
City government responses to the city's deepening crises were to ignore
the serious effects of discrimination and poverty and to ut-ilize the
federal urban programs liberally to focus on physical redevelopment to
encourage "return of economic interests' to the city. Two successive
city administrations, in addition, became increasingly absorbed in
maintaining power through use of the police system.
There was little response in Newark to the rising problems of poverty
and discrimination fostered by the increase in nonwhites in the city.
Discrimination in employment, even in public projects, was ignored in
Federal and state governments. While strong anti-discrimination legis-
lation was passed in New Jersey governing both private and public
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employment, there was negligible enforcement. The strong Federal
enforcement powers were also neglected, particularly in local public
employment. In city government itself, although a Human Rights Commis-
sion was initiated in the mid-1960's, it had no enforcement power over
integration of city employment and the rate of integration on city
generated jobs remained low.
In addition to a general failure to attack the problem of racial dis-
crimination in employment, there was little done to respond to the
obvious skills needs of workers in a changing economy. The city'spublic
education system had deteriorated rapidly from one reputed as one of
the best in the country in post-war years to one of the country's worst
by the late 1960's. There was little or no attention to changing the
high school curriculum to reflect rising demand for clerical workers,
or develop specializations required for growing white collar employment
in the region. While the city received substantial amounts of Federal
job training grants for older workers, resources were allocated to the
Italian dominated trade unions, with the worst records in the
city for setting obstacles for entry into trades by nonwhite workers.
Many of the training programs, in fact, appeared to be utilized for
facilitating entry into jobs of white workers. 12
One Federal program in Newark which produced extremely negative effects
on the city's social problems and.possibly did little to assist the
economic situation was urban renewal. Newark's renewal program,
initiated during the early 1960's was the second largest after New Haven
in per capita expenditure in the country. In contrast to New Haven,
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however, radical clearance dominated the program. In the Newark setting,,
with its very densely built up land area, an inevitable result was
removal of a substantial proportion of built-up uses, both residential
and commercial. In declining industrial areas, the program removed
thousands of low skilled jobs in labor intensive industries such as
opticals, electronics, light metals and the garment industry. The
impact of removal of a great number of these operations within a short
time frame undoubtedly contributed to growth of unemployment and
possibly erosion of the city's tax base. Despite strong efforts on the
part of the renewal program managers, however, very few of the jobs were
replaced. While some larger service industries in the central business
area took advantage of urban renewal land subsidies to expand office
operations, few new businesses came to Newark and land remained vacant
almost two decades following clearance.
The two city administrations of the post-war period up until 1970 were
unable if not unwilling to resolve the serious problems in the city's
economic and social life. Ignored by the city's powerful business
corporate elite, and pressured by an increasingly poor constituency,
the political system had few resources to in.stitute change. The solu-
tion of distributing the city spoils among competing white ethnic
groups failed when nonwhites increased and the size of the city pie
declined. Pressured increasingly by nonwhites, the traditional regime
resisted, increasingly falling back on the coercive arm of the state,
the police, to reduce nonwhite demands. The outbreak of black unrest
in the mid 1960's was an almost inevitable response to the failures of
the economic and political system.
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Two types of factors aided blacks in gaining control over City Hall in
Newark. The first was Federal poverty grants over which blacks gained
control during the mid-1960's. The poverty grants along with other
resources from the broader U.S. civil rights movement were used to train
and organize political leadership for the mayoral fight. A second
factor was an opening created by the sensational political corruption
trials initiated against Newark government officials during the late
1960's in a post-riot climate. With the discrediting of white ethnic
power leadership, few obstacles remained in the way of a black electoral
victory.
3) Black Mayoral Victories and Constituent Expectations
The election of Kenneth Gibson in 1970 in Newark was unquestionably a
demand for reform in government by the voting public, and particularly
those most disadvantaged in the Newark system. Constituent expectations
in electoral situations as dramatic as that of 1970 undoubtedly run
high. The shape of these expectations can and do pressure and limit what
an administration can do once in office.
Two types of expectations could be underscored in the Newark case. One
was for relief from the particularly negative pressures exerted against
blacks which they perceived as racist; key pressures were arbitrary
police harassment and renewal clearance. In post-riot inquiries, both
were cited by investigatory commissions as strong factors underlying
hostility most blacks had against organized government in the city.13
A second expectation was for a larger share of the city's benefit
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system. With low rates of employment in government activities and low
rates of representation in electoral office, blacks perceived government
output to be produced and distributed in a particularly discriminatory
way.
Against these two sets of expectations were posed the limitations of
mayoral office itself, the institutional power of city government and
an existing administrative staff composed of mainly permanent civil
servants hired during the prior administrations.
4) A Black Mayor's Influence over Change in City Resource Allocation
This study examines the case of a black mayor's influence over resource
allocation. It poses the general question of whether black leadership
in government is a meaningful pursuit for nonwhite communities or
whether any difference can be made to disadvantaged constituents by the
action, given the constraints of the institutional apparatus of govern-
ment, the limits of electoral office and the values and political
arrangements stabilized in an existing government organization. More
specifically, the study hypothesizes that meaningful changes are
possible through the exercise of mayoral power en key instruments of
government. Further, changes which are possible are hypothesized to
contribute positively to the disadvantaged. The study also suggests,
however, that the kind of changes which are made through mayoral action
to reach these objectives will result in gains, only a small part of
which will accrue to the disadvantaged directly, in the short run.
Rather, in confronting the organization of government with the objective
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of redistribution, black government can assist in challenging to a
greater or lesser degree the question of what are the objectives of
government, how do these objectives fit the structure of local govern-
ment systems and the relationship between local government production
and benefits. It thus may be a somewhat larger gain to the society in
understanding the real obsolescence of the American city apparatus.
Before examining the general hypothesis and methodology of the study
of Newark it is useful to look more closely at the instrument of local
government for allocating resources.
a) City Government Structure and Resource Allocation
The public portion of resources in U.S. cities, in tax and expenditure
terms are allocated over very long periods of time and in ways which
reflect few of the changes in U.S. social standards. Of necessity,
as in all productive activities, commitments must be made to develop
functions which assume 'start up' and development periods. Continuity
also must be assured. This is made possible principally through per-
sonnel commitments and purchases of fixed assets. This does not
preclude change to structure of government productive apparatus over
the long run, but it makes longer stabilization more likely in the U.S.,
for example, commitments have tended to inhibit planning, re-evaluation
or change to functions and this, in turn, has reinforced personnel and
assets commitments. In a very fundamental sense, the U.S. Federal
structure, coupled with a very strong value orientation in the general
population towards 'individual self sufficiency', has resulted in a
very conservative attitude towards development of public organization.
A -
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Owing to the particularly rigid fragmentation of power between the
states and the national government, a concept of public civilian
function and organization is undeveloped and the local governments we
have today are prohibited from evolving to meet changing standards of
contemporary urbanized society.
Growth in direct expenditures for particular civilian functions in
American cities as a result has taken place outside a 'planning'
context and without the benefit of direct service consumer inputs.
Very little shaping of functions or the organizational structure which
produces output has taken place 'all at once' as in a planned economy,
nor have pressures of dramatic economic or social upheavals or crises
(economic depression, revolution or war for example), resulted in such
need to re-plan. The local government service consumer acts primarily
through elections to express preferences for those he hopes will
generally represent his views in the matter of services, but rarely can
he register a specific functional preference or payment for local public
production. In the absence of mechanisms -for this purpose, local
government has been shaped by a combination of special interests,
employee and business interests who benefit from spillouts of govern-
ment production, and stable and archaic laws passed over many years and
rarely recalled.
Since the 1920's, when public education became widely disseminated, very
few new functions have been introduced in cities. The early absence
of attention to the social dimensions of government, when most local
governments were organized, has served to magnify problems. There is a
_____ -I
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distinct skewing of local government functions towards support of local
economic and business interests. This is visible in older cities in
the substantial attention and budgetary weight given to police, fire
and property and business oriented functions and away from functions
appropriate for householders such as child and family oriented services,
cultural and recreational facilities, consumer protection, intermediate
transportation facilities, etc. With the decline in business interests
in cities and the growth of general expectations of more social activi-
ties, older city functions have become anachronistic. There are fre-
quently visible and dramatic contrasts between service distributions of
14
suburbs and core cities. Meanwhile, the older conception of skewing
services to business to assure growth of tax base and employment appears
inappropriate given contemporary standards for urban life and the decline
in importance of business for support of government and employment base.
In principle, city spending and production apparatus distributes
resources. The city budget annually plans expenditures and forecasts
revenue required to support government activities. Since most services
are produced under long term personnel and contractual arrangements, as
to some degree in the private sector, there is little potential for
shifting production from year to year. Thus, although the city budget
may reflect resource allocation over time, on an annual basis, the
budget becomes a very different kind of instrument.
In the short run, city budgets indicate some potential resource alloca-
tion change, temporal policies governing new and uncommitted resources
which enter the city system and shifts in responsibilities to higher
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levels of government, or back to the consumer. One effect, that of
temporal policy over new resources, is the locus of central administra-
tive control and influence over annual budget change. The control over
resources in the short run by mayors or managers is possible primarily
by control over 'budgetary slack' (unused resources in existing alloca-
tion), new resources from taxes and flexible grants and intergovernmental
transfers.
Other instruments beside the city expense budget contribute to shaping
resource allocation in cities, however, in both short and long run
terms. Important among these are personnel policy, instruments for
structural reorganization of government and finally intergovernmental
resources subject to local choice. Allocation effects of use of these
instruments are frequently visible in short range terms, as with efforts
to increase revenue by a temporal decisionmaker or a change in personnel
recruitment poli.cy. Increases in revenue, even the presence of grants
in aid do not happen automatically in U.S. government; policy decisions
and resources must be devoted to an effort to capture grants and
decisions must be made about subsequent use. Similarly, personnel
policy is not the automatic outcome of civil service or bureaucratic
machine although it may appear so at times. Central administrative
actors have authority over appointments of key administrative officers
in most large cities and discretion to shape recruitment, hiring and
promotional patterns. There is considerable discretion in shaping what
new types of workers are added to city payrolls and adjustments can be
made to suit the labor force or policy priorities in government. Finally,
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structural reorganization, changes in the functional distribution and
organization of activities can have important impacts on expenditure
growth and the types of personnel utilized in government; instruments
which alter the array are also powerful determinants of allocation in
cities.
E. Impact of a Black Mayor on Resource Allocation: Hypothesis and
Approach
This study examines the impact of the administration of Kenneth Gibson
in Newark, New Jersey on shifting the distribution of resources in
city government. It looks at the general constraints on mayoral power
in government and the limits of the instruments for resource shifts
and, in particular, the city expense budget. A general hypothesis first
tested is that a black mayor will seek to address problems of the dis-
advantaged through a variety of strategies to shift city resources
into areas which primarily service the disadvantaged. A series of sub-
questions are also examined relating to the problems of mayoral author-
ity and instruments of resource allocation. These can be divided into
questions related to the exercise of mayoral power and control over
government and political and institutional cons.traints on one hand and,
on the other, the budget as an instrument of resource allocation.
More specifically, the study asks the question of whether or not
mayoral influence can affect change using conventional means to shift
city resources and to what degree. This suggests that there are many
levels of effectiveness, and an element of 'choice' in decisions. A
second question posed which is important to the Newark case and that of
29
other large cities is whether or not race poses disadvantages or
opportunities to the exercise of mayoral power.
The specific hypothesis tested is that exercise of mayoral power can
influence expense budgets and reorganization of government to shift
resources in preferred directions. Key assumptions are necessary,
however. These include the existence of at least a margin of uncommit-
ted resources of 'slack' in expenditure and legitimate or sanctioned
new spending areas constituting gaps in the existing array.
Current theories about the mayor's control over city resources and
related policies in government tend to avoid discussion of mayoral
choice preferences or effort. Both budget outcomes and the budgetary
process are treated frequently as either an environmental pressure
phenomena, or the outcome of special interest pressures or as a struggle
between the spenders (or other internal beneficiaries of government) and
the administrators15 Where executive or administrative choice is
treated, it is represented frequently as personal preferences of mayor
or manager unrelated to policy goals. The absence of many discussions
leaves unrelated the problem of how representational government works
in distributing values. Few conclusions can be~made relating policy
input and choices to policy outputs.
This study of the Newark case hypothesizes that choice of decision-
makers in government represent important values which can be directly
related to policy. In the case of a black government brought to power
by nonwhite votes, the case suggests that values of. equity and equality
are fairly strong. A black mayor would be expected to emphasize
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changes which redistribute services and other benefits to nonwhite
constituents. These changes would be reflected in spending, taxation,
personnel and other key issues where executive control and prestige is
strong.
The second area examined by the study is budgets as instruments to
allocate resources. This involves a somewhat different set of questions
than those represented by shifts in values on the policy making level.
In particular, the question of the degree to which expense budgets do
allocate resources is an important one.
Budgets are widely recognized to change somewhat in the short run
although changes in the bulk of expenditures take place over a longer
period of time. Major questions can be raised about whether these
short run shifts reflect policy changes and efforts of a particular
administration or the 'drift' of other forces. Another important
question is to what degree other policy changes have budget. impacts or
impacts in shifting allocation of city resources to favored policy
areas.
The study hypothesizes that some policy changes are visible in short
run budget changes, including year to year changes. Such changes can
involve both deliberate efforts asserted through budgetary decision-
making by the executive, or efforts to influence other issues such as
revenue policy, organizational structuring of government and personnel.
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1) Limits of the Study
The study is based on a single city case and looks at resource alloca-
tion policy within a relatively short time frame. As a single city
case, Newark poses advantages and disadvantages. The Gibson administra-
tion, in office only four years at the time of the study, also poses
limitations for understanding more general situations involving exercise
of mayoral power as well as the specific problems of black mayors in
U.S. cities.
The disadvantages, beyond the question of a single case, are that.
Newark does represent an 'extreme' from many perspectives. There are
few other cities with analogous extremes of geographical limitation
in size, age, poverty and magnitude of economic and social shifts in
recent years. In addition, Newark also suffers as the case study and
other recent investigations show, from an extreme of institutional under-
development both in private and public spheres. These extremes may pose
some slight advantages for a severe 'test' of effort, but, on the whole,
they limit severely the impact of change.
A second disadvantage is the time frame for the study of a black mayor's
impact. For a study of almost any value change impact, four years is
short. In the case of altering very deep values on both black and
white sides which have built up over centuries, it is clear that the
task is almost impossible. On the other hand, accepting this constraint,
effort and choice are important. Even a short time frame can indicate
to what degree values are institutionalized in government and how they
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operate to constrain and inhibit effective decisionmaking on current
issues. They may also give some notion of how much actual distance
there is between the constituents of government and their preferences
and the institutions themselves in responding to those preferences.
There are some advantages to the case approach for assessing the influ-
ence of a black mayor in altering government behavior. Advantages of
the case approach lie in the ability to examine a decision more closely,
and particularly to evaluate its context for clues as to forces which
influence it most. The roles of local political culture, institutional
organization, regional influences in and out of government become
somewhat easier to isolate in a case study. The internal influence
structure of decisions also frequently stand in sharp relief; the
particular formal and informal roles, personal values and actions which
interact in decisions are made particularly visible in case studies.
Another advantage is the ability to examine policymaking itself.
For the policymaker, the case study is frequently more interesting than
larger, more global analysis, in part because it can test the constraints
of the institutional framework as well as the short time frame. It can
also trace decisions through stages. The case 'serves to open the
'black box' of decisionmaking a bit wider and thus contributes an under-
standing of what policymaking is.
2) Methodology
In examining the general hypothesis that a black mayor will tend to use
mayoral influence to improve the position of disadvantaged constituents,
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the study looks for evidence in key policies of budget and spending and
government reorganization. In the case of the budget, both general
policy and policy efforts at change in key issue areas of Health and
Welfare, Public Works and Police are evaluated. In the case of
structural organization, the efforts at elimination and creation of new
functional units are evaluated since these actions suggest recognition
of 'gaps' in the array of functions, or alternatively functions of
lower priority for local attention.
A second evaluation of policy includes examination of influence during
the budget decision process itself both from the point of view of
constraints and opportunities for exercise of mayoral influence.
Observations and information generated during the budget cycle form a
basis for assessing the use of the instrument by participants to gain
control over resources and the direction of any change. Since city
budgeting is extremely internalized, direct observations also assist
in displaying the interaction of key participants in terms of support
of mayoral policy.
A third policy area tested is that of structural reorganization of city
government to favor the disadvantaged. It is argued that one way to
reduce spending gaps or create new spending in an old structure is
through asserting control over key functional elements of government.
Both the effort to create or drop spending areas entirely, and budgetary
and spending impacts are evaluated in these terms from information and
observations of the cycle during 1973.
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As suggested earlier, budgetary decisions are discrete and highly
internalized in cities. It was possible to examine one budget cycle
in Newark, the 1974 budget in the making during four months during
the latter part of 1973. Observations from the several dozen meetings,
supplemented with information and studies generated during the prepara-
tion of budget data and interviews with participants involved on the
administrative, policy and operations end of city activities form the
basis for the study. Budgetary decisionmaking is complex. There are
many influences during the cycle and the process itself often resembles
an open struggle for stakes in the city prize. Different personalities
and values of participants appear to distinguish the amount of influence
rather sharply. Further, interpersonal influence and conflicts are
not necessarily correlated with traditional conceptions of formal
authority, seniority, etc. There are nonetheless basic patterns which
emerge suggestive of a particularly strong prior sub-culture and
decision structure created exclusively for budgeting. It is these
patterns which appear most important in shaping particular outcomes
of the process.
There are many budgets in cities, which can be-distinguished by purpose
and stage. The budget cycle normally generates three, a departmental
request budget, an executive budget and a final or council budget.
.Some observers argue that the final budget represents no more than a
guide for expenditures and cite as proof considerable variation between
council budgets and final expenditures. Budgeting does continue
throughout the year to the extent that new resources (principally
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anticipated taxes or grants) may come in and be available for spending,
or that emergencies may occur. Nonetheless, however, principal
budget decisions relating to local resources are made during the
cycle. It is rare, for example, in Newark that major revisions are
made in spending during the cycle and more likely that new resources
have either been previously budgeted in the cycle, though not included
in spending (as with grants in aid) or wait till the next cycle.
The approach to budget outcomes in the study has been to assume only
marginal changes between cycles and to principally assess (where
information is available) major changes within. This in fact has
generally been the case and emergencies and other in cycle changes
are ordinarily carried forward to the next budgetary period. In-cycle
changes are utilized to test mayoral influence over the general spend-
ing patterns of key departments, which should indicate which are
favored and which are not by the central executive. This carries more
general trends in outcomes to a lower level of detail and also may
indicate some of the constraints posed to mayoral influence.
3) Organization of the Study
This study is organized into three general parts with the first present-
ing basic themes which underscored election of a black mayor in
Newark. One theme drawn from evidence of the Newark case is that
broader economic and social system breakdowns can institutionalize
conflict in government and result in a further disintegration of
functioning of 'normal' operations.
S.-
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The first part of the study reviews erosion of the government system in
Newark and opportunities presented by it for black succession in government
in the city. A second part reviews a black mayor's role in government
in terms of.constraints, opportunities and specific efforts at change.
The scope of legal authority, the continued existence of a permanent
bureaucracy, the division of power between the legislative and executive
sides of government and finally the political culture of a long tradition
of unreformed government in Newark are examined against the pressures
of constituent demands for change. Among instruments and opportunities
available to a black mayor, the study looks closely at new resources,
structural reorganization of government, authority over personnel
policy and the city budget. A final part of the study evaluates the
city budgetary process as an instrument for change and focuses on
efforts to shift both the process and outcomes during one budgetary
cycle during 1973. Finally, some implications of the Gibson experience
in Newark are drawn in light of current trends in black electoral victor-
ies in big city mayoralities and more general urban policies in the U.S.
The following outlines the chapter division of the study.
Chapter 2: Political Events and the Impact of Political Regimes in Newark
This chapter introduces the case of Newark through an assessment of
immediate forces shaping political events in Newark during the 1960's.
Two issues are examined. The first is the rise of ethnic regimes in the
post-war period. The second is the evolution of government under these
regimes in ways which suppressed the rising of black demands for power
sharing. The combination of the two forces culminated in the civil
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explosions of the late 1960's, the fall of the ethnic system and a
final black takeover of city government in 1970.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first reviews the birth
of 'ethnic coalitions' in Newark during the late 1950's, based on a
balance of power and reward distribution between heterogenous blue
collar constituent groups in the city. A second part of the chapter
traces the breakdown of this post-war system, as white voting strength
declines and nonwhite demands for power sharing increase. The overall
shrinking of the city's economy and regional indifference provide
additional pressures for the growth of conflict between blacks and
whites over the political spoils of the city. A third part of the
chapter reviews the final failure and fall of the Italian system with
the outbreak of civil disorders and criminal indictments during the
late 1960's.
Chapter 3: Rise of the Black. Movement in Newark
This chapter looks at another side of political events which shaped the
government changeover during the 1960's by assessing the rise of black
power and its conversion to an organized force.in electoral politics in
Newark. Underscoring the growth of the black movement was increasing
repression of nonwhite political drives as the rewards of government
and the economic system contracted. Three phases of nonwhite political
development in Newark are examined in the chapter. The first, during the
early part of the decade of the 1960's, was characterized by development
of two kinds of coalitions, one an experimental alliance with white
. A-
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groups which agitated primarily for service improvements, an er to
public clearance projects and a variety of other 'city hall' issues.
A second was a black appendage of the dominant white ethnic machine
which operated along traditional lines and was based on a limited
sharing of power in city hall in return for the 'black vote'. A second
phase of black political development grew out of the failures of these
two coalitions. A series of increasingly organized ad hoc protests
against public actions took place, challenging the increasingly
'corrupt' Ialitan machine. A third and final phase examined in the
chapter is the formal organizing for electoral takeover in city hall
which took place towards the end of the decade. Utilizing resources
and ideological bases of the Civil Rights movement, new black politics
and the rhetoric of the Great Society poverty programs, an electoral
coalition succeeded in successfully promoting a nonwhite electoral slate
in 1970. A final part of the chapter reviews the impact of the rise of
black political power in Newark on the black administration which grew
out of it.
Chapter 4: A Black Mayor in Office and Constraints on Resource Assoca-
tion
This chapter examines the constraints on a black mayor once in office in.
influencing change. A specific emphasis is placed on the constraints
of an inherited government structure, state political setting and the
local political cultural tradition. All of these forces acted to rein-
force the already limited authority of an executive once in office.
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The chapter reviews some of the limits for change the Gibson administra-
tion encountered initially in Newark, both external and internal. An
initial part of the chapter examines the background parameters set by
state and local government legal and political institutions; these
severely limit change to respond to new demands on the local level. A
second part of the chapter looks at the impact of overall limits in
reinforcing conservative political traditions in Newark. The distribu-
tion of power between the legislative and executive, the autonomy of
various parts of government and the role of civil servants are important
factors in reinforcing a white working class ethos. This ethos favors
maximizing blue collar jobs at the expense. of the human services side
of government. A third part of the chapter examines the pressures in
the city environment for change. Two types of pressures were critical
in Newark. One consisted of pressures from regional forces for reform,
efficiency and contemporary management in government. Another consti-
tuted pressures from nonwhite voting constituents for qualitative
changes in city services and a shift in benefits to favor nonwhites.
Chapter 5: A Black Administration in Power: Forcing Changes in
Resource Allocation in Newark
Having examined the institutional limits on mayoral actions and the
political constraints on change, this chapter evaluates the experience
of the Gibson administration in trying to reshape government in Newark.
Three key instruments of change reviewed in this context are: (1) reve-
nue efforts and more general fiscal policy in the city, (2) structural
reorganization of government units, and (3) appointments and personnel
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policy. The Gilson Administration's efforts, strategies and final
successes and failures in these areas, as well as some of the impacts
on broader goals, are assessed. One major thesis tested is the
question of 'choice' and effort by a city executive and what role this
plays in outcomes. Given a complex set of problems, the choice and
timing of particular efforts and the degree of commitment may explain
the difference between the failures of some kinds of changes and the
successes of others. Another important theme examined in the chapter
is the relative vulnerability of institutions and values during the
initial stages of government changeover.
Chapter 6: Impact of a Black Administration on the Budgetary Process
A final critical instrument for change in a city with stringent resource
limits is the city budget. This chapter looks at the mayoral role in
the budgetary decisionmaking process in Newark and particularly how
executive actions influence changes during the budget cycle. Observa-
tions from the 1973 budget cycle in Newark are used to formulate a
general picture of this influence as well as obstacles to it. Two
main elements are reviewed in detail: (1) traditional budget groups,
which ignore policy influence and promote traditional allocation
patterns, and (2) the policy forces, represented in 1973 by a special
ad hoc task force, tested for the first time during the 1973 budget
cycle.
The chapter examines the budgetary process in Newark in the context of
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current hypotheses about city budget making which suggest that the
combination of long term commitments, resource constraints and conserva-
tive tradition result in creating substantial inertia and a budgetary
subculture which dictates automatic outcomes. In this model, the policy
or leadership influence from the center is minimal and priorities can
rarely be addressed. The chapter explores these assumptions and examines
how attempts to change past patterns were undertaken in the city. The
key strategies, the process of efforts at control and finally the
successes and failures in final outcomes are examined in selected service
areas.
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions: Implications of the Newark Experi-
ence for Urban Policy
Having examined the case history and outcomes of the Gibson administra-
tion's efforts at resource allocation, this chapter summarizes some key
themes of the study and looks at implications of the findings for other
cities as well as for more general urban policy in the U.S. today. As
the case themes suggest, while a city executive is weak to control
most of the instruemnts for change available in government, marginal
changes are nonetheless possible and can be important. Control over
uncommitted resources and over the city governmental apparatus can extend
the scope and depth of public actions in ways that may have important
consequences in the long run for the disadvantaged. Beyond this, there
are other implications about change. This chapter summarizes some
lessons of the Newark experience first in the context of trends in the
election of black administrations in other cities across the United
States, then looks at some implications of the experience for more
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general urban policy making.
The first part of the chapter examines the real limits and potential
of black government for change, drawing on the experience of the
Gibson administration in Newark. The successes and failures are
reviewed against the 'opportunities' to use electoral gains for redis-
tributing resources to black communities. A second part of the chapter
examines the case of Newark for some indications of the appropriate-
ness of current urban policy directions, particularly those on the
Federal level, for assisting in altering stable and unresponsive
patterns in local government activities.
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Chapter 2: Political Events and the Impact of Political Regimes in Newark
Political events inevitably shape regimes by creating pressures and
shaping the order and timing of responses. The flexibility of government
systems in responding to new demands, changes and crises can be used as
one measure of the "success" of institutional development in communities.
Unfortunately, the picture of U.S. cities in the 1960's is not reassur-
ing. Until the open urban clashes of the past decade, U.S. government
institutions were considered by many analysts flexible in making adjust-
ments to social and environmental demands as well as structural changes
in the economy without resort to open conflict. The discovery that
U.S. institutions had a repressive as much as responsive tradition
required a revised view of institutions as positive and conflict
reducing.
Several political background factors shaped government of post war
Newark and contributed to the conflicts of the 1960's. Some were
unique to Newark's tradition and geography. Others were more generally
typical of American community change.
Newark had evolved a stable, unreformed governmlant organization by the
1960's, based on a succession of parochial white ethnic political
machines based on a heterogenous blue collar ethnic constituency.
While the machinery of government which developed from this political
organization was somewhat anachronistic for larger U.S. cities, the
ethnic government system was important in balancing the needs of whites
in a changing economy. Through a balance of power in government,
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competitive ethnic constituencies were assisted in overcoming the
social costs of dramatic economic change. The system was short lived
however. Beginning in the early 1960's, the ethnic system began to
fall apart. Increasing conflict took place between the remaining
white groups, whites who could move did, and the expanding nonwhite
population began to raise demands. Ethnic government acted first to
partly accommodate nonwhites and then was forced into increasingly
repressive actions to curtail the threat of black challenge to govern-
ment power.
A second set of factors more general to post war U.S. cities which under-
scored government development was the dramatic shift in the city's
economy. A large scale decline and suburbanization of industrial
activities resulted in a contraction of employment when demand for
industrial employment was increasing. The impact on the overall economic
base was less visible in Newark, primarily because of expansion of
corporate activities. Employing mainly white collar workers, however,
corporate activities contributed little towards resolving the widening
gap between labor supply and demand in the city. In fact, to the
contrary, the presence of high level corporate activities served to
justify increasing responsiveness on the part of state government in tax
policy largely negative to city interest.2 Another policy which
corporate stability in Newark tended to generate was slum clearance,
which increased social costs to the community. Meanwhile, the largely
commuting non-resident workforce contributed little in consumer or
housing taxes to support of the city.
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An additional factor which underscores both the ethnic workforce
dependency on government and the dramatic change in the economy was
the phenomenon of an elite vacuum in Newark, to guide and shape local
government operations. In contrast to many other cities of post war
America, Newark's corporate elite had withdrawn as a presence in city
government very early in the 1920's. Throughout the war and afterwards
the large scale interests developed a pattern of 'handling' local
matters through state government in Trenton, or possibly ignoring
them altogether without risk. 'Handling the locals' was largely left
in post-war times to paid lobbyists such as the Newark Chamber of
Commerce and other business oriented groups. Corporate centralization
also made local affairs and city location less important. While con-
siderable inertia remained in actually moving out of Newark, there
were clearly few obstacles particularly for insurance, banking and
the large statewide utility, Public Service. What remained to fill the
vacuum was a combination of small factory entrepreneurs, built on. the
artificial war boom economy and an assortment of other ethnic entrepre-
neurs active in illegal and quasi legal activities. The former group,
increasingly marginal in a changing regional and national economy,
tended to participate selectively in government and reflected the
considerable economic insecurity of their position. This group was
particularly strong during the early 1960's in joining the professional
lobbyists in promoting highways, urban renewal and big police budgets to
protect property against the encroaching blacks. The latter group,
the illegals and quasi-legals, participated under ethnic government
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heavily in government contracting and some city service operations,
particularly where protection was involved such as in police operations.3
The absence of corporate leadership in Newark was also reflected in the
shape of government itself. There was little managerial, administrative
or efficiency influence such as that normally promoted by business
backed civic 'reform' groups. There were few pressures for civic types
of activities and the government development lagged. Newark's govern-
ment remained very much the 'operations' oriented system, reinforced
even more by ethnic leadership. Even the efficiency, managerially
oriented Urban Renewal program created by Louis Danzig, the program's
first director, quickly disintegrated under Addonizio into a porkbarrel
contracting operation, devoid of market orientation and lacking in the
local 'civic' touch.
A final effect of the corporate vacuum and indifference was promotion
or acquiescence to the almost entirely suburbanized workforce, despite
the implications of this trend for the city. Newark's service employees
literally left the city in post war times, aided by FHA mortgage
supported suburban building booms. Some working class whites also
left, escaping to 'blue collar' suburban locatibns closer to suburban-
ized industrial parks. Key corporate interests largely ignored the
change, lent little assistance to nonwhite suburbanization and finally
-practiced open discrimination in hiring both working class whites and
nonwhites. This served to reinforce commuter shifts of burdens on the
city and fiscal segregation in suburban areas. Commuters also assisted
in stopping state actions to reorganize the tax system as their repre-
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sentation increased in the state legislature.
Black expansion and the subsequent political resistance to repression
were key forces in change in Newark's political system. Rapid black
expansion began during World War II, as blacks were attracted to
expanded wartime employment in Newark. With a severe labor shortage
blacks were hired in public and private industry alike. By the 1950's
Newark's nonwhite population equaled the largest of the white ethnic
groups and surpassed in numbers many smaller groups. In post war times,
however, the severe economic downswing pushed unemployment up, Increas-
ingly discriminated against in a shrinking job market in Newark and
segregated in housing outside Newark where jobs were expanding, blacks
were increasingly pushed to look to the public employment system. Here-
however, things were bad, if not worse. While Italians were increasing
substantially in lower scale public works employment, blacks were
excluded almost entirely, even from menial custodial work. Ethnic
patronage was the rule and blacks had almost no representation in
local politics. A poor and very inferior appendage to the white machine
operated to channel and reduce rather than expand power.
Black political organization in Newark developed primarily from the
late 1950's on, spurred by a combination of government actions such
as urban renewal, hiring discrimination on public contracts at a time
when apparent victories were being won in the Deep South and ignoring
of education system change. A series of spontaneous ad hoc organizing
and civil rights protests were generated, underwritten by expanded
ideologies and consciousness and civil rights veterans. The entry into
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Newark of the Federal poverty program during the mid 1960's provided
the additional resources required for definitive actions.
Organization of the Chapter
This chapter traces the chronology of political conflict events in
Newark over the past three decades, and examines the impact of these
events on government regimes in Newark.
Theories of political events and change paint two contrasting pictures
of political conflict in U.S. communities. One suggests that government
institutions are flexible to accommodate to changing values. While
there are competing values and conflict in urban society in the U.S.,
these conflicts tend to get adjusted through representation and parti-
cipation through a combination of participation in the political
process and other institutional adjustments. A combination of fragmented
power in and out of government as well as deeper agreements among people
and shared values over democratic goals assist in making government
institutions work. 5
A contrasting view sees government institutions mirroring larger and
deeper conflicts in society which,because institutions such as voting
operate only sporadically, never get resolved. Underlying some of the
absence of accommodation of institutions, however, is the domination
of the value system and its institutions by key interests, particularly
in the economic sphere. Thus government may serve not to mediate
values and conflicts, but rather to legitimize some groups and interests
and repress their opposition. There is no institutional or legal solu-
I A
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tion to this dilemma; repression or exclusion of alien values can be
maintained over long periods of time. Key power interests are
important in conflict. Because it is rarely in their interest to allow
conflict reduction through institutional mediating, costs of conflicts
are passed back to be borne by the society.6
The general hypothesis of the chapter underscores the themes of
political conflict in government, most visible in cities. The chapter
suggests that Newark developed a dual participation system composed
on one hand of the apparatus of city government, adapted to the require-
ments of low status white groups and on the other hand of a repressive
arm to maintain order between whites and blacks. Through government,
growing competition between whites and blacks was reduced at a cost
of black exclusion and division of rewards between competing whites.
Because whites themselves were divided along ethnic lines, the system
was fairly effective until the system became visible. Black protests
increased during the 1960's and forced open repressiveness; costs to
the external society became too great and safety valves were created.
A power struggle between blacks and government culminated in a system
of guerrilla warfare and the violence of the 1960's.
The system was greatly underwritten by the evolution of the regional
economic system. Through deliberate decisions of the large corporate
elite, the city was forced to absorb many costs of economic and
social change. These are the underlying causes of social chaos visible
in the riots and police violence during the late 1960's. The one
device white lower classes of Newark had devised for themselves to
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adjust to the negative impact of corporate decisions was eventually
abandoned by regional interests who had initially favored 'ethnic'
buffers to black control. 7
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at the decline
of ethnic balance in shared rewards through the regime of Leo Carlin,
Newark's first mayor following the government reform of 1954 from a
commission to strong mayor system. The relationship between Carlin's
struggle to consolidate power, attempts to expand his shrinking power
base to the business community and the rise of Italian power and an
eventual takeover of government utilizing the black vote is reviewed.
A second part examines the consolidation of power under Italian control
and creation of an Italian machine to replace the ethnic balance
system. Hugh Addonizio's Italian machine as an operating force and its
impact on government operations is examined against the counter theme of
increasing demands by blacks for a share in the rewards of.government.
A third part of the chapter looks at the disintegration of -the Italian
machine, as the exclusion of blacks increases alienation and shifts
the government into more repressive posture. The shift from 'accommoda-
tion' and marginal sharing to open coercion with growth in threat of a
strong organized black political thrust provides a final blow to the
machine system.
B. The Ethnic Balance System in Newark
1954 marked the beginning of state instituted reform government in
Newark and the changeover from the half century old, problem-ridden
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Commission government to a strong mayor-council form. It also marked
the ethnic machine systems which centralized power and patronage and
reduced the former fragmentation of five parts, corresponding with
the five commissioners. Although the Commission form itself had been
introduced as a 'reform itself', at the unusual urging of the state's
corporate elite community, by the late 1940's and early 1950's,
commissions had come to be known in New Jersey as 'five-headed monsters',
snapping up and dividing the spoils of government freely along ethnic
lines in the northern part of the state. 8 Under the flourishing county
machines, dominated by Irish bosses, the commissions of Essex and
Hudson Counties, helped in generating a large business in building
contracting, services and materials purchases and, above all, employ-
ment, all divided among county bosses and commissioners. There was
little central administrative apparatus or service content in the
philosophy of the commission, and operations were emphasized to generate
lower-skilled employment to provide rewards for votes in blue collar
cities. In Newark, the changeover to the strong mayor disrupted but
did not destroy ethnic politics in Newark. It did, however, raise
expectations of the Italians. Following a period of conflict and
competition between various factions fo dominant ethnic groups, the
machines won out and the former county system disintegrated. 9
Between 1955 and 1970, Newark elected two ethnic machine mayors, each
serving two terms. Leo Carlin (1955 to 1962) was Irish American and
represented the last influence of the Essex County Irish machine in
Newark. Hugh Addonizio (1962 to 1970) represented fulfillment of
Italian-American hopes to control Newark city politics, as well as a
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strategy new to Newark, using the black vote at minimal cost. Despite
ethnic differences, however, Carlin and Addonizio had much in common.
Both appealed to distinct ethnic voting constituencies, largely lower
classed whites. Both also had strong connections with traditional
county organizations, though in different dimensions, and both had
important links with organized labor in Northern New Jersey. The
success of county machine politics in the city and of its initial
candidate offerings was made possible primarily by the coalition and
balance between white constituent voters and beneficiaries, county
bosses and labor. Carlin and Addonizio also had a common goal to
centralize the power and patronage rewards of city government which were
growing rapidly, under personal regime structures.
1) Leo Carlin: 1955 to 1962
Leo Carlin was mayor of Newark for two terms between 195fand 1962
Carlin was a traditional Northern New Jersey political with very
traditional political origins. He was of Irish origin, had served as
a minor official in a teamsters union local, was tutored by the then
machine 'boss' Dennis Cary and quickly moved into Essex County machine
politics. This resulted in his appointment to-his first public post
as President of the Newark Board of Education, a job which administrated
a very large patronage pool. He subsequently ran successfully for
-Public Works Commissioner, yet another lucrative job, which administrated
a large workforce of primarily unskilled workers in sanitation services
and some of the city's larger construction contracts. As Public
Works Commissioner, Carlin had an ideal spot to run for mayor with
the charter change in 1954. With county machine support, Carlin easily
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captured Newark's mayoralty.
In office, Carlin was immediately embattled with the 'new' Italian
dominated Council and its older conception of ethnic division of power
between the dominant groups of pre-war Newark, the Italians, Irish and
Jews. 1  He tangled first with the now ward based Council to gain
control over the city, then shifted to support an essentially externally
oriented urban renewal program. Under the ward based council, however,
much of Newark's patronage -- including public housing -- was still
subject to council veto power, thus continuing fragmentation of patron-
age in the city. The Italians,for their part, saw through the Carlin
move with renewal, accused him of courting the business community at
the expense of the poor through urban renewal and turned to the very
large, untapped resource, the black vote. As one observer suggested,
Italian Americans saw a potential coalition with the blacks in the
future and dissatisfied with progress in the new power-sharing under
Carlin, decided to act. 12
Italian-Americans shared political power with the
Irish Americans and had elected several councilmen
under the new charter and commissioners under the
old. Italian power could become the dominant force
in Newark politics if an anti-city hall coalition
could be forged and blacks were the likely candi-
dates to join.13
Newark's urban renewal program, one of the country's first, represented
Carlin's attempt at a flirtation with business interests in the city
as well as a device for centralizing power by removing public housing
as a source of Italian patronage. Until that time, Newark's enormous
public housing program initiated during the late 1930's was allocated
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along ethnic and geographic or ward lines. Urban renewal promised to
shift the Newark Housing Authority in a different direction. 14
Traditionally disinterested in Newark city government affairs, key
business interests had only briefly tested and failed at a push for
'reform' in pre-war Newark. Carlin's attempt largely failed. While
the elite corporations,such as Newark's two big home based businesses,
Prudential Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance, were willing
to finance rebuilding of corporate headquarters in Newark's downtown
under the city renewal program sponsorship, few banking and financial
interests, or the state's large utility with headquarters in Newark,
Public Service, were willing to participate. None of the life insurance
companies were interested in other redevelopment activities, such as
housing. Moreover, there is some evidence that general interest in
Newark at all was marginal as many planned to relocate growth outside
the city in expanding commercial centers. 15
Another error of Carlin was to shift to a 'tight' tax policy to court
business interests. The fiscal policy, though necessary to support the
large renewal program drain, meant very little in terms of meeting the
rapidly declining tax base of the city, largelf the result of housing
and industrial decline. Moreover, as increasing amounts of taxable
land removed for urban renewal failed to interest investors, tax gains
-were largely lost.
Carlin's other thrust against the Italian interests in government also
failed. As Harold Kaplan pointed out in his study of Newark's renewal
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program in the early years, while Carlin was a good political manager in
some respects, as in the case of keeping urban renewal out of the
ethnic porkbarrel for a time, he failed to see the threat of the
shrinking rewards in government.16 With less patronage in city services
and with fewer taxes to pay for city services, the Italians inevitably
turned to the urban renewal program and its growing employment and con-
struction contracts.
Carlin's greatest error in political terms, however, was to fail to
anticipate that the political balance of power in Newark lay with the
growing black population and, particularly, its management in the voting
arena. By Carlin's second term Newark had its first black councilman,
the self-styled black machine chief, Irvin Turner. Turner's entry into
office, unlike that of Italian politicians, did not signal to Carlin a
slice of the ethnic spoils, either of patronage contracts or jobs.17
Turner himself first courted Carlin, then in 1962 turned to ally himself
with Hugh Addonizio, the Italian-American congressman in whose district
Turner's ward lay:
Turner's chief criticism of Carlin was that he had not
acted on his [Turner's] choices for patronage appoint-
ments. At that time the mayor was as insensitive as
most other white politicians in the c1ty...to the needs
of the black community. 18
The Turner-Addonizio alliance was largely a marriage of convenience to
remove Carlin. Carlin never recovered from his error of judgment poli-
tically. He ran unsuccessfully in 1966 against the then popular
Addonizio, then, with his Essex county support in disarray, disappeared
into oblivion.
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2) Hugh Addonizio: Rise of Italian Power in Newark
...For Newark's blacks, Addonizio promised better
schools, more housing and a decrease in crime. While
not appealing directly for fear of alienating his
major supporters, he left the impression that their
days of exclusion from city hall would come to an end.
So black voters gave Addonizio a large vote--they
simpl( 9could not identify with the Carlin administra-
tion.
While Hugh Addonizio's political career had much in common with Carlin,
his route to city hall via the U.S. Congress contrasted somewhat with
that of his Irish predecessor. In contrast to many Italian Americans in
Newark, Addonizio's father was a small tradesman rather than a blue
collar worker. After a start in his father's business and completion of
a night school law course, Addonizio .entered private law practice based
on connections with local labor, Italian politicians and some 'school
friends' later to connect him with organized crime. 20
In 1950, Addonizio entered politics, running successfully for Newark's
congressional seat and managed to hold the seat for the following 12
years. While he was known as an uninspired legislator, he did learn an
important lesson in packaging his dwindling Italian vote with a growing
nonwhite one. This was essentially the key to the mayoralty. He care-
fully kept a liberal voting record and repeatedly sustained a large
popular vote. In 1962, at the urging of friends he decided to try for
Newark's mayoralty.21 Once again the Italian-black combination paid
-and Addonizio captured a strong majority against the incumbent Carlin.
The 1962 Addonizio victory generally signaled the demise of the older
ethnic balance system and its replacement by centralized power and a
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new Italian machine. In 1962, it also signaled symbolic gains for the
Italians. Frustrated with a shrinking economy and blue collar employ-
ment and tired with the 'wait' for their turn at the spoils of public
office, the.Italians were ready to vote for almost any Italian.
Addonizio's appeal, while not open, was a clear promise to end the
sharing with the Irish.
He [Addonizio] appealed to the Italians' resentment of
Irish domination of the city's politics by charging
that Carlin ran a machine that dominated city hall for
20 years. He expanded on this theme by denouncing Essex
County Democratic Chairman Denis Cary's endorsement of
Carlin as another example of the mayor's indebtedness
to a sinister political organization. 22
Another part of the Italian-ethnic appeal was the alleged connections
between Carlin and big business. Addonizio accused the Newark Evening
News, one of the city's two dailies which had endorsed Carlin, and the
state's giant utility company, Public Service Gas and Electricity, of
having used Carlin to get property assessments reduced, leaving the
poor homeowners to make up the lost taxes. The strategy worked and
Addonizio carried every Italian ward by an overwhelming margin.
With the blacks, Addonizio tried a delicate route. While he adopted
as his slogan 'A mayor for all the people', he carefully refrained from
any promises which would be viewed as 'pro black' by blue collar Newark.
He did take Irvine Turner, Newark's black congressman under his wing,
-and promised to make the Turner alliance worth Turner's while in return
for the black vote. 23
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C. Addonizio's First Term: Consolidation of Power and Development of
the Italian Machine
Addonizio's 1962 election represented at once a break with the ethnic
balance system and a continuation of the highly traditional political
style of Newark where friendships, bargaining and negotiations behind
closed doors characterized settlement of most conflicts. The key differ-
ence with Addonizio, however, was a drive toward centralization of
authority under the mayor and development of a highly personal power
structure.
In city hall, Addonizio confronted the Council with the new Charter and
let it be known that the mayor controlled the spoils. He set 'about to
eradicate the internal, informal ethnic 'shares' in the employment system
by dismissing employees, especially the Irish, and,utilizing power of
the charter, replaced higher level appointments with his own people,
mainly Italians. As Barbaro pointed out, little was sacred during
Addonizio's first years and the by now Italian dominated council did
little to stop his thrust:
He [Addonizio] cleaned house at city hall and moved in
aggressively to control all governmental agencies includ-
ing semi-autonomous agencies like the New Housing Author-
ity established by reformers in an attempt to deny poli-
ticians direct control over their operations. As Harold
Kaplan describes it, the election was followed by one of
the most radical changeovers in government personnel
Newark had witnessed in many years. Almost all of the
leading city hall officials (including civil servants
with tenure) resigned a2 their positions were filled
with a crop of new men.
In adding over 500 new jobs to the city payroll during his first years
of administration, Addonizio was able to distribute a considerable
-1
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amount of patronage, build a solid base at city hall while at the same
time claiming to be building new service areas. When the Council
grumbled that they didn't get a say in the job distribution or that
the jobs were unnecessary and a burden on the city's finances,
Addonizio responded that the Council was narrow and believed that only
uniformed personnel were essential to the city's operation.25
Another means of control was exercised through a careful maintaining
of the unreformed, 'operations' organization of the city. Addonizio
was able to mould the city's operations into a machine tailored to
serve the needs of constituents and business support.
While Addonizio argued that the Council only wanted the 'uniformed'
services expanded, his administration was completely traditional. Tra-
ditional divisions of labor, hierarchical organization and work task
organization were maintained. A great deal of the actual work was
highly routinized in order to maximize the numbers of jobs and avoid
problems of output changes. Any innovation, planning or managerial
control was minimized, in part because it looked at efficiency questions
and in part because it tended to challenge the competency of the new
middle management in Addoniziols regime. With -regard to the central
administration of city affairs -- the budget and finance functions,
accounting and the like, these were in many cases reduced to bookkeep-
-ing operations, little power was delegated downward and most policy
came from the mayor's office. 26
Addonizio's patronage system organization was most visible in the areas
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of employment and contracting. As suggested earlier, a key factor in
the Addonizio system was linking jobs to votes. He had come into
office with the Italian vote and the black vote. He tended, once in
office, however, to respond first to Italians and as little as possible
to blacks, as long as he could get away with it. A few symbolic and
highly visible appointments of blacks were satisfactory for a time and
at the same time resolved his problem of potential alienation of white
workers.
Employment strategies followed Addonizio's considerable links with
Italian organized labor in the city. Regional trade unions dominated
city jobs such as construction and sanitation where most Italians were
hired in private industry. The city repeated the pattern. Under
Addonizio, the Italian dominated unions moved in to define public jobs,
to define entry requirements, seniority and promotions through similar
apprenticeship rules and other rules which dominated private sector
employment. Supervisory personnel and foremen as well as many 'skilled'
labor categories were hired from union nominations.
In the stronger civil service categories such as the uniformed services
of police and fire, Addonizio had more trouble.- After the war, the
Irish who dominated these work areas of local government moved on the
state capital in Trenton and managed to pass strong civil service
.requirements, as well as a bundle of side benefits in pensions,
veterans' preferences and hiring preferences for those employed before
the war. As a result, cities like Newark were subject to very special
treatment and a kind of 'lock-up' on pre-war positions, titles and
I
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personnel, many of whom were Irish. Irish veterans who were patrolmen
or firemen before the war thus found themselves in the best positions
in the hierarchy of uniformed services after the war.27
Addonizio never fully controlled the fire department in Newark and
managed to gain control over the police only through use of strong
persuasion on new recruits and promotions to favor Italians. With
an aggressively pro-Italian police director, Dominik Spina, later to
be implicated by both the F.B.I. and Justice Department with an extra-
legal police department system operating protection service for
organized crime, Addonizio found a means to by-pass the civil service
system and the Irish. Spina utilized considerable discretion in top
promotions, especially into the lucrative detective system and many of
the Irish were simply isolated in 'bureaucratic jobs'. In new hiring,
true to the Newark parochial system, much recruitment was through links
to government, through family, friends or Addonizio organization loyal-
ties. Many were hired, despite the existence of civil service in the
state, outside hiring rules. 2 8 Given the state patterns of enforcement
and the suspicion of the general public about Spina's connections, few
potential employees challenged the pattern. Thus, by 1970, after
two terms of Addonizio, the city personnel office estimated that 3/4
of the new uniformed personnel recruits were referred by relatives or
close friends. Many workers were hired under 'provisional' appointment
rules which were then extended indefinately. 3 0
1) Centralization of Power II: Urban Renewal and City Fiscal Policy
The dominant part of Addonizio's thrust and many of the objectives of
A-I
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his gaining city hall in the first place, lay in the sphere of contract-
ing, particularly of building construction. This was unquestionably
where the opportunity for personal monetary gains lay in machine style
operations in Newark as elsewhere. It was common gossip in Newark at
the time of the riot investigations that the mayor's office was worth a
minimum of 'a million' annually, most of this earned from kickbacks on
public works construction.31 Building construction expansion had an
added advantage in Newark. It overlapped nicely with the Italian
dominated construction workforce, always victims of private business
construction cycles and seasonal downswings. Many of the key building
contractors, materials suppliers, equipment rental businesses, were also
Italian and there was always the suspicion that some if not most
financing of these operations was supplied from the Italian wing of the
syndicate. 32 The search for expansion of the construction output led
Addonizio directly to the burgeoning urban renewal program and inad-
vertantly directly into rising black hostility. A key effect of
Addonizio's preoccupation with contracting, however, was not black
unrest but was the city fiscal policy and economic base.
Addonizio was barely in city hall before he turned to the city's urban
renewal program. The question had been raised during the election about
the role of the business community and collaboration between big busi-
ness interests and Leo Carlin. While Carlin undoubtedly needed and
probably courted Newark's corporate elite, there is little evidence of
reciprocity. Harold Kaplan, who studied the politics of Newark's
renewal program at its initiation, suggested that the real strategy
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behind renewal was the 'separation' of the program from the politicos
in city hall and the porkbarrel tradition of Newark.33 The genius
behind the Newark renewal program was a new type to Newark, Louis
Danzig, a personality who probably epitomized Jewel Bellush and Murray
Hausknect's model of the 'entrepreneur'.34 Danzig, along with Robert
Moses in New York City, was important in getting the initial legisla-
tion drafted and set up Newark's program as a 'model' of managerial
efficiency. While initially Danzig (as Moses in New York) distributed
the public housing program in ways that satisfied the politicos along
ethnic and geographic lines, by the time of urban renewal the situation
had changed. Urban renewal was not a 'distributional' program,
adapted to ethnic rewards, but rather addressed needs of the economic
community. It required centralized administration, tight control over
expenditures, careful accounting with the Federal government (especially
following a scandal in neighboring New York City which contributed to
the downfall of Moses)35 and, above all, a search for serious private
developers and capital. By getting in on the ground floor on the
renewal program, Danzig managed to rev up the program to a strong
start imprinted with his entrepreneurial efficiency orientation before
the Italians got in power.
Addonizio was faced with a considerable dilemma in squaring off with
Danzig and renewal. On one hand there was the considerable potential
patronage of the operation in staff jobs, By 1962, the Newark Housing
Authority comprised a staff of over 2,000 jobs, many in clerical and
even blue collar work categories associated with public housing project
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maintenance. 36 Furthermore, the operating budget was exceeded only by
the Board of Education. Most important, however, was the fact that the
Housing Authority with the combined public housing and urban renewal
programs, was literally a construction contracting machine. As the
biggest dollar value program in the country of the time, urban renewal
activities alone projected $259,405,000 of construction in combined
public and private projects in 1966 and an additional $130,000,000 was
projected for public housing.37
Despite the theoretical autonomy of the Newark Housing Authority,-
Addonizio moved in, opening the technical and administrative staff to
his nominees and lower staff jobs for patronage. Secondly, he established
claim over contracting and encouraged (or let it be known) that certain
contractors were to be favored in development. 38 All in all Addonizio
substantially succeeded in increasing his span of control over the
spillout benefits of the NHA, without substantially altering the direc-
tion of the program in development terms, at least initially.
It was in terms of program direction during a latter phase that
Addonizio essentially failed, when he backed the program's slum clear-
ance against blacks. During the first few years of his administration,
Addonizio essentially was content to draw down on patronage while
leaving Danzig control over planning and marketing of sites in renewal.
Danzig's plan was complex, but he essentially focused strongly on
downtown redevelopment (including the clearance of some old industrial
slums) and steered clear of residential areas with the exception of
the hard core slums of the Central Ward, where he tended to replace
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slum housing with public housing construction. For Central Ward blacks,
while there was considerable cost imposed on those relocated, most
favored the program on the whole. Public housing was a substantial
improvement over the deteriorating private housing slums. As long as
public housing production remained high and clearance was confined to
the hard core slums, there were few objections to the program.39
Around the mid-1960's, however, the Federal program shifted sharply and
Danzig with it. Public housing ceased to be what if formerly was, a
low density program, designed primarily to house lower middle income
families and blend in with existing neighborhoods, possibly contributing
in open space and services. The program shifted now to a high density,
least cost approach, devoid of amenities. In addition, the Federal
input drastically declined. Newark responded by shifting some of its
cleared land into other uses, notably institutional since few private
interests were willing to build in the ghetto areas. Publ.ic projects
which were constructed were drastically altered in design terms, chang-
ing to high density elevator towers set in a sea of asphalt, completely
40
cut off from surrounding neighborhoods.
With the drastic removal of low income families from cleared sites,
adjacent areas soon began to feel pressures as the supply of lower
priced housing dwindled. As more housing eroded with influx of the
poor, areas adjacent to the Central Ward became high priority targets
for extension of renewal clearance. Extension into one area, a transi-
tional black-Jewish area first felt the impact of the expanded program
and challenged the renewal authority. This action and a hard line
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response from Addonizio essentially kicked off black resistance to
Addonizio.41
While transitional Clinton Hill, directly south of the Central Ward, was
still middle class. Already strained from the flight of Jewish families
and the flight of the poor from clearance, many of the black homeowners
greeted the news they were targets for 'industrial clearance' with alarm.
As if the clearance proposal were not enough, the community then found
itself slated to be partly cleared for two highway projects. One, an
Interstate, promised to separate the small area from the middle class
areas of Weequaic, one of Newark's better, suburbanized neighborhoods.
The other, an interstate 'connector' (connecting two interstates), would
sweep through the neighborhood, demolishing its East side. The community
reacted swiftly, generated outside organizing interest and went to battle
the renewal authority. Joined by businesses also scheduled for demoli-
tion, the project was eventually 'shelved'. But considerable bitter-
ness remained. The Clinton Hill affair was later to be remembered and
connected with Addonizio's 'secret agenda' to 'clear out blacks in
Newark'. 42
Through the initial phase of Addonizio's renewal strategy, he was
content to keep a low profile and put Danzig out front. Despite campaign
promises to build more housing for blacks, however, the NHA shifted
sharply to clearing slums for middle income and even luxury housing
construction.
During a second phase of redevelopment policy, however, some of
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Addonizio's politics became clearly perceived at 'anti-black'. When
blacks organized against construction of institutions on cleared land,
notably the famous New Jersey Medical School, Addonizio emerged and
made a strong defense of the renewal program, adding some personal
touches. When blacks were still dissatisfied with the highway proposals
(which remained, though renewal was shelved), Addonizio held widely
publicized press conferences arguing that the highway project was still
essential to the business community, that it was unalterable and that
he personally had got state agreements to build a 'linear buffer' park
along with it. The problem with the linear park was that it doubled
clearance and was unusuable for community purposes.43
The core of the new Addonizio strategy, however, was the medical school
site. While the project was not initiated by Addonizio, by the mid
1960's Addonizio had become its primary advocate in the state.
Prior to 1962, the state had considered Newark for location of a new
state university faculty of medicine and dentistry. Later, additional
sites outside the city became more competitive and the board decided
to reconsider the Newark site.44
Addonizio responded to the school's uncertainty by waging a hard
personal battle, both behind the scenes in Trenton and publically. As
one aide recounted to the New Jersey Riot Commission later, the city
was so determined not to allow the school to back down, at supreme
costs the city offered to double the clearance area of the Central Ward
initially promised.45
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2) Addonizio and the Black Community: End of the Honeymoon
While Addonizio's election strategy continued to work through his
second election in 1966, in years immediately preceding his return to
power with the black vote, the relation was souring. While initially
blacks were optimistic over the hints of change and counted heavily
on Addonizio's liberal voting record in Congress as well as his
alliance with Irvine Turner in the Central Ward, the first few years
of the administration saw little change in city policies and a few
damaging directions. Blacks were also increasingly conscious, as
were the Italians before them, of their increasing numbers. Local
leaders began to talk of 'voting strength' and the prizes in city hall.
The undercurrent of complaints from blacks against Addonizio had a wide
range. In addition to the renewal program mentioned earlier, there
was systematic exclusion in the rewards of city hall. Many blacks
perceived that Addonizio's real black strategy was to use the blacks to
justify an expanded social service system and police system which
mainly generated jobs for whites. The more black problems grew, the
more the city budgets grew and the more expenditures grew, the more
white employment expanded. Newark was indeed cLeveloping into a
'colonial' ghetto in the estimate of many.46
Addonizio did little to dispel these suspicions. A few symbolic jobs
were created for blacks in city hall, notably that of Director of
health and Welfare for a black woman political supporter, Laurie Stalks.
The budget director (later to become controversial during Addonizio's
second term) was also black, though a man quite qualified for the job
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as New Jersey's first black CPA.47 Some employment expansion for
nonwhites took place in city services. More than likely, however,
nonwhites were employed in the very low levels of public works, and
in functions 'less desirable' such as sewers and streets where the
work was dirty and hard. 48 . In areas adaptable to skill levels of
nonwhites such as parks and recreation, cultural services, blacks
were notably underrepresented even in heavily nonwhite centers. In con-
tracting employment on public sites, there were few attempts made to
integrate work crews and most construction sites in black neighborhoods
were characterized by entirely white work crews.49
By the eve of Addonizio's second term, black resistance had already
grown to serious proportions and Addonizio's response in turn less con-
ciliatory. In addition to the hard line he was taking on urban renewal-
the police were increasingly coercive and escalations in arrests took
place. 50  Civil rights leaders began protesting arbitrary arrests and
calling for a civilian police review board. By 1966, black protest and
organizing was in full swing. Addonizio's attempts to undercut the
Newark Poverty Program, increasingly active in supporting protests,
legal actions and general organizing, were viewed as the emerging of
yet another sanction. While initially Addonizio had attempted to
manipulate and get control of what he considered to be potential 'patron-
age', by the mid 1960's he was threatening the board with some kind of
direct actions. The attempts largely failed and acted to create an
even stronger hostility between the emerging black leadership and city
hall. 51
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3) Impact of the Addonizio Machine on City Government Administration
Addonizio had little interest in the administrative structure of govern-
ment and like most machine leaders, tended to view reform and 'efficiency'
as threats to discretion in control over city resources. Little struc-
tural organization reform took place, there were few programs initiated
to streamline, or change the 'operations' approach to the city functions.
Areas of accounting, taxation and budgeting took a back seat to political
decisionmaking. One effect was a deteriorating fiscal situation in the
city.
During Addonizio's first term, the city budget continued its steady
climb, increasing over 10% between 1962 and 1966. The revenue picture,
however, was bleak. While the city raised revenue to cover the increased
expenditures, growth in the city's assessed valuation, on which a large
proportion of budgeted expenditure depended, slowed from an annual
growth of 4.88% during the prior electoral term, to 4.09 under Addonizio's
first term. 52 Part of the decline was attributable to the. city's massive
urban renewal program which, despite optimism during the late 1950's,
was slow to interest developers. Acres of demolished taxable values
had taken place and little replaced it by the mid-1960's. Further, as
the renewal program went slowly, renewal planners increasingly turned
to replacement projects which were either subject to special tax
treatment, such as housing, or to tax-exempt institutions such as
county government offices, religious institutions, state higher
educational facilities, etc. Another force contributing to the decline,
however, was the state. During the mid 1960's, following an incredible
71
move by the New Jersey Legislature, the city was forced to remove a
substantial proportion of assessed valuation from the property tax base.
In Newark, this removal of the business personalty tax cost the city
12,000,000 in 1966 tax dollars in tax income. Despite warnings from
fiscal consultants called in to evaluate the capacity of the city to
finance the massive renewal program, the Addonizio administration
neither fought the tax base removal, nor tried for a reasonable state
replacement formula. 53
With the growing crisis, Addonizio's key strategy was an annual manipul-
ation of the tax rate. The trick was to keep the rate fairly steady in
appearance without actually reducing operations wherever visible rate
hikes would harm political chances. This policy, largely agreed to
by the Council, was primarily an 'election year' strategy, where
selected items -- usually welfare assistance or services, such as
health, would be cut. The tax rate would then subsequently drift
upward during off election years. While the technique is not unique
to Newark, by the mid 1960's it had assumed somewhat questionable propor-
tions.54 With the assistance budget too small to conceal magnitude of
increases, other areas had to be sought. In 1966, for example,
$117,954 was 'cut' from salaries and wages of the Hospital budget; how-
ever, this was not accompanied with a cut in workers.55  In the 1969
election year, the tax rate remained 'stable' despite the fact that a
generous 'election' bonus of $2,000 per non-uniformed worker was put
into the budget. 56
The absence of a strong administrative-technical staff and good relations
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with the state government undoubtedly hurt fiscal policy. Addonizio
tended to fill the fiscal administration parts of government with
competent people, but the jobs themselves were largely insulated from
the 'political administration'.
This left political aides largely in control over fiscal areas, or,
as sometimes seemed to be the case, a vacuum. As one budget examiner
who had worked under Addonizio put it, 'there was very little in the
way of budgetary analysis'.57  In the absence of responsibility both in
the areas of spending and fiscal control, the older fragmented system
took over, reducing the budget office to a 'paper processing agency'
servicing the needs of operating divisions. Both the budget and finance
office remained poorly staffed, the budgetary process unorganized, and
budget decisionmaking dominated by the chief clerks of the operating
divisions who closely guarded department accounts, prepared requests
and dominated meetings during the cycle. Fragmentation was symbolized
by the budget document itself. Divided into 12 separate volumes, with
the key spending areas allocated in a separate document, there were no
totals visible for analytical or communication purposes. Only the
state submission, which contained no information on requests or
executive actions (only final budget figures) showed expenditure and
revenue summaries.58
-As suggested, city-state relations were never good. New Jersey's
largest municipality was especially poorly represented in the post-war
period with the withdrawal of a good deal of its middle income whites
to the suburbs, where, in turn, they voted against the city in state
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politics.59 Under Addonizio, however, there few improvements and
the situation may have deteriorated as Addonizio's ambitions for the
state house grew. Traditionally a low tax state, the actions to remove
more of the taxes in high tax Newark, were in line with business influ-
ence on city politics through Trenton rather than through City Hall.
Addonizio mildly protested the state action on taxes and on changes in
grant in aid formulas and encountered considerable hostility. On the
other hand, with the urban renewal program in trouble and the apparent
stagnation in economic development in the city, it is not at all clear
that he was unfavorable to the state action.
By the late 1960's, Addonizio needed state assistance badly. The
'threatened' withdrawal of the state medical school from its proposed
Newark site would have left a considerable gap in Addonizio's plans to
clear the Central Ward as well as a relatively unmarketable clearance
site. In addition, The Newark Housing Authority pushed strongly and
got yet an additional commitment from the state to condemn and purchase
a right of way for the proposed route 75 connector, part of which was
reimbursable from Federal Highway Trust Funds. While Addonizio could
not be blamed for the state's general reluctance to view the city's
fiscal problems seriously, his state relations seemed to be character-
ized primarily as efforts to gain state participation in construction
schemes, rather than some general fiscal reform and improved tax
policy. 60
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D. Addonizio's Second Term and the Rise of Black Unrest
Hugh Addonizio's second electoral victory in Newark's mayoralty was
seen by the local press as a big one which practically set him within
sight of the Governor's seat in Trenton.61 He was reported to have run
a well organized campaign out of fifteen offices, scattered throughout
the city, staffed with young enthusiastic volunteers. The press avoided
mentioning the last minute black candidate who would force Addonizio
into a runoff. The press, like many whites in the city, could not begin
to conceptualize an organized black voting block in the city, nor a
black candidate, so convinced was it that Addonizio held the votes of
the rapidly expanding nonwhites closely.
For Hugh Addonizio and his aides, however, the candidate, Kenneth Gibson,
undoubtedly signaled a different set of questions. It suggested that
Addonizio's 'black vote strategy', the tradeoffs of the black vote for
token employment in public jobs and a partial entry into the Italian
machine, were increasingly perceived for what they were, primarily
public relations level shows of sympathy to the black problems. More-
over, the indifference to problems such as the hospital (a city facility
increasingly subject to criticism by its mainly-black clientele) and
the perceived use of urban renewal slum clearance, manipulation of the
black controlled poverty programs and, finally, the Addonizio police
policy to control blacks were increasingly perceived as the real
'Addonizio' strategy for blacks. The test run of a black candidate
and his showing at the last minute seemed to confirm the changing mood
of the blacks in Newark.
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Addonizio's victory in 1966, except for the Gibson showing, was a rela-
tively easy one. His strongest opposition candidate was the ex-mayor
Leo Carlin, attempting a comeback with the support of the now crumbling
Essex County Irish machine. As a challenger, Carlin posed almost no
threat. He had little to offer any one for a vote in Newark with almost
no white ethnic voting base and since he was anti-black, he was hardly
an alternative for the second largest block in the city. Carlin later
withdrew, leaving Addonizio the automatic victor in the general election.
Before this, however, Kenneth Gibson entered, forcing a runoff between
Carlin and Addonizio. 62
Gibson, a black city entineer, was vice president of the black dominated
0EO supported United Community Corporation, the city's community action
agency. He had been generally active in civil rights in Newark, was
known as a moderate and active in organizations seeking to promote
dialogue between the races and between business and civic groups and
blacks in the city. He was persuaded very late in 1965 to run against
Addonizio as a 'test' of voting strength in the black community. He
announced his candidacy only six weeks prior to the primary, had no
campaign organization and $2000.00 in campaign funds.63 Despite these
handicaps, Gibson finished third, polling a surprising 16,250 votes and
forcing a runoff between Carlin and Addonizio in the final election.64
-While Addonizio received the black vote in the election overwhelmingly,
there were rumours that the 'support' was subtly if not openly coerced.
Welfare clients learned that a Gibson vote would strike
them from the rolls. People on waiting lists for public
housing or government jobs learned that their positions
A-
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were related to their vote. It was also contended that
Addonizio enlisted the help of "old-line machine"
Negroes to see to it that new black voters were allowed
to register only as Democrats. 65
Addonizio's 'victory' was also mixed on the side of whites. While
Carlin officially withdrew before the final runoff, he nonetheless
polled a substantial number of votes. 66
Addonizio's second term was characterized by the playing out of three
types of interrelated events: (1) increasing attention to urban renewal
programs in the Central Ward, now seen as key to the city's future,
(2) rise of the police system as an arm of government-machine maintenance,
first as a day-to-day enforcement mechanism and finally as an armed
attack force during the rebellions of 1967 and 1968, (3) the corruption
trials of 1969 and 1970 which resulted in the final collapse of the
Italian machine. Underlying these key events was a miscalculation of
the level of organization of Newark blacks as well as the willingness of
regional forces (i.e. the State, the corporate elite in Newark, the
press) to support the maintenance of white power in Newark at any cost.
While Addonizio had generated suspicion and dismay among black leadership
almost immediately after his first victory in 1962, by his second term
disenchantement had grown to drastic proportions. In essence, the
Addonizio regime failed to perceive the value of the vote, or the per-
ceived distance between values of black and white votes. While there
had been some increases in employment in city jobs, blacks remained
disproportionately underrepresented in key black issue areas, namely
on the teaching staff of public schools, in highly visible employment
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such as police and fire departments and on public works construction.
During the second term, there were only slight improvements. In 1967,
only 25% of Newark's public school teachers were nonwhite out of a
total workforce of 3,500, and only 15 of approximately 1,600 policemen
were nonwhite. 67
In the many public works and public related construction rising all over
the city under renewal, craft dominated unions assured that almost no
nonwhites were employed,generating large scale protests in black commun-
ities. Addonizio's actions in turning over the Federal training
programs during the period to Italian craft union leadership to ',imple-
ment' generally meant more whites than blacks were served, and Federal
funds themselves went to assuring development of a strong licensing
practice against nonwhite construction employment in the city.68
Between 1966 and 1970 there were a series of mounting protests against
the Addonizio regime in Newark, handled with a characteristic public
relations manner by the mayor, though there were suspicions in black
Newark that the police generally reinforced the Mayor's policy with a
strong arm. Key among protests were those over the public education
system, over the hospital and health situation and over the police.
The schools' situation was grounded in the increasing indifference of
the institutional organization to the community, as the school popula-
tion became increasingly nonwhite. Addonizio tended to reinforce,
rather than assist,in the alienation of nonwhites to the school function
in Newark. In 1967, of 80,000 students, 80% were now black or Puerto
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Rican and 90% of the students had tested below national reading levels.
Meanwhile, the School Board remained indifferent and even hostile to
nonwhite demands, with notable exceptions of the few black members. The
teaching staff was largely white and by the late 1960's increasingly
suburbanized and, among other things, an attractive target for union
organizers in neighboring New York City to play out national political
ambitions. Newark, in fact, became a test case for settling a long-
standing rivalry between two competing unions, the older American Federa-
tion of Teachers (AFT) and the New York based United Federation of
Teachers (UFT).69
Blacks had become involved in the school situation in the early 1960's
pressuring for integration of the teaching staff and more Board repre-
sentation. While by the late 1960's blacks had articulate black leader-
ship on the Board such as Harold Asby, the Board remained weak without
support from city hall against a teacher takeover of policy. In 1968,
the grievances in the schools broke out into racial violence between
students in a high school in the mainly Italian Vailsburg section of
the city. Black students then boycotted the school, pressuring for
more representation. They were supported by Civil Rights groups,
and black members of the Board itself. As a result, the Board broke
its contract with the teachers union and in 1970, when the teachers'
contract expired, they walked out. A particularly bitter strike
followed. A few years earlier blacks had already been outraged by
what they considered 'sellout settlements' to white teachers. They
also trusted Addonizio very little. It was Addonizio a few years earlier
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who had appointed a white political crony with a high school diploma
over a black with a graduate degree in public administration and a
state CPA license who was serving as his Budget Director, as head of
the school administration. It was also Addonizio's administration which
repeatedly undercut attempts to get school construction sites, among
other projects in the city, integrated with nonwhite journeymen and
apprentices. The school strike thus presented a good test of Addonizio's
willingness to meet some black demands, at what was considered a
fairly minimal cost. Just the opposite happened, however. While 200
teachers were arrested during the 1970 walkout, behind the scenes
Addonizio personally worked to pressure the Board of Education into
the most lucrative contract thus farin the country, which specified
among other things that teachers were not to be employed in any duties
other than those in the classroom having directly to do with teaching.
For the union it was a big victory, not so much in local terms, but
71in the prominence it gave the AFT nationally. For the city, it
merely set the stage for yet another very long bitter strike in 1972,
as the administration vainly sought to backtrack on the extraordinary
budgetary impact, and for blacks it meant yet another reversal of
black attempts to improve the role of educatiorT in the city.
The Newark Hospital affair was also a long series of skirmishes between
Addonizio and the black community and, unlike the case of the schools,
the mayor could not claim no direct authority. In fact, the city
hospital administrative organization was directly under the control
of the mayor, its director and chief administrator reporting directly
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to the mayor and its financing assured out of the city budget. Addonizio
chose it as one issue in his appeal to blacks in 1962, but soon used it
to manipulate the state in the medical school affair. Under this kind
of objective, the hospital continued to decline while its expenditures
soared.
The Newark City Hospital had a singularly bad reputation by the early
1960's which seemed to worsen with the shift in its clientele to mainly
nonwhite, as in the case of the schools. While urban renewal projects
had planned 50 million to be spent on construction renovation, various
state commissions had pronounced it unfit for use as a health care
facility by 1962. In 1962, Addonizio hade the hospital a major target
of his campaign against Carlin; he charged that the recent accredita-
tion by the state Joint Commission of Hospitals had been pressured
through by Carlin. 72 Part of the appeal was undoubtedly to the hospital's
main clientele, the city's poor blacks for whom the facility repre-
sented the only health care facility. Three years later, however, the
hospital had changed little and this time it was Addonizio who was
manipulating the state for takeover as part of the Medical School
package.73
Addonizio did little to reorganize the city hospital's administrative
apparatus, or to respond to the growing grievances from community
-activists, or to outright health scandals. There was no board of
trustees and thus no check on the director and administrator. Single-
handedly, rules and regulations governing management, policies on
patients, staffing, staff structure and organization, salaries and
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general institutional conditions were made by the Director. Three
hospital directors appointed by Addonizio resigned in rapid succession.
Conditions in the hospital under Addonizio deteriorated rapidly. 74
In 1965, just before the elections, a diarrhea epidemic broke out in
the hospital, resulting in deaths of twenty-eight infants. Black
leaders were furious when the hospital administration was confronted
and then admitted it was unaware of the deaths (four in one day) until
the epidemic was over.75 Two years later, following continuing pressure,
Albert Black, then chairman of Newark's Human Rights Commission, released
a report detailing an investigation of the hospital. The report found
shortages of staff, inadequate equipment, shortages of eating utensils
and food, lack of staff doctors and hospital security personnel;
roaches and vermin in the rooms, lack of bedside curtains and exposure
of the patients.76 The city administration, embarrassed by the report,
saw to it that Black, along with sympathetic commission members, was
removed shortly thereafter, with no promise of improvement to the
facility.
The hospital situation, and particularly the question of capital
renovation and expansion became tied by Addonizio to the medical school
affair. Because the medical school site became such a large contro-
versy, it is useful to review some of its history and its links to
Addonizio's political goals and problem solving style.
In 1962 Addonizio offered the city's municipal hospital to any medical
school which would take it, primarily in the interest of absolving his
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direct responsibility as mayor for it. In 1965, two other medical
schools became involved, as Seton Hall College's Medical School in
South Orange became a state institution and an evaluation of the
rehabilitation of Jersey City Medical Center disclosed that rehabilita-
tion would cost as much as construction of a new facility. The following
year, the trustees examined two site options, one an urban renewal
clearance site totaling 20 acres offered by Newark and one offered by
a philanthropist in suburban Madison, New Jersey, consisting of 138
acres. The trustees accepted the suburban location, based on assurance
of control and access to acreage for future expansion, as well as'
uneasiness about locating in a ghetto.77 Donald Malafronte, testifying
before the Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders later, and
an administrative assistant to Addonizio suggested that the medical
school board had betrayed Newark, but the city administration for its
part hastened to repair the damage. City hall, according to Malafronte,
received an advance copy of the site selection committee report which
stated that the land was short in Newark and that 150 acres were
required.
We got a copy of the report and said, "We have been
undone here." We all sat down with a map and looked
around at the area....So we thought we would surprise
them in this and we drew a 185 acre area which we
considered to be the worse slum area. We felt that
in the end they would come down in their demands to
20 or 30 acres....We never felt they would ask for
185. We felt that it was a ploy on their part. 78
As one observer pointed out, however, there was a glaring conflict
between the city's stated goals in applications for the medical school
site to HEW and its application to HUD for Model Cities, a program
I L
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which also fell within the same boundary area as the Medical School-
Hospital project. While the HEW grant application for financing of the
school facility made little mention of the community in which the
school was to be located, or of its impact or role, the Model Cities
application spoke glowingly of the community service the school would
bring.79
The primary goal in improving health services in the
Model Neighborhood area is to evolve a relationship
with the new Medical School whereby the School will
become the major stimulus in bringing about quality
service, a new quantity of services and new kinds
of service previously not available. 80
However, while HUD insisted on community involvement for the Model
Cities programs (and, by 1967, even for Urban Renewal), the Medical
School Board thought in traditional terms of the school as a teaching and
research facility, bearing no relationship to the environment. The
Hospital, as a teaching facility, would have followed the same route,
as the Board saw it, with community exclusion. 8 1
While Addonizio's interests in the Medical School were dual purpose
in getting rid of the Hospital, while at the same time absorbing a
large part of Central Ward land, he gained substantial regional interest
and support with little difficulty, despite thJ tremendous and heated
struggle generated in the black community. Among supporters escalating
pressure for a Newark site during 1966 and 1967 were the Essex County
-13 member Democratic legislative delegation, the Governor's office in
Trenton, a former Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service,
The Regional Plan Association's New Jersey Committee and numerous medi-
cal, civic, recreational, religious, business organizations and municipal-
I .-
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ities. 82 While undoubtedly some of these interests viewed the Medical
School site as genuinely advantageous both for Newark and the region,
it was clear that many felt as black activists Harry Wheeler,
head of the Committee Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal and
Junius Williams, head of Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA),
felt, it was supported primarily because it threatened to demolish black
power in Newark. Some of the sentiments were visible in the testimony
before the state Senate hearings in Trenton in 1966 of Louis Danzig,
head of the Newark Housing and Renewal Authority for 18 years. In these
hearings, Danzig testified that the land could be condemned quickly and
that "buffer zones.. .can be readily established to take away the fear
of the surrounding areas. "83 Not surprisingly, blacks. viewed the Medical
School-Hospital affair as a sinister conspiracy stretching far outside
the city's boundaries.
E. Addonizio's Police System
Addonizio's strategies for isolating and controlling power in Newark
through the use of city resources available in legitimate programs such
as education and health were far surpassed and, in fact, locked neatly
to his use of the Newark Police. In fact, some. observers suggest that
Newark represented some unique example of cadilloism, with more in
common with a Central American peasant economy than the United States. 84
It is more likely, however, that there was a great deal of tolerance by
the rest of the region, and indeed, the nation, for the Newark system
because, despite its excesses, it controlled great threats to regional
wealth by controlling blacks. Further, because it assisted in sustain-
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ing a large lower class white population, it avoided whatever potential
threat came from this end as well. Traditionally Mafia-dominated labor
had been more tolerated than left dominated labor of which New Jersey
had a strong tradition in pre-war times, for its stronger control over
labor demands coupled with its absence of 'threatening' political
ideologies.
Newark police have had a long history of corruption dating almost from
the beginning of the organization's history in the last century; the
'leatherheads', as they were known, were, in fact, a group of petty
entrepreneurial gangs, hired by business interests in Newark to intimi-
date and harass immigrants in the city, to bust strikes and generally
keep the lower classes away from the propertied interests.85  Later,
during the 1920's, with Prohibition, Newark flourished as an eastern
bootlegg-liquor distribution center with Canadian connections, the
liberal assistance of the local police and an equally flourishing ethnic
entrepreneurial class. As the city has shifted its underground economy,
the police system has followed closely, shifting from illegal liquor to
other activities as opportunities in the main system shifted. Fraud,
gambling, narcotics, prostitution have all in turn become important in
the economy and to the police system. What is probably most signifi-
cant about the recent decades, including the Addonizio administration,
however, is that the city has become a kind of 'greenhouse' for diversi-
fied small activities, rather than either specialized in one or two
kinds of activities as in New York with narcotics. Nor has the city
developed a drift toward the larger scale 'syndicate' of important
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gambling and illegal trade centers such as Miami or Las Vegas. As a
kind of backwater hinterland, illegal entrepreneurs appear to 'get
their start' in Newark, then move on to better things elsewhere.86
The Newark police force under Addonizio undoubtedly moved into a new
phase of syndicate interaction, whatever existed previously. Some
observers claim that Carlin's Director was a relatively clean Irish
cop, but that Addonizio's choice, Spina, by contrast, entered with the
full backing of several notorious syndicate operators and a very
specific goal to operate the police as fully as possible with the illegal
system.
Spina's operation was characterized by several schemes and strategies:
(1) secure links with the Mayor and city hall; (2) insulation and isola-
tion where possible of the 'regular' force, particularly senior Irish
officers; (3) use of the detective division, with its peculiar organiza-
tion and discretion as a mainspring of the system. It was in relations
in the regular police system with the blacks, which were of very little
interest to Spina and the irregular system, where things got out of
hand.
With Addonizio's takeover of city government in 1962, one of his first
appointments was the police Director, Dominick Spina. Spina had worked
in Addonizio's campaign and, according to Ron Porambo, a local journal-
ist who produced a lengthy study on Newark's police system, had enough
connections with Mafia kingpin Ray de Carlo to get himself named
Police Director. 8 7 Addonizio's relations with de Carlo and others were
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such that the Spina appointment might be made 'mutually' interesting,
particularly if Spina were to show loyalty both in contractual contact
arrangements and with 'political' problems. In the first area, there
is considerable evidence that the final convictions of Addonizio and
his associates on extortions were only the tip of the iceberg. The
FBI tapes, cited by Porambo, for example, showed Mafia chieftains illus-
trating systematic kickbacks, even for very 'small jobs'.88 More
important, however, were the really big jobs, or the publically gener-
ated construction related contracts. As one illustration, a local
electrical contractor, known as Valentine Electric, started modestly in
1958, but in a short ten years became the biggest in the area.- This
company was literally supported by $5,000,000 worth of contracts exclu-
sively through the Newark Housing Authority, contracts assured through
its 'salesman'Tony Boiardo and Addonizio.89 Most of the contractual
arrangements in Boiardo's words on FBI tapes were through Spina, the
police director.
In handling Addonizio's political problems, Spina's efforts- centered on
black control. Even before the riots, the Newark police under Addonizio
had gradually become to blacks a kind of lower class gestapo, randomly
and arbitrarily harassing ghetto residents and provoking arguments
leading to killings from time to time. There was little discipline of
the patrolman under the Spina system. Whatever semblance of traditional
hierarchical organization and paramilitary structure the police force had
prior to Spina, most of it broke down with the banishment of the Irish
and the replacement of many top officers with Spina's friends, some of
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whom, thanks to Spina's by-pass of the civil service system, were
appointed without the benefit of civil service promotional examinations.
Some of Spina's own thoughts on blacks were evident when he was called
to testify. on riots in Trenton in 1968 and he labeled the problem as
"guerilla warfare" and suggested "they're going to go into the downtown
business section and into the white suburbs and start shooting and
burning" .90
The regular police force, as suggested, became a prime target of Spina
and Addonizio. In particular, senior officers -- mainly Irish -- were
threatening in part because of broader connections in the regional
system, in part because some, at least, were not to be 'trusted' to go
along with the system and, in part, probably because they were Irish
and taking up positions and power the Italians believed they were
entitled to. Immediately, Spina did face resistance from John Redden,
a senior officer, widely reputed as an honest cop and a man slated for
promotion to Deputy Chief in the Department. Redden was a natural
leader for the anti-Spina forces, or for those demoralized by the new
system. 91
Spina's strategy of use of the police centered -on use of the detective
squad, through a system of by-pass of promotions and discretion on re-
cruitment. As early as 1965, a Grand Jury presentment brought in Essex
-County found political consideration in offers to plainclothes and
gambling details. The Grand Jury also found that Spina's testimony
that he makes decisions regarding transfers of personnel using his own
standard and that the mayor recommended transfers and appointments that
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were political, unacceptable behavior for city police administrative
staff, and in violation of State Civil Service Rules. 92 More specific-
ally, Spina ignored the state and local rules. As Porambo recounted,
although no examination was required when the detective title was
instituted in 1955, Spina's predecessor established evaluation criteria
when he took over in 1958 and a written exam followed. In addition, a
rating system and recommendations of deputy chiefs was required for
promotion. The assignment from patrolman to detective carried an exam,
regularly scheduled by the state department of civil service, and an
additional $300 annually in salary. Spina replaced the exam with per-
sonal choices, and it was hinted widely that many of the choices were
contingent on the abilities of the men to get involved with the growing
protection rackets in the city. While the Kerner Commission report
suggested there was widespread "belief" of corruption in the police
and the city, the Hughes Commission report recommended a grand jury
probe of "corruption" in the Newark administration and an investi.gation
of the Newark Police Department, a group regarded in the ghetto as "the
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single continuously lawless element operating in the community".
Later, in testimony before the Governor's Riot Commission, police
careerist John Redden confirmed the general and widespread use of the
detective division for protection and growth of a mini-syndicate within,
engaged in a broad range of illegal activities in the city.94 The addi-
tional fact that Spina openly hired known syndicate connections in
police activities, such as Harry 'Tip' Rosen as director of public
relations in the police department while he continued to hold a part
time job with Geraldo Catena, a widely reputed syndicate leader, was
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found to add to the picture of a thoroughly corrupted tangle in the
police system.95
1) Nonwhites in the Addonizio Police System
There is little doubt that nonwhites suffered particularly under the
Addonizio police system. There is little question that most of the
police personnel were anti-black, as was the Director, Spina. While
Newark's nonwhites had always suffered to some degree from the discrimi-
nation against their participation in department hiring, and from
direct effects of 'policing the ghetto', the situation seriously pre-
cipitated the civil disorders which rocked the city in 1967 and 1968.
In 1967, at the time of the riots, the police hiring system had disin-
tegrated into chaos, and there were few records on what the division did.
The Hughes Commission, investigating the riots, was forced, for example,
to make its own survey on composition of the police force.- Department
personnel records (the city personnel department was not allowed to
keep data other than simple payroll information on the police), were
remarkably void of information and there were no statistics on composi-
tion of the force according to age, education, -race or residence. The
Commission survey found that of a total force of 1,512 there were only
145 blacks and one Puerto Rican serving a city population of at least
52% black and 10% Spanish speaking. All but nine of the nonwhites held
the lowest rank, patrolmen, and only one, Edward Williams, had obtained
a rank as high as captain. Williams, however, had been appointed
hastily, and with much regret by Spina, following the 1967 riots and a
spectacular condemnation of the police force. 96
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Blacks had a long history of grievances against the Newark police.
Almost immediately following Addonizio's first electoral victory,
blacks agitated for an end to harassment in Newark's ghetto areas.
George Richardson, who had just won an assembly seat to represent
Newark, agitated heavily for a civilian police review board to take
citizen complaints. Addonizio proved no more responsive to black
demands than the Carlin administration, and, after pressures from the
police organization, barely considered the idea.97  In 1965, the
civilian police review board was revived again and James Farmer,
national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) led a'march
to Newark's Military Park in the central business area supporting the
review board. What followed was a police riot, mass beatings, shootings
and the arrest of Farmer and other black leaders.98
With the increase in militancy of blacks during the mid 1960's, the
police system response was widespread and often brutal. Even before the
outbreak during the summer of 1967, a system of harassment by the police
in ghettos prevailed. Recruited primarily among lower class Italians,
the police echoed a growing anti-black sentiment as black agitation and
political organizing expanded. On the one hand, the 'off duty' police
surveillance system tended to expand control of the police in the
ghetto. On the other, the tendency for the central operation to dis-
patch large numbers of police at peaceful demonstrations aggravated
hostilities. Whether protests were local, or those of outsiders such as
the NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union, or other civic and civil
rights groups of national standing, the police treatment was the same. 99
Generally, support by local white self-styled vigilantes assisted in
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covering openly brutal acts and assured 'civilian' white testimony
would neutralize any charges. At the same time, a more general
system of arrests on petty charges, beatings, confinements was pervasive
in Newark's ghetto areas.100
The outbreak of civil disorders in the summer of 1967 in one way was
expected and appeared more of an extension of prior police rioting than
a new set of events. This time, however, the system disintegrated
quickly out of control, bringing the even more brutal external state
police forces. According to the New Jersey Riot Commission report, the
Newark police force crumbled into anarchy and white police and civilian
leadership underwent total paralysis. Random killing followed, leaving
26 dead.
F. The 1970 Election and the Fall of the Ethnic Machine
The election of 1970 in Newark symbolized the end of the I-talian machine
in Newark and the rise of black power. Two major themes underscored the
elections of 1970: one the one hand, there was the disaster of the
Addonizio years, sealed neatly during the campaign, with a grand jury
indictment on extortion charges. On the other.hand, there was the rise
of black political organization out of the ruins of the rebellions,
organized protests and struggles over the poverty program. In 1970, a
black and Puerto Rican coalition had nominated a viable candidate
who looked like he might win. The opposition looked bad, but not
hopeless in racially divided Newark. The election was a true test of
black organization's ability against high odds.
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Addonizio's situation would have been hopeless in any city but Newark.
In addition to the revolt over urban renewal, the schools, the police
and the hospital, Newark was smouldering from the civil disorders of
1968 and a scathing report from the Governor's Select Commission
openly accused Addonizio's regime of graft, corruption and his police
of initiation of a full scale riot. There was no conspiracy found on
the part of blacks, and, in fact, the Commission Report suggested that
most black grievances were quite legitimate. By 1970, the report's
recommendation had taken effect. Three separate grand juries which had
been sitting for more than a year, just prior to the 1970 elections,
returned indictments on Addonizio and six close associates, including
several councilmen. Trials were set to run during the campaign. While
Addonizio's record was probably one of the worst in contemporary U.S.
city history, in parochial Italian Newark, there were other considera-
tions which weighed very much in his favor for reelection.
Addonizio played heavily on the local political culture, the intense
hatred of blacks and threat of loss of rewards and prestige. a black
upset would make. His campaign was run on a mixture of strong arm
strategies utilizing the apparatus of government at its legal maximum
while playing on fears of whites fearful of displacement. To the
general white community, he evoked fears of 'black extremism' and
associated his strong opponent, Kenneth Gibson, with a 'racist' conven-
tion led by Leroi Jones, a black poet who had returned to Newark during
the 1960's to become heavily involved in Newark black politics. His
other opponent, Anthony Imperiale, a self-styled white vigilante and
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head of the North Ward Citizens Committee, was also pictured as an
'extremist' in his baiting of blacks and occasional involvement in
harassment and beatings. The campaign, however, for Addonizio
focused on two key issues of (1) race and (2) the trials.
By 1970, race had been transformed from an ethnic 'law and order'
issue into the real threat of loss of the spoils of the machine system.
With a direct employee payroll of over 5,000 mainly white, lower classed
workers and other city employment totaling around 9,000 (with the
Newark Housing Authority and the Newark Education System), the threat
of displacement of white jobs by black government was great. With
nearly every white family in Newark with a friend or relative in city
employment directly or through city generated construction contracts,
Addonizio made the employment issue work to his advantage. He actively
campaigned in Italian areas hinting at his intention to preserve white
jobs if elected, and cajoled endorsements from public employees and
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big trade unions which dominated city contracting. In city hall,
top administrative employees were openly threatened to 'get in line or
get out' and he fired his fire director for refusing to endorse him. 102
Finally, he pushed a carrot through the city council for existing city
workers in the form of generous pay hikes and promotions for top
uniformed personnel and across the board 'bonuses' of $2,000 for the
city's remaining 3,000 non-uniformed employees.103  While these actions
left the city with an effective 'deficit' in the 1970 budget, it
succeeded in mobilizing an army of workers.
Addonizio had little defence against the exposure of the national and
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local press over the Trenton trials which he attended by day while he
campaigned by night. This seemed to affect him little, and he managed
to recruit an army of aides. Very possibly Newark was so accustomed to
corruption that Addonizio did have no reason to worry. For the general
public, the trials were probably more important to outsiders than
insiders who knew about corruption for much longer. For his part,
Addonizio plunged ahead. He campaigned on a theme of "Peace and
Progress", and avoided talk about the trial. Hundreds of youthful
Italian Americans were mobilized and the mayor concentrated heavily
on Italian wards. City Hall reporters suggested that Addonizio's
campaign 'ticked like a well-wound clock', and his aides were predicting
a likely victory. 1 0 4
In Newark's non-partisan primary, Addonizio faced,in addition to
Imperiale and Gibson, John Caulfield, the city's former Fire Director,
an Irishman and a moderate; George Richardson, the black assemblyman
who had initially endorsed Gisbon in 1966; Harry Wheeler, another black
who had vacillated back and forth between Addonizio appointments in
city hall and black activism, and finally, a particularly innocuous,
but 'clean' Italian, Matturi, reportedly sponsqred by the Newark
business interests. 105 Gibson managed to poll the largest share of
the votes, but fell short of a majority which automatically forced a
runoff with the runnerup Addonizio in the final election. In the
final elections, Imperiale endorsed Addonizio and Caulfield endorsed
Gibson. While the Imperiale endorsement contributed substantially to
Addonizio's vote, Gibson won handily with over 10,000 votes.
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The defeat of Addonizio signaled far more than a victory of blacks over
whites in Newark. It ended, symbolically at least, the ethnic regime a
an instrument of power and, given the Newark experience, it is unlikely
to be repeated. Blacks danced in the streets on the evening following
the victory and for days afterward; they had been the center of attention
for the nation, and for a few the 'great white hope' for salvaging
democracy. The ethnic regime created by Addonizio, however, neither
developed in isolation, nor was it or the themes underlying it resolved
by the Gibson victory. Addonizio's system was linked very securely with
the interests of the region and perhaps the nation, in resolving both
the poor white problem and the poor black problem. The costs, however,
in the Addonizio system were very high. Addonizio had to create Dahl's
classic 'hegemonic' social system, which by 1967, blacks were unable
to accept.106 The real threat, as Porambo and other black observers
suggest, was that more might be exposed. The Addonizio system was
entangled with regional and even national interests. If the legs could
be chopped, the body could be salvaged.
There are other thoughts on the fall of Addonizio and blacks in city
hall. George Sternleib, a student of Newark housing and racial transi-
tion in the area, suggests that black victory paves the way for regional
insulation of blacks in a 'sandbox', where regional wealth can turn off
the water, or indulge in experiments of black self-development at will,
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and where blacks will always remain vulnerable. Frances Pivin and
Richard Cloward suggest a similar thesis in visualizing the empty coffers
faced by Gibson in Newark, Hatcher in Gary or Coleman in Detroit.108
There is little risk indeed to having a black mayor in an impoverished city.
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Chapter 3: Rise of the Black Movement in Newark
Black political organization in Newark was conditioned by the opportuni-
ties available to Newark's ghetto, by resources which entered during
the mid-1960's under the Great Society Programs (and the subsequent
decision to curtail them in order to curtail meaningful black control),
by external advocates of black control, and by the unfolding of a set
of events in the political environmnet which made the white power
system in Newark extremely vulnerable and costly to the region. Along
with growth of black organizing, black expectations changed radically.
What Newark citizens -- both black and white -- expect of government
today was largely shaped by the process of black organizing and protests
during the 1960's. This has posed constraints and provided some oppor-
tunities for black government which has controlled the city since 1970.
There are several views about the causes of black political development
in the United States as well as more general views of how citizens make
known their desires in government, especially to candidates for public
office. Although political development is a term usually applied to
developing economies, some views of black organization link causes to
similar conceptions of economic and social development, as well as
evolution from traditional social organization to conceptions of secular
government. One view of black political development in the United
States hypothesizes that blacks will organize politically when perceived
economic gains are threatened, there are openings in the system which
create some opportunities for mobility and there is threat of coercion.
This view is what might be termed an hypothesis of 'conflict' mobiliza-
I
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tion. Underlying it is the notion that blacks are 'conscious' of their
victimized status, as a social group, and do not accept its institution-
alization, and tend to shift blame for it outside of their scope of
control. Another somewhat contrasting view suggests that blacks may
be subjected from time to time to consciousness raising, but that
basically the system has prohibited political development. Lower class
sub-culture, created out of discrimination, has reinforced itself over
time into a kind of pathological sub-system which permits some self
protection, but basically exists within a larger system of control.
Supporting the first view is black sociologist St. Clair Drake in argu-
ing against both the 'conflict, accommodation and assimilation' model of
U.S. ethnic mobility, and that of Marxists who persist in viewing blacks
as a 'sub-culture which reinforces false consciousness'. Drake suggests
instead that the events of the 1960's -- particularly the Civil Rights
Movement, as well as the losses incurred by cooptation by white machines
in northern cities such as Chicago -- illustrate that blacks are
conscious of their low status in the U.S. economic system. - At the same
time, however, blacks are cynical about potential change. The develop-
ment of the black 'folkways' culture thus is not so much 'pathological'
as it is representative of the existence of a value largely dis-
tinct from 'middle class' norm of white America. Rather, poor whites,
or working class whites are more likely to be guilty of a pathology
growing out of distance between the middle class norm and achievement
toward these goals.
A sober analysis of the civil rights movement would
suggest, however, that the striking fact about all
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levels of the Negro community is the absence of 'false
consciousness,' and the presence of a keen awareness
of the extent of their victimization, as well as
knowledge of the forces which maintain it. Not lack
of knowledge but a sense of powerlessness is the key
to the Negro reaction to the caste-class system.
There is an increasing tendency among Negroes to discuss
what the quality of life would be within Negro communi-
ties as they grow larger and larger. At one extreme
this interest slides over into Black Nationalist reac-
tions such as the statement by a Chicago Negro leader
who said, "Let all of the white people flee to the
suburbs. We'll show them that the Black Man can run
the second largest city in America better than the white
man. Let them go. If any of them want to come back and
integrate with us, we'll accept them".1
While St. Clair Drake sees in black social organization itself a con-
sciousness strong enough for blacks to conceptualize the organization
and operation of a political system (and few fears of the capacity to
do so), some parallel views look more at the opportunity structure
provided (or not) for mobilization to take place. William Gameson, for
example, suggests that American political life is characterized not so
much by high levels of competition serving to create distribution of
power and thus superior access for minorities, as it is by a shifting
opportunity structure. The shifting of opportunities is created by the
tendency towards repression of the entry of new-groups. Depending on
how such repressive tactics are timed, resistance and development of
conflict through extra-legal means may occur.
My central argument is that the American political
system normally operates to prevent incipient compe-
titors from achieving full entry into the political
arena. Far from there being built-in mechanisms
which keep the system responsive, such groups win
entry only through a breakdown in normal operations
of the system or through demonstrations on the part
of challenging groups of a willingness to violate
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the "rules of the game" by resorting to illegitimate
means for carrying on political conflict.2
Illegitimate, of course, can have two interpretations: one suggests
that the 'rules of the game' are written by those in power to keep
those out of power excluded. The other suggests more of a market
model, where in the course of cooptation the greater system 'allows'
a certain amount of 'slack' or safety valves for the playing out of
real potential pressures generated by conflict. Some 'slack' may also
be generated outside organized government, as with Federal programs
for the poor. The playing out of political roles in the 1960's for
blacks in the Civil Rights movement, OEO and Federal program citizen
participation politics, as well as civil disorders, have not generated
a particularly coherent view of the conflict and mobilization thesis
of black political organization. Observers, such as Skolnick, Waskow,
and Cosner3 have tended to isolate the riots and riot behavior from the
more general organized build up in cities where civil disorders took
place; social and political analysts who prepared reports for the
various commissions tended to downplay the role of black political
organizing as a political movement, and generally pictured leadership
as the 'coolers' of unrest. The riot commission reports, on the other
hand, tended to diffuse the causes into the socio-economic environment
and generalize a great deal about 'legitimate grievances' black communi-
ties had against 'racism', again a very general and pervasive phenomena
which offers little explanation or remedy for the questions raised by
rioters themselves. There is, therefore, almost a quantum leap from
the disorganized riot behavior of the victims to the election of black
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mayors in 15 or more U.S. cities between 1967 and 1974 which is
unexplained.
Hadden, Masotti and Thiessen,writing on the first black mayoral victories
in major U.S. cities (Richard Hatcher in Gary, Indiana, and Carl Stokes
in Cleveland) attempt to uncover some threads of explanation for black
political victories. They generally find a mobilization of black voters,
an alienation of whites, a high level of debate during campaigns (which
tends to raise information exchange and communication about candidates),
all preceding narrow black victories.4 Another feature is failure of
'ethnic' coalitions, militant black organizing, civil disorders, decreas-
ing support by otherwise neutral white mayors or anti-black police
chiefs, and finally (particularly in the case of Gary), large suspicions
about the domination of local regimes by organized crime. Moreover,
they count rather heavily and pessimistically on the white exodus --
that is, the exodus of anti-black voters -- to explain victories.
Stokes and Hatcher won because black-voter power
coalesced with a relatively small minority of
liberal whites. It was not a victory of accept-
ance or even tolerance of Negroes, but a numerical
failure of the powers of discrimination, a failure
that resulted in large part because of the massive
exodus of whites from the central city.5
The picture that is painted from the black community organizational end
is essentially appeal based on an entirely new organization phenomena in
black communities. Excluded from participation in white politics, with
the absence of any mechanism such as a 'white machine' to channel
votes, when whites became alienated, there was little appeal to black
candidates by white leadership. In fact, to the contrary, white candi-
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dates retrenched to 'protect' failing white coalitions, threatened by
white voter exodus. Thus it became possible to mobilize blacks with
a wide variety of distinct objectives and grievances through the
voting mechanism and in the case of Stokes, a fairly 'generalized'
appeal. 6
A final view of black organizing based on a combination of opportunity
structure and 'consciousness' is outlined by Thomas Pettigrew following
closely on theories of Mascotti and Bowen and Davis.7 Starting with
Davis' four processes which lead to unrest, Pettigrew suggests that
both the context for the black revolt of the 1960's and subsequent
political organizing for the vote have much to do with the classic
Marxist 'relative deprivation' situation.
...improving conditions typically set off four pro-
cesses which lead to unrest. Thus economic progress
(1) frequently leads to faster improvement for the
dominant group of elite than for the subordinate
group, (2) typically creates expectations that rise
more rapidly than actual changes, (3) generally leads
to widespread status inconsistencies, and (4) often
causes a broadening of comparative reference groups 8
In examining further the case for organizing, Pettigrew suggests that a
key variable in the process is the sense of "environmental control".
Advances, if perceived as paternalistically 'giVen' by whites, according
to Pettigrew, "would presumably have had far less psychological impact
than they have had in fact -- since they are typically seen as "won" by
-Negroes whose control over their fate is expanding".9
Leading one step further, Pettigrew outlines one potential explanation
for the electoral organizing which he connects to the civil unrest
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framework; this is the perceived legitimacy of national government by
blacks and the equally perceived illegitimacy of local government. 0
Suggested here is that because blacks did have a concept of environ-
mental control, the fact that local government institutions such as
police, urban renewal authorities, etc., acted to frustrate this
control, while the Federal government appeared to be open and responsive,
blacks concluded that opportunities did exist for extending control
over local governments. By gaining power in city halls, blacks could
bring local governments in line with the broader, more responsive
national society and its institutions.
Traditional studies of black electoral politics (many made or based on
observations prior to the rise of black organizing in cities. Civil
Rights as a black movement and the development of 'black consciousness'
ideologies) tended to view blacks as a thoroughly repressed political
group, at worst, insulated carefully by coercion and tradition in a
separate political state, or at best a weak appendage to a sophisticated
white political machine. In the first case, the classic southern model
simply follows on the de-legitimization of black status; blacks do not
participate except on white terms. Robert Dahl, who called the system
'dual' and 'hegemonic', suggested its maintenance in the South was
dependent on an understanding of the main political strata of the
North, not to intervene and on repressive coercion.
James Q. Wilson in his classic study of black politics in Chicago in
the 1950's generally suggests that black electoral politics are a
function of white political organizational structure, and particularly of
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choices and devices used by white political organization to channel
and control black votes. 1 2 He develops a strong case for the relati\-
ship between a socially stratified black community and white interests,
with leadership choices (or leadership at all) based on certain effi-
ciencies of white politics to 'control' blacks socially or politically.
Thus, with a highly stratified social structure in the black community,
Chicago erected a sub-structure to the dominant, strong ethnic machine;
Detroit co-opted working class leadership through CIO-AFL organization
(again resulting in exclusion of direct participation of blacks in
electoral politics); and in Floyd Hunter's Atlanta, informal linkages
with black business elites assisted in communicating grievances or
exerting social control. Varying degrees of efficiencies and costs
accrue both to the white power and political interests and blacks,
depending on local tradition, the existence or not of a strong black
elite, the need for ethnic coalitions, etc. 13
What is useful from the traditional views of black politics is the
strains built into the secondary system, from the perspective of black
political development. Assuming that the 'long swing' of economic
improvements was taking place during the 1950's, that there were major
strains in ethnic coalitions (or in the South, between poor and better
off whites) caused by suburbanization, it becomes easier to understand
the receptivity of blacks to political organizing. With a decline in
'competition' (albeit accompanied by a rise in repression), a delegiti-
mization of local government and a growth in the notion of 'control'
assisted by Civil Rights and other philosop-hies, electoral politics
was an almost natural outcome in the 1960's and 1970's.
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Organization of the Chapter
This chapter examines two primary questions. One, the structure and
evolution of black political organizing in Newark during the 1960's,
which brought Kenneth Gibson to power in the 1970 elections. A second
question examined is that of the kinds of demands and expectations
which evolved during this intense debate period, and subsequently
carried over into the administration of black government in 1970. In
the first case, some deeper themes of development of concepts of black
control and legitimacy which are hypothesized to effect the propensity
for blacks to organize politically are examined. More specific questions
of the perception of national government roles in Newark, outsiders and
resources which are hypothesized to also effect organizing are also
examined. In the second case, while most analysts suggest that prefer-
ence and demand raising is only imperfectly carried through during the
electoral process, despite the fact that this is considered the key
mechanism for citizen preference stating for local government, others
suggest in the case of blacks there is something called 'excessive'
expectations articulated through the black vote. Both these hypotheses
are important in understanding both the constraints and opportunities
for a black mayor once in office.
The chapter is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three
phases in the evolution of black organizing in Newark. The first
examines background population and economic change, and in particular
the rapid increase of nonwhites between 1950 and 1970 and the political
outcomes of one experiment with coalition, in a machine arrangement
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with white political forces in Newark. The strained relationship
between the coalition and ad hoc protests over public works clearance
bringing about the demise of the 'machine' lead to the second phase
of black political development.
The second part of the chapter looks more closely at the protest during
the rise of the Civil Rights movement, and the entry of the Great
Society programs in Newark during the mid 1960's. One hypothesis
examined relates to the use of the poverty programs for political
organizing and other resources for extra-legal challenges, and the
evolution from extra-legal to legal challenges, culminating in the
victories over highway and renewal clearance. Emergence of key person-
alities are also examined.
A third part of the chapter examines the electoral challenges of 1966
and 1970, and the role of key community, regional and national interests.
Two evaluations are made: (1) one of the coalition movement itself as
a device for organizing votes, and (2) the structure of issue raising
and issue articulation. In the latter case, the question raised is to
what degree has demand been raised in generalized terms, so that
expectations are above the response capacity of elected officials once
in office. An antithetical question posed is to what degree are issues
so articulated as to make goals specific to the official. Both of
-these questions are important in examining the degree to which a con-
ception of 'rising expectations' characterized black electorates
versus degrees to which electorates perceive some limitations on power
of electoral office.
I . -
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A. The Emerging of a Black Political Movement in Newark
Relations between blacks and whites in the political sphere of Newark
were largely defined by the trends in settlement during the 1950's and
by the failure of coalitions providing entry to blacks into the
broader political arena in Newark. A traditional 'black' machine
endured only briefly, a victim both of the 'shrinking of resources'
of the city available to 'feed' political rewards and to the rapidly
evolving political development of blacks themselves.
Large numbers of blacks had settled in Newark during world war II.,
attracted by wartime employment expansion in the city and region.
During the war industrial employment based on wartime contracting
expanded considerably as did the production of some consumer products
(notably food processing) for the rapidly expanding concentration of
wartime workers. 14 Government employment also grew, primarily, however,
in the Federal sector. For example, some 2,000 jobs were located in
Newark in a regional Office of Price Stabilization Office. 15 While
discrimination was generally practiced against blacks in both public
and private sectors, particularly at the end of the war, Federal
employment was opened substantially. Efforts by black civil servants
both in Washington and outside paid off in passage of numerous anti-
discrimination laws, as well as the setting up of national panels
accompanied by substantial publicity.16
1) Black Population Expansion in Newark
Black population expansion followed closely behind wartime economic
. S.-
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expansion. Between 1911 and 1917, Newark's black population increased
from 11,000 to around 30,000 reflecting a combination of world war I
expansion and contraction in European immigrants. Newark's black
population continued to increase somewhat more slowly during the 1920's,
and tapered off during the depression years, increasing only slightly
between 1930 and 1940. World war I conditions were then repeated during
the mobilization in the early 1940's and were once again highly corre-
lated to wartime industry expansion. Between the Census periods of
1940 and 1950, nonwhites in the city increased 60% from 45,760 and
slightly more than 10% of the city's population to 75,965 or around
17% of the city's population. There was little question that this
period was characterized, as had been the world war I period, by
increases owing primarily to inmigration. In 1957, studies indicated
that only about 9,000 of the total 30,000 nonwhite increase between
1940 and 1950 could be attributed to natural increase, or excess of
births over deaths; the remainder was inmigration, primari'ly from
southern states. 17
During the past two decades, however, the pattern of nonwhite expansion
shifted considerably from one characterized by high inmigration of
nonwhites to fairly stable increase in nonwhites from natural increase
alone; the drastic changes in the composition of the total population
and the increase in nonwhites from 17.23% to 56.0% of the population
between 1950 and 1970 are explained primarily by white outmigration.
While nonwhites increased between 1950 and 1970 from 74,965 to 214,035,
an estimated 60,000 whites left Newark. 18
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2) Black Employment in Newark
While a key underlying cause for both civil disorders in the late 1960's
and the election of a black mayor cited by a large number of Newarkers
and the leadership was employment and employment opportunities for
nonwhites, evidence indicates that a pattern of expansion and contrac-
tion has characterized nonwhite employment since the second world war.
During the second world war up until the cessation of hostilities,
unemployment among nonwhites was low owing to the general labor shortage
while employment had expanded in blue collar work. While there were
56,600 manufacturing production jobs in the city by 1939, by 1947 there
were 73,700, but by 1955 manufacturing had dwindled to around 69.600.
Moreover, one study suggests that the war only interrupted a pre-war
job composition shift from manufacturing to service activities which
had already started during the 1920's. 1 9 By the post-war period,
Newark already had a smaller proportion of manufacturing to total jobs
than that of the region, or 44% compared to 55% in 1955.20'
Nonwhite employment rates, as well as reverse commutation patterns,
soared with contraction of manufacturing jobs and their replacement
with white collar jobs. The nonwhite job gap was estimated to equal
around 15,000 in 1970, compared to 5,000 in 1960 according to a recent
21
report.21 In 1970, census data indicated that nonwhite unemployment
totaled 7.7%, while 26.59% of nonwhite families received some form of
public assistance.
The established pre-war 'commutation' patterns also deepened with the
shift from mainly white to mainly nonwhite resident workforce. In 1944,
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a study of potential post-war unemployment estimated that 56% of local
employment of all categories resided outside the city, while a large
number of Newark residents, including an estimated 8,000 - 12,000
commuters employed mainly in manufacturing in New York City, worked
outside the city in Hudson County, Bloomfield, the Oranges, Irvington
and other municipalities of the region. 22 This phenomena was again
noted by Wilfred Owen in his study on transportation in the region in
the mid 1950's 23 and by the Rapkin study in 1957.24 Rapkin also sug-
gested that suburban commuters into the city generally earned more than
residents undertaking the more costly reverse commutation.25 The impact
on nonwhites was particularly serious. A high proportion of the
'replacement' employment for Newark residents for that which had con-
tracted during post-war years was very low wage domestic services work,
undertaken by nonwhite women outside the city.26
There were few attempts by the public sector to address the problem
of employment contraction in general in post-war Newark, or particular
problems of nonwhites in the employment market, particularly on the issue
of employment discrimination. In 1944, the City of Newark commissioned
a major study to analyze the potential problem of unemployment the
cessation of hostilities would bring.27 The study made the assumption
there would be no employment contraction, despite all evidence to the
contrary, and suggested that a modest public works program would
suffice to employ around 2,000 workers.28 The business interests who
served as an advisory staff to the study consultant advised the'
consultant that the private sector 'would be in a position to manage the
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problem', and further, that a large scale public works program 'might
disrupt the local labor market situation'.29
There were also few moves to enforce anti-discrimination laws passed
during the post-war period in the state and on the Federal level, or
to hire nonwhites in public services, particularly on the local level.
Since 1947, New Jersey had one of the strongest anti-discrimination
laws in the U.S.; enforcement, however, was left to a very weak State
Division of Civil Rights. Only after the Federal Divil Rights act of
1964, however, was the Civil Rights Division empowered to initiate
cases. 30 Lowcal officials were not only reluctant to set up apparatus
for monitoring private discrimination, but did little as recently as
the late 1960's to monitor public employment discrimination.31
B. The First Steps: Black-White Coalitions
Two types of coalitions emerged in Newark during the late 1950's and
early 1960's. One was ad hoc organizing attempts, primarily in
racially transitional neighborhoods, which attempted to build resistance
to a 'tipping' factor in the proportion of nonwhites. Another was an
attempt to build a black political organizatiorrin traditional machine
style by Newark's first black councilman, Irvine Turner, with white
support. Both failed primarily because of the underestimation of the
rapidity of changing ideas on one hand and the commitment on the
part of whites to cooperative experiments involving blacks on tie other.
Clinton Hill, an area locked between the entirely black Central Ward
and more suburbanized white South Ward of Newark, was a formerly Jewish
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area which during the 1950's became an area of rapidly accelerating
exodus of Jewish families, real estate speculation and a drift toward
consideration for clearance by the City's renewal authority. In the
early 1960's, a bi-racial Clinton Hill Neighborhood Council was
formed, primarily to halt urban slum clearance and fight several
highway projects. There was no political representation of the commun-
ity in the City Council, and many of the grievances were felt by
nonwhites to be 'overreactions' to the entry of nonwhites into the
area.32 A great deal of the organization's early activities were
directed toward stemming the tide of racial change in the area. In
1961, the Neighborhood Council did, however, support a lawsuit initiated
by seven local residents to halt urban renewal. For the following
three years, while a struggle went on in the courts against the renewal
plan, the area continued to decline. In 1964, the area was therefore
a prime target for entry of outside organizers, active in Civil Rights
and urban affairs. In 1964, Students for A Democratic Society (SDS),
led by Tom Hayden, began organizing in Newark, at the invitation of
Professor Stanley Winters of Newark College of Engineering, who saw a
need for the group to assist the Clinton Hill Council.33 SDS concen-
trated on housing and other organizing for city services improvements.
Following a split with the group at the end of the summer of 1964,
SDS left local people as full time organizers in a new organization,
Newark Community Union Project (NCUP). NUCP remained strong in the
area, but established liaisons with other groups and shifted its focus
to picketing and demonstrations, litigation against landlords, rent
striking organizing and agitating for more responsive police. By 1965,
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the initial white influence in the activities of the group had declined
and attention was turned to action in the OEO poverty arena and the
emerging black movement in Newark.34
The rise and fall of Irvine Turner's Central Ward organization was a
somewhat different situation. Turner came in somewhat earlier and
prior to the rise of the nonwhite movement in Newark. An ex-copyboy
for a local white newspaper and occasional journalist for black weeklies,
Turner succeeded in running and getting elected Newark's first black
councilman in 1953. He reportedly had ambitions to become Newark's
first black mayor and immediately set about attaching himself strongly
to the Italian power structure emerging with the Charter change in
1954. When efforts to gain patronage through Carlin's two terms
failed, Turner turned to Addonizio and agreed to 'deliver the black'
vote of the Central Ward, if Addonizio would assure him patronage
denied by Carlin. By most accounts, both Turner and his organization
were ineffectual at developing a genuine appendage to the white-Italian
machine in Newark. Turner, himself, as a personality, tended to be
crude and transparent in strategies for containing the black vote,
reportedly occasionally using coercive methods. 3 5 Further, while he had
a high recognition factor in 1968 among blacks according to the New
Jersey Riot Commission report, 36 he had been all but excluded from the
emerging 'new politics' based on OEO resources and programs and the
northern civil rights movements. In fact, shortly following the
election of Addonizio in 1962, he appears to have been rendered
largely ineffectual. While part of this may be explained by failing
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health (some observers suggest he had become senile), part seems to
have been explained by his increasing involvemet with Addonizio's
extra-legal activities which expanded rapidly during the early 1960's.37
By the mid 1960's, Turner was no longer much of a force in the mainstream
of black politics in Newark.
However black-white coalitions may have operated in other situations,
clearly the typical models (the ad hoc coalition or the machine) did not
work in Newark. In addition to the mutual distrust of motives outlined
by observers such as Hamilton and Carmichael, other reasons may be
offered, including: value distances between blacks and whites, and
'threats' of losses to whites of collaborations with nonwhites, external
pressures which sought to undercut such coalitions, the general weak
resource position of blacks in setting base 'rules'for coalition forma-
tion. 38
In the case of the Clinton Hill Neighborhood Council (and to some
extent, its heir, NCUP), the problem lay with the initial objectives of
the organization, to dampen the effects of 'block busting', or general
'flight' in the area, by convincing whites to stay. This inevitably
suggested forming a tight boundary to prevent eftensions of the black
community into the area. The fact that there was a mixture of landlords
(i.e those with investment property) and homeowners suggested equally
mixed motives. A second objective, to halt the nenewal and highway
plans, also had problems. The 'ad hoc' protest movement is seldom
able to sustain itself without very strong commitments of at least a
few residents willing to devote considerable amounts of personal
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resources in a continuous organizing process. Also, victories count
in giving some momentum to the organizing process. With no victories,
and the state and city adopting noncompromising attitudes (or in the
case of the. highway, feeling the waiting process help's in overcoming
any objections), there was little to build on.
In the case of the Turner machine, it was clear that the rewards were
far too small to establish a genuine claim on the community vote and
loyalty. As one observer suggested, "the organization begins to feed
upon itself," and very soon is exhausted.39 Another problem which the
Turner machine had which contrasts it with other black machine appendage
situations was the nature of the Addonizio machine. No black slice
was carved out for Turner which included an expanding black community
and vote. Rather, Turner was limited pretty much to the Centra-1 Ward
and very poor Newarkers, while the rapidly expanding areas of the South
Ward were not addressed.40 A New black leadership simply ,emerged in
the vacuum. As a traditional 'boss', Turner had little appeal to the
new Newarker with rapidly rising expectations and little patience.
With limited authority over black Newark, Turner, for his part, had
little to offer the Addonizio machine. Addonizio finally shifted his
strategy toward cultivating his own in-house black leader, Calvin West,
whose loyalties were certain, age and image more fitting with
the middle class black Newarker and who at least initially promised to
be able to control the poverty program.
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C. The Rise of Poverty Politics: The United Community Corporation
The evolution of political organizing and actions in Newark and the
development of black politics cannot be grasped without understanding
the evolution of Office of Educational Opportunity (OEO) programs which
occurred almost simultaneously with the migration of the Civil Rights
movement to northern cities. The two movements provide the underlying
ideological themes which welded blacks together, developed leadership
and gave a concrete and programmatic direction for political actions.
Poverty program politics in Newark had its birth with the initiation
of the United Community Corporation (UCC), Newark's community action
agency, which was set up in 1964. Newark's mayor, Hugh Addonizio, who
had been in office for two years, initiated the action by calling
together a group of public officials and civic leaders to form the UCC
and obtain a state charter. This was even before the congressional
action was completed. The mayor's staff had examined the bill and decided
that two components should be separated: the Mayor's office itself
should operate the manpower-related programs such as Neighborhood
Youth Corps and the Adult Work-Experience Programs, while a new non-
profit organization would be created to conduct- the community action
program. With the setting up of the UCC, the city, the Board of Educa-
tion and the United Community Fund each put up $15,000 to get the
program underway. Cyril Tyson, who had served as director of New York
City's experimental HARYOU, Harlem's youth development program, was
hired as a consultant to the Newark program. An application for OEO
funds was prepared and when an OEO development grant of $184,000 was
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received in 1965 Tyson was hired as the program's first Executive
Director. 42
From the start, the program wassomewhat handicapped by the detachment of
the manpower training programs, by the absence of community participa-
tion in the application and by the Mayor's domination of the development
process where objectives were primarily 'creation of a sub-system' of
black and white patronage activities, well removed from city hall.
43
Tyson's approach was to profit considerably by the HARYOU experience
and structure the organization in the beginning in ways that 'locked
in' very widespread community participation. The structure comprised
five components: corporation membership, area boards, task forces, a
board of trustees and new service agencies. The membership corporation
was open to anyone over 15 years of age, living or working in Newark;
all members automatically belonged to the area board for sections of
the city where they lived or worked. The city was divided .into nine
areas, which included poor and less poor sections such as Clinton Hill.
Three were organized initially and eventually eight came into being;
staff was hired by the central UCC, upon recommendation of the area
board.
In order to review program or service proposals, the UCC created a
series of task forces, on employment, education, housing, community
action and special projects. During the first year, membership was
drawn from area boards, public and private agencies and the public at
large and comprised 30 to 100 members.
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Policy control for the organization was vested in the Board of Trustees,
a body elected from the large membership corporation. This seems to
have given the UCC its uniquely democratic structure, as well as
made it praised widely, including by OEO, as the most representative
of Community Action Agencies in the country.44 At first, the board
of trustees comprised 53 persons, 5 city officials and 48 persons
chosen by the corporation members. This was gradually increased to 114
in 1967, then cut back following the Green Amendment to the Economic
Opportunity Act in 1968 to 45, comprising 15 public officials, 16 repre-
sentatives of the poor chosen by the eight area boards and 14 representa-
tives of private interests. Throughout the changes, however, the
board of trustees did maintain a black majority.
Two basic strategies emerged fairly early in UCC organization politics.
One was the setting up of entirely new agencies which would be con-
trolled by blacks and advocates of the poor. This was designed to
prevent established agencies -- public and private -- from capturing
control over the program. When UCC got its first OEO action grant in
1965, two new agencies, the Pre-School Council and the Legal Service
Project, began operations and a pre-existing black controlled Blazer
Community Employment Training Program was also funded.45 An additional
grant was given to the city sponsored Senior Citizens Commission, con-
ditioned, however, on the setting up of a policy advisory committee with
representation by the area boards. The 1965 grant also permitted the
setting up of three more area boards, bringing the total up to six and
the exploration of additional programs.
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A second strategy was an early focus on educational programs and
organization of the area boards. While this was intended to get the
organization started quickly and attract funds by the initial director,
Cyril Tyson, it did steer UCC away from the area of job training and
job development and into increased conflict with some city Councilmen
and established social agencies.46
The first strategy from the community's perspective worked extremely
well. As the New Jersey Riot Commission report found in its surveys
of the black community, a large proportion of Newark's black citi.zens
were impressed with the achievements of the pre-School Council and the
Legal Services Project, but unfortunately little of this success rubbed
off on the parent UCC. 47
The programs of the UCC's delegate agencies have, on
the whole, met much less criticism than the activities
carried on directly under the banner of the central
office. Deputy Mayor Paul H. Reilly has stated pub-
lically that the Newark Pre-School Council's Head Start
is the 'finest pre-school in the United States.' Simi-
larly, the Newark Legal Services Project is generally
acknowledged in the community to be well run and re-
spected. (Two-thirds of the project's board of trus-
tees are from the community served.)
Both programs have had an impact on existing institutions.
The parents of the Pre-School CounciL were instrumental
in getting the Board of Education to hire community 'aides
under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act and are now working for the implementation of a
teacher-intern "new careers" program at the Board of
Education. Newark Legal Services played a major part
in developing the recent legislation on rent control that
was enacted in Newark, and it has assisted in developing
new guidelines for welfare clients.48
The second strategy had very mixed results. On the community side, it
appeared to raise frustrations over the absence of economically oriented
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or job creating programs, which spillout effects resulted in a growing
challenge outside the UCC structure to the Mayor's control over job
training programs in the city, and the ethnic hiring practices on city
contracts. The one effort, the Blazer Work Training Program, while
supported to some extent by UCC, was also in almost constant conflict
the central board.49 On the other side, outside the community, the
restriction of interests to educational and social service programs
and organizing, did not relieve the City Hall view that the program was
out to challenge existing agencies and the political structure (i.e.
Mayor and Council) itself. Both the Mayor and the Council had strong
interests in preserving the status quo in existing institutional frame-
work and arrangements of government. The uses of the program, for exam-
ple for organizing against urban renewal projects, key appointments
such as the Board of Education and agitating for control over common
neighborhood services such as street lighting, trash collection and the
police, were viewed as a challenge to white control over jobs and
patronage. Addonizio also conceived of the program as a source of
'diversion' and potential patronage for blacks; out of his control,
the UCC was viewed as a threat. As early as UCC's first board meeting,
Addonizio expressed himself clearly:
It is the UCC's job to act as the eyes and ears of
the anti-poverty program and to suggest and coordin-
ate programs developed from the information gathered
from the poor; a 'social agency', advising the com-
ponent organizations on what is needed and helping
with detail...if the UCC builds itself up into a major
publicity force and begins to think of itself as a
political weight, then it will fail. 5 0
Later, the mayor was reported to have expressed himself more fully on
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the patronage potential to the executive director, Dr. L. Sylvester Odom,
during the first meeting of the two men.51  The Council also came
into strong conflict with UCC. White council members testified repeat-
edly before. various state and federal commissions against the UCC and
claimed to have documented proof of anti-poverty workers inciting to
riot; appearing before the McClellan Committee, however, they failed to
provide any such proof, as well as other proofs of illegal activities
on the part of the organization. 52
The hostility of the Council extended to actions to halt the program,
notably the provision of matching city funds to the organization. From
the beginning, the Council tied various strings to voting on grants to
matching city funds required by the Federal agencies and during the
entire operation of the program from 1964 through 1970, provided only
$28,503 in matching funds to the total of more than $3.6 million
generated out of Federal funds. As the New Jersey Riot Commission
reported, this action generated a good deal of bitterness in segments
of the black community; New York City, by contrast, provided approxi-
mately 30% of the funds out of local tax levies for its Community
Action programs.53
1) Impact of The Community Action Program on Black Political Development
The UCC served to accelerate political organizing in several ways.
First, it provided a forum for debate and central organization for focus
of a variety of legitimate community grievances, which was made widely
accessible to most community members, including latent leadership.
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Secondly, it provided resources and support for a number of constructive
programmatic and managerial experiments, as well as mechanisms for
'protecting' or 'buffering' them from external thrusts. Resources were
also provided for certain challenges to damaging or hostile actions,
public and private. Resources also provided support for leadership
development of a more general nature. Thirdly, the UCC had the indirect
effect of raising expectations for increased control , at a time when
Federal postures were rapidly turning against the evolvinq OEO system.
In the first case, in many instances the UCC provided a focal point for
discussion and strategies for actions (as well as a 'cooling' mechanism
for hot issues) where none existed in Newark. It was the only black
majority organization in the city, and the only one with large numbers
of blacks represented.54 While there were wide disagreements among
various factions in the community, as well as constant in-fighting,
there were really no other forums where such diverse views could be
expressed. The tight control exercised by the Italian regime, as well
as the absence of resources of Civil Rights group options such as CORE,
or the NAACP, served to encourage this basic strength. There are a host
of examples of the forum and backup support function of the UCC. Among
those which were important were the frustrations against urban renewal
clearance, the city hospital situation and the struggle for black
influence on the Board of Education. In each case, the UCC provided
directly or indirectly a mechanism for debate and strategy formulation
and occasional constructive implementation of alternative programs.
123
The uses of the UCC for initiating its own constructive programs in
spin-off agencies such as the Pre-School Council and Newark Legal
Services project have already been cited. It should be equally noted,
however, that many of the challenges to 'legitimate' institutions were
equally constructive, and certainly important in contributing to leader-
ship experience. The campaigns led by controversial Area Board 3 in the
Clinton Hill area against slumlords and city services culminated later
in the organization of a new and still viable agency, the Bessie Smith
Community Center, initially supported by UCC, and a white suburban
group, Friends of Clinton Hill, and eventually with the changeover in
1970 by city funds.55
The third issue, the indirect impact of the UCC in promoting rising
expectations, leading to demands for increased control is probably the
key to the creation of a viable mood and setting for organizing for
electoral office in Newark. The organization, almost from the beginning,
trailed somehow behind community expectations. This was clear in the
somewhat restricted role first laid out for the organization, which its
delegate agencies also almost immediately surpassed. The question of
employment and control over the city public school system became a main
thrust, for example, of the Pre-School Council when the real resources
of the system became apparent to activist parents. More importantly,
however, with each thrust -- on the Federal level, and from City Hall --
UCC retreated, once again provoking community antagonism and conflict
over the higher goals set previously. Two key events are important to
underline in the 'stop and go' trends of the external pressures.
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Almost from the start, the U.S. Congress became hostile to the OEO
program, particularly its organizing and legal services arms, which
appeared destined to generate conflicts between the poor and established
centers of power. True to expectations, city politicians and bureau-
crats saw OEO resources being utilized to challenge them. A congres-
sional battle ensued and culminated in the famous Green Amendment, which
literally threatened to dismantle the program. 56  The Green Amendment
gave the mayor of a city the option of placing the existing community
action program under his "complete control or of designating another
corporation of his choosing to serve that purpose in the city." 57 The
New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders predicted the outcome of
change accurately:
Given the present atmosphere of hostility and distrust
between the Mayor and important elements of leadership
and opinion in the Negro community, a fundamental
change in the status of the Negro community's "last
best hope" might create new problems.58
City Hall itself had first tried to threaten the UCC, then at a later
time attempted an unsuccessful takeover, using a black mayor's aide,
Laurie Stalks. When the UCC applied for matching funds for a second
OEO grant in 1965, the city Council waged a widely publicized 'investi-
gation' which culminated in a report condemning UCC activities. A
final opportunity was offered after the resignation of Cyril Tyson in
1966. Following an interim period of changeover, in September 1967,
Sylvester Odum, from OEO headquarters, took over in a mood of 'reform'.
Under Odum, the UCC radically changed directions, opened links of
communication with city hall and shifted emphasis of area board activi-
125
ties from social actions to recreation, sewing classes, tutorial
programs, welfare rights, certification of surplus food and multi-
phasic health examinations.59 The most striking change, however, was
in the budget. While for a nine month period ending in January 1968,
the allocation of resources for the UCC were divided between 50% for
Community Action, 20% manpower; 10% administration and 20% for five
programs, by 1969 slightly less than 20% of the UCC budget was
reportedly assigned to area boards for community action. 6 0 By this
time, however, not only was the UCC itself drained of its initial
resources and thrust, but City Hall had turned elsewhere with the new
strategy of Model Cities. 6 1 While the Addonizio administration had once
again evolved an early strategy for control over the black community
through Model Cities, by gerrymandering boundaries of the area to
include an at least 50% geographic concentration of whites, alert blacks
were organizing to take control over Model Cities where the U.S.
Congress had vested control, in City Hall.
2) Civil Rights Movement Themes
If OEO politics in Newark provided resources and opportunities for con-
structive actions and organizing, the entry of the Civil Rights Move-
ment's northern thrust brought a very new set of political ideologies
and organizing tactics, which focused on confrontation of institution-
alized power in both the private and public sector. The two intermingled
liberally during the mid-1960's, particularly through emerging leader-
ship. Finally, the Civil Rights Movement brought in new ideas from the
'outside', serving to expand the traditionally parochial Newark political
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system.
Among groups which were important were the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), which became active in Newark early in 1963, as part of a
strategy which focused on protests against discrimination; CORE
initially became active in the Barringer High School demonstrations,
which protested discrimination in construction hiring and lasted five
days in July 1963. This resulted in a series of arrests, culminating
in an agreement to organize an apprentice program for the building
trades. 62
CORE was active in a number of other issues, through its director,
Robert Curvin and other Civil Rights recruits to the group, including
the Medical School controversy, and the Parker-Callighan dispute. This
later action, concerned an issue which arose in the context of disputes
over black influence in the schools. It deserves some special mention
because of the influence it was said to contribute to rise in frustra-
tions which culminated in the civil disorders of 1967.63 Moreover, it
placed the civil rights activists squarely in a confrontation with a
recalcitrant Mayor, anxious to maintain patronage promises at the
extreme expense of alienation of most regional .support.
Early in 1967, it became known that the secretary of the Board of
Education planned to resign (to take, however, a $25,000 a year "con-
sulting' jobs with the Board of Education) and be replaced by Council-
man James T. Callaghan, an Addonizio supporter with 'county' connec-
tions. In May, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) proposed that the City Budget Director Wilber Parker, a
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black with a master's degree in public administration and the first
black CPA licensed in New Jersey, be named to the post. Callahan was
a former labor official who never attended college, and, in addition
to his council post, held a $10,500 a year job as secretary to the
Essex County Purchasing Agent.64 Even the normally quiet Newark Evening
News was forced to comment editorially that the differential qualifica-
tions of the two men were extreme.65 A tremendous outpouring of interest
followed when the appointment was taken up in June and it was only
through persuading the old secretary to stay that the matter was
resolved. The incident, however, left a lasting mark on the organization
and unity of the community, as one observed remarked:
"The only issue on which I've seen Negroes get truly
excited and concerned was Parker-Callighan. For the
first time, you really had a community." 66
Key strategies which the Civil Rights Movement brought to Newark were
the organizing around issues which cut across class and interest lines,
which focused on the key issue of a defined 'public authority' control
or action and which, where possible, defined questions in terms of
economic interests, such as employment. The concept of voting rights
was crucial, not only in organizing voter registration, but in defining
rights of control over public actions by citizen voters.
D. The Electoral Campaigns of 1966 and 1970 and Kenneth Gibson
The worst fears of Newark's City Council and mayor over poverty program
politics were realized by the entry of Kenneth Gibson in the primary of
1966. Gibson at the time was vice-president of the Board of Trustees of
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the United Community Corporation, and A city engineer, who decided at
the last minute to enter the race, reportedly as a 'test' of black
voting strength. By 1966, however, blacks were already organizing to
run for electoral office. That yearthere was still very little repre-
sentation in political office in the city. The two black councilmen,
Turner and West, were considered of negligible effectiveness in black
community terms, and while a few blacks had successfully gained state
offices, City Hall, where real potential for black gains lay, was com-
pletely closed off by a now hostile mayor and council.
The 1966 election was characterized in the black community as one
lacking in interest. While blacks were increasingly confronted with a
changing Italian regime, the only real opposition to Addonizio was
the anti-black ex-mayor Carlin. Addonizio had turned increasingly
against black organizing and demonstrations, while at the same time
showing increasing disinterest in the emerging and active QEO groups.
By 1966, his basic response was at best paternalistic. He responded
to black demands by powerless task forces, investigatory commissions
and other devices which appeared aimed more at dissipating unrest than
solving problems. The handful of symbolic jobs in city hall remained
that, symbolic for most blacks. The announcemnt in 1966 of a Black and
Puerto Rican convention to select two candidates for two councilman-
at-large seats, while late, promised at least a beginning.
The 1966 Convention organizing got started late, was poorly publicized
and was conceded by its organizers to have had 'too narrow" a base.
Imamu Baraka, one of the organizers, was a black poet born in Newark,
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who had returned after a successful career in New York in black nation-
alist theatre in Harlem. He became quickly involved in black politics
and organized the United Brothers, a new political group based on
nationalist ideologies which were rapidly expanding in Newark and
African cultural militancy. Determined to make Newark the successful
cultural and political experiment which failed in Harlem, Baraka
imported such emerging nationalist leaders as Maulana Ron Karenga of
"US", a Los Angeles-based black nationalist group, and displayed sympathy
and support for the growing black Muslim groups in Newark. Two themes
emerged gradually: one was black unity, based on shared African values
and one was black self-sufficiency and control. It is probable that the
1966 convention was 'looking forward" to 1970 more than anything else.
The 1966 convention nominated several blacks and Puerto Ricans for city
and state offices, but declined to nominate a candidate for mayor. At
the time, blacks were divided on the issue and the Convention itself
was too narrowly based and late to play the unifying role in a city
wide election its organizers hoped to achieve.
Kenneth Gibson's entry into the 1966 mayoralty and success were all the
more astonishing. Gibson, a city engineer, acfive in United Community
Corporation affairs, was well known as a 'moderate'; he had served on
several committees for UCC and the city, and was respected as a good
-liaison between such sensitive groups as the business community and
blacks in Newark. As a Newark College of Engineering graduate, he
retained ties with this institution which became important in support-
ing Civil Rights in Newark. While from a thoroughly working class
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background, he typified black Newark's aspirations in some senses and
he also had a somewhat broader appeal, especially to youth. 67
Gibson entered the 1966 election at the urging of George Richardson,
a black reform candidate, ex-state Assemblyman and Addonizio critic
who himself was running against Irvine Turner in the Central Ward.
Richardson, however, reportedly was interested in a 'test' of a black
candidate and intended to run himself in 1970. Gibson agreed and entered
the race only six weeks before the primary. He had a total budget of
$2,000 and almost no organization. He nonetheless polled a surprising
16,246 votes to come in third, forcing a runoff between Addonizio and
Carlin. 68
Addonizio regained the mayoralty in the fall elections, but some of the
momentum created by 1966 by the new black effort in city electoral
politics carried over early the following year. No sooner had Addonizio
been sworn in than a movement started for his recall, as well as that
of several Councilmen. According to the report of the New Jersey Com-
mission on Civil Disorders, the movement started over a drastic
increase in the tax rate early in 1967 from $5.97 to $7.66 and "rubbing
salt in the financial wound was the fact that City Councilmen had voted
pay raises for all employees, including themselves and the Mayor. The
Mayor's increase was $10,000.",69 The recall movement cut across class
and racial lines, with black taxpayers feeling the pinch as deeply, if
not more so than whites. 70
The recall movement did succeed in ousting South Ward Addonizio cohort Lee
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Bernstein, in a dramatic recall election of June of that year; a fifty-
four year old black activist, Rev. Horace Sharper, was elected, and
immediately began to condemn city officials for interference in the
federal New Careers program and called for resignation of Addonizio and
his spokesman and aides and aide Don Malafronte.71  Momentum continued
to build both in and out of government for a unified black trust at
City Hall for 1970.
1) The Electoral Campaign of 1970
By 1969, blacks were ready to mount a serious electoral campaign.. Profit-
ing from the 1966 convention and outcomes, as well as an off-year conven-
tion in 1968, the 1970 campaign was carefully planned. In November of
1969, a three day Black and Puerto Rican Convention was planned to
nominate a viable slate and build a strategy around unity of the nonwhite
communities and a structured campaign. More than 300 delegates chose a
council ticket that included activists Earl Harris, Sharpe James,
Reverend Dennis Westbrooks, Al Oliver, Ramon Aneses, Donald Tucker and
C. Theodore Pinckney. The latter two were United Brothers candidates
who had been defeated in the at-large elections the previous year.
Kenneth Gibson, then thirty-eight, with the strong showing in 1966,
was unanimously chosen as the mayoral candidate. Gibson had been
quietly preparing during the interim to run in 1970 and the civil
disorders had accelerated his efforts. 7 2
While there were considerable divisions among the black community lead-
ership over the Gibson candidacy, with a notable hostility growing
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between Gibson and his supporters and Richardson and his allies, the
real fight was shaping up outside the black community as two main white
candidates squared off against Gibson. Addonizio was desparate. With
official condemnations of police during civil disorders, and the rising
specter of a potential conviction on extortion and bribery, Addonizio
and his council concentrated on courting Italians and coercing city
employees into support, even should he be convicted. While the city
was nearly bankrupt. large pay increases were voted for 16 employees in
the city's financial administration, and across the board raises for
police, fire and other city employees. Italian youth were mobili'zed to
saturate Italian areas with the subtle threat of 'blacks in city hall'
and his black appointees were sent out in black neighborhoods to threaten
'blood in the streets', if he failed to be elected.73 The other primary
white candidate was Tony Imperiale, as ex-karate teacher, and self-
styled protector of white rights who had gained notoriety and a council
seat during civil disorders in Newark, by promoting 'arming' of white
citizens groups. Imperiale managed to gain a hard core working class
Italian following, which included a sprinkling of Newark detectives and
patrolmen and the Police Director Spina himself, who frequently appeared
more in sympathy with Imperiale's sentiments th'an Addonizio's. In
addition to his generally anti-black stance, and the involvement of his
North Ward Citizens Committee in a number of provocative incidents,
Imperiale's main thrust was at Gibson, whom he quickly labeled a tool
of Baraka and the black nationalists.74
Rounding off the slate were three other serious contenders, two white
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and one black. One of the whites, Alexander Matturi, a resident of the
North Ward, a Republican and a state senator, was the choice of the
Italian bourgeoisie and the business community.75 As Porambo and
Barbaro both point out, his chief failing was that he was better known
in Italy, where he had served as an Eisenhower appointed conciliator
76after the war. Richardson, the black ex-assemblyman, though a viable
candidate, had gained a reputation in black circles as 'vacillating',
particularly for what was perceived as a 'sellout' to the Jersey City
71Kenny machine in Trenton when he was in the Assembly. Finally,
John Caulfield, the ex-Fire Director, was honest and reputable but as
an Irishman was considered to be of the 'wrong nationality'.
By December of 1969, after a year of work by a federal strike force,
grand juries indicted Addonizio and his associates Councilman Turner,
West and Frank Addonizio (a brother of the mayor); former Councilman
Berstein (who had been recalled), Callaghan, Gordon (later, appointed
by Addonizio as the city's corporation counsel) and Guiliano (subse-
quently appointed a municipal judge); former corporation counsel Norman
Schiff, Anthony La Morte (director of municipal utilities); Benjamin
Krusch, public works director; Mario Gallo, a contractor and Anthony
Boiardo, son of the famous 1920's bootlegger and syndicate leader,
Ruggerio "the boot" Boiardo. They were all charged with 65 counts of
actual extortion and tax evasion between 1965 and 1969.78 When the
indictments were out, and the inevitable trials started, Caulfield and
Imperiale emerged as leading contenders.
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Gibson's campaign was exceedingly moderate. While the militants stayed
somewhat in the background,79 Gibson refrained from inflammatory
statements 'and played a conciliatory role. The campaign attracted a
host of national black civil rights and political leaders and enter-
tainers, as well as considerable interest from local youth, students
and liberal to "left" volunteers. There was little need to raise issues;
most of the issues appeared on the front pages of the newspaper, daily.
One key issue, however, was voting strength of the black candidate, a
particularly sore issue in black Newark, where there were suspicions
both about law enforcement on election day and about public actions to
'scatter the black vote'.
In 1970, there were only 133,000 registered voters, approximately 20,000
fewer than in 1966. The greater proportion of those lost, however, were
probably nonwhite. Between the two election years of 1966 and 1968, it
was estimated that the South and Central Wards, where most of the black
vote was concentrated, lost almost 10,000 voters while the predominately
white wards lost under 6,000 during the same period. One explanation
was the general transiency of blacks. Another, however, was the great
deal of urban renewal and highway clearance which fell primarily on black
neighborhoods. Albert Black, chairman of the Newark Human Rights Com-
mission estimated to the Governor's Commission on Civil Disorders that
if 30,000 blacks were registered in a voting drive, 10,000 would be
unregistered three years later because they had moved.80 A key question
was would an experienced black candidate, with little financial backing
and support, be able to even muster enough votes to stay alive past the
primary?
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In the spring primary, the black coalition strategy worked partly.
Gibson led the field with 37,859 votes, polling nearly twice as many
as his nearest rival, Addonizio, and winning in all wards except the
North Ward.. The white candidates divided their votes but Gibson
shut out the other black candidates; Richardson polled only 2,038
votes. Because he did not gain a majority, however, Gibson was forced
into an autumn runoff with Addonizio.
For the fall election, both Gibson and Addonizio sought the endorsement
of the losing candidates, particularly Caulfield, the moderate. At the
same time, Gibson's supporters concentrated heavily on getting the vote
out. Imperiale, who had campaigned almost, as strongly against Addonizio
as Gibson, shifted abruptly and 'endorsed' Addonizio. Caulfield's
endorsement, however, which was the real prize, went to Gibson. Caulfield
campaigned vigorously for Gibson, despite considerable harassment, and
his appearance undoubtedly helped symbolically.81  In the councilmen
race of the primary, a very large field of sixty-three candidates ran
for nine council seats; six of the seven Black and Puerto Rican Conven-
tion endorsed candidates made the runoffs and Irvine Turner was badly
defeated in the Central Ward Councilmen race, ending a long political
82
career.
In the November runoff election Kenneth Gibson won by capturing 56.1
-percent of the vote to become the first black mayor of a major eastern
city. While the final count showed gains in all wards over his primary
showing, it was the overwhelming black vote which made the difference
and compensated for losses in the other wards. It was also clear,
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however, that the Italian dominated wards had voted solidly against him;
in effect, Addonizio had captured most of Imperiale's large Italian
vote. And, as one observer noted, Italians were still a very large
factor in control over the city through the council. Only one black,
Earl Harris, a former Essex county free-holder, won a citywide seat
whichadded to the two predominately nonwhite ward seats, left the
majority in the hands of the Italians. 83
Blacks literally danced in the streets on election night,
while Addonizio supporters turned on the media at his
headquarters, smashing television cameras and abusing
newsmen. But... Italians were still the major political.
force in the city in that they controlled three wards
and the city council....Preliminary analysis indicated
that white moderates made the difference. They did not
want to return Addonizio to.office, but they were not
prepared to turn the city over completely to black
leadership. The fact remained that 43 000 people had
chosen Addonizio despite the scandals. 4
E. Impact of the 1970 Victory and Black Political Organization in U.S.
Cities
While the Gibson victory probably signaled the culmination of a long
struggle to erect a viable coalition for the end of achieving legiti-
mate political control over a U.S. government organization, it also
may have signaled the end of the Civil Rights n~rthern strategy,
peaceful protests and black-white coalitions for change. The evolution
of black political development was played against a backdrop of 'tests'
of almost every strategy utilized in the Southern movement -- resistance,
demonstrations, solicitations, coalitions, study commissions, advocacy --
but most served at best to unify blacks in the belief that nothing
outisde 'legitimate' power would work. The gain of legitimate power,
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however, was effectively prohibited both by the local power system and
its regional support. Regional business interests, state government
and the broader residents not only tolerated the coercion of nonwhites
(using both legitimate and extra-legal means) but encouraged the
building of a dual participation system by the Italians during eight
long years.85 Only when the outbreak of violence and sustained threats
of disruption threatened to raise the regional costs of using the city
did regional interests begin to attack Italian power through the courts,
the press, etc. Nonetheless, blacks, including Gibson himself, were
legitimately bitter that not one representative of the business commun-
ity supported his candidacy and except for the Newark News the media
generally ignored the serious issues for the sideshow of scandals and
Imperiale v. Baraka.
Black political development, viewed through the Newark case, however,
can be viewed as following a somewhat separate development. While
the broader regional events created the opportunities for electoral
victory in 1970, a different set of events took place inside the black
community. Two forces provided the catalyst for development of a new
kind of urban black politics, entirely distinct from the tradition of
machine appendages of cities such as Chicago, or the charismatic leader
type epitomized by Adam Powell in New York City. One was birth of a
new ideology which transformed the Civil Rights optimism in 'shared
power' into internal unity-based ideology, linked in part to black
nationalist ideologies. While many observers have viewed 'black con-
sciousness' as a radical separatist movement, in fact new black
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nationalist politics incorporated more of lower classed goal standards
and African socialism than separatism. While there are many apparently
conflicting themes in the kinds of ideologies and rhetoric of Newark
during the 1960's, within the black community itself, political
organizing appealed far more to goals of reducing conflict, and burying
individual differences. The concept of a 'community' for the first
time became widespread, symbolizing the general shift in the black
citizen's concept of politics.86
The second key force contributing to black political development and
organization was the Great Society Programs of the Johnson years.
While in many cities, these programs may have operated to 'share'
power with nonwhites, open some safety valves where frustrations could
be dissipated and occasionally coopt leadership, in Newark's case the
programs had a more direct contribution to black political organization.
The local community corporation was captured early by blacks and their
white advocates and its resources put to work in winning legal rights
and successfully challenging some of the most established and routine
patterns of public action in the region, including urban renewal, slum
clearance, highway development, public works contracting and public
assistance sanctioning. Early successes, made possible by the interest
and entry of skilled outsiders (especially Civil Rights leadership),
assisted in further organizing and consolidating gains. The avail-
ability of resources under black control also provided some incentives
and support for participation on a much broader scale than had been
witnessed by Newark's blacks and resulted in the emerging of new local
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leadership and a diversity of new leadership roles. In OEO programs,
with less direct interference, Newark's blacks managed to convert
resources in terms on the whole fairly useful for political organizing
purposes.
A second important effect of the OEO programs was found in their
programmatic and organizational structure, particularly the spinoff
units. With entirely independent organizations, buffered to some extent
from the backlash mood of Federal officials, the Congress and City Hall,
units such as the Newark Pre-School Council were able to provide planning
and managerial-political experience to large numbers of latent leader-
ship who would otherwise have been excluded from public or community
activities and who would have had little information about the 'operat-
ing' and organization of a unit in a larger institutional context. For
blacks with little access to private or public institutional organiza-
tions, particularly on a managerial level, the experience was to
become important later when blacks moved into city hall.
Finally, both factors forced and shaped the emerging new black leadership
into a very different mould than that which had preceded it during the
early 1960's. In contrast to the earlier typical black leaders, who
were 'filters' between the black areas and white power structures,
leadership which emerged in the late 1960's was forced much more into
a position of 'detachment' from the white power alliance, and identifi-
cation on one hand, and obliged to articulate black goals in specific
programmatic and action terms on the other. This particularly affected
the mayoralty, as by 1970 blacks had a very clear conception of the
weight of mayoral power and the distinction between it and more familiar
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legislative power.
Blacks in Newark, probably more than other areas, went to the polls to
vote for very specific types of change. By this year, blacks were
aware of the use of the mayor's office both for concrete gains (and
the value this created in the Italian areas of the city) and as an
instrument to assure these gains would be maintained through the use of
legitimate force. In voting for a change in the mayor's office, blacks
were voting for an end to use of the coercive arm of the state to
exclude them from the city benefit system and for control over at
least the legitimate resources available in city hall.
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Chapter 4: A Black Mayor in Office and Constraints in Allocating Resources
Barely had the euphoria of the 1970 black electoral success passed when
the real world constraints of mobilizing and mastering the city hall
gain became apparent in Newark, especially to its new mayor. While Gibson
was deliberate and programmatically oriented, it was quickly clear that
Newark's immediate heritage from the Addonizio regimes and the disasters
of the three previous years left a disarray so extreme as to prohibit
the luxury of work on policy. Six months of transition government
served only to confirm the worst suspicions of external observers. There
was little left in the way of an administrative apparatus in the election
aftermath, hostility was so extreme that white workers, while clinging to
their civil service status, frequently refused to show up for work, and
there was a basic underdevelopment of the most rudimentary discipline in
most city operations. Moreover, worst, of all, in a few short years
preceding the changeover, the city had drifted towards fiscal bankruptcy,
accelerated by desperate attempts by the Addonizio regime to. court public
workers by attractive pay increases without any increase on the revenue
side. The complete hostility of Addonizio to warnings of outsiders of
the need for a cautious fiscal policy and tax and spending reforms was
known early in state government, but was largely ignored. I The disaster
was thus correctly borne by a much wider responsibility than that of
Newark itself. Unfortunately it was passed on with only 'sympathy' to
the new black mayor. The sixty million dollar deficit which the Gibson
administration inherited was not resolved until three years later; mean-
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while, the state 'deducted' deficits created during Addonizio's last
year from Gibson's first year state urban aid entitlement.
The transitional government also served to confirm the general shape
of constraints the Gibson administration was to face during its four
years in office. There were four large constraints perceived initially,
two posed by the limitations on the role of the mayor and the institu-
tions of government. Two additional constraints were posed by the
demand side, one for general government reform, one for black participa-
tion and 'shares' in government. Set against this were very limited
and largely untested opportunity structures: authority of the mayor
to exercise legitimate control over a few areas of government, the
prestige of office, and potential, but uncertain external support. A
very early focus centered on the question of resources, the distribution
of existing resources in the city on the one hand and the potential
for increasing the base through external actions on the other.
On the constraint side, the mayoral role was limited by legal power
assigned it and the usual 'shared' power arrangement with the City
Council, the city's legislative body, for key decisions on expenditure,
taxation and personnel. In addition, in less formal terms, until 1970,
very informal power arrangements between Council and mayor had subdued
though not eliminated this 'sharing'. The value overlap and tradeoffs
-possible through the 'ethnic' regimes were broken with Gibson's entry
into city hall and the white dominated council promised to be 'inform-
ally' demanding as well as legally so. Another key constraint on
mayoral power was that of the civil service. Again, as in most cities,
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Newark possessed a large public staff, numbering over 10,000 workers
directly employed in government operations and perhaps an additional
1,500 in contracting of services. Many in 1970 had been hired prior
to development of a strong civil service system in the state, many were
not required to pass statewide testing, many were hired under 'political'
or community ties arrangements. As a result, many of these workers were
threatened with displacement and/or loss of status in a black administra-
tion. The top staff could technically be removed and replaced by
Gibson appointees, but middle management posed additional problems.
Here the constraint and potential conflict was enormous. Most, if not
all, particularly in service operations of government in Newark, were
persons 'risen in the ranks', who were not markedly different from the
lower staff in value terms. The potential for dissipation or under-
cutting of mayoral power was enormous, given the scope of authority on
the middle level.
Institutional development in the city had also proceeded very poorly
in Newark. The state instituted Charter centralized power with the
mayor, but created ambiguous responsibilities in poorly defined positions
such as that of the 'Business Administrator', ax office which rarely
exists in strong mayor systems. It is not entirely clear in legal
terms what this officer's responsibility is, but it was clear during
the Gibson administration's first term it was put to handy use as an
attempted 'check' on mayoral power. Another limitation was the inade-
quacy of the rubber stamp charter in addressing the major need for
government functional and administrative reorganization in an essen-
. .1 -
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tially unreformed government such as Newark had in 1954. Rather than
providing guidance in government development, the superficial reform
tended to be by-passed in favor of retaining the old operations sum-of-
the-parts domination cultivated under the Commission form.
The second group of constraints on the demand side were no less criti-
cal in shaping the overall pressures on the mayor in 1970. One was the
demand for reform in the operation of government, long overdue from
the Charter reform of 1954. The other demand constituted expectations
of black government constituents.
There was considerable demand in Newark for basic reform of the city's
institutions and for a more visible government. By 1970, there was a
widespread 'taxpayers' revolt, wherein delinquent tax payments had
accelerated. As mentioned previously, one outbreak of organized
actions by citizens to 'recall' Addonizio and the Council had taken
place in 1967 following the raising of the mayor's and council's salaries
and hiking of the rates by more than $1 .00 per $100.00. Many believed
government officials were frankly 'irresponsible'. In addition, the
runaway budgets, absence of efforts at efficiency, lack of comprehen-
sible public budget statements and visible deterioration in city ser-
vices increased demands. While the usual 'civic' and business elite
leadership and reform pressure groups were absent in Newark, there was
nonetheless widespread consciousness of a very unreformed administrative
operation in Newark dity government.2 For Gibson, who ran as a reform
candidate, there were natural expectations, especially outside Newark,
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in the state and Federal system, some regional business circles and the
local press that reform would be a first priority in 1970.
The second set of constraints on the demand side flowed directly from
the political development process in black Newark. Black demands can
be characterized as twofold. First, there were the low or fairly modest
demands for 'relief' changes, which in normal circumstances would not
have been constraints. These included an end to public clearance,
police harassment, racial hostility in the public housing program, in
the public school system and other operations of city government theo-
retically under mayoral control. An end to the 'dual' treatment system
of Newark which destroyed black dignity and kept whites 'in charge' of
black problems was strongly registered in the 1969 vote for Gibson.
While modest, however, in Newark these 'legal' changes became constraints.
They inferred nothing less in many cases than either overnight changes
in the attitudes of white workers (at a time when they were most hostile
and threatened by blacks) or alternatively the replacement of existing
workers by those more sympathetic to blacks, a near impossible task
in either case. Under the most ideal circumstances, halting arbitrary
police actions in ghetto areas would have been difficult; with the
Newark police system built up over eight years of systematic attention
to the creation of lower classed Italian control, it was literally
impossible to make change. Gibson's first action, the appointment of
an untainted Irish professional to head the police system (and purge
the Italian control system), was met with wide criticism by black leader-
ship in Newark as symbolizing failure, rather than an indication of the
A
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constraints on mayoral office.3
A second constraint flowing from black political development in Newark
was demand for filling of specific programmatic gaps in the city's
array, and for reorganization of city services and qualitative changes
to address needs perceived as critical to black well-being. The com-
bination of the Great Society programs, 'alternative' black nationalist
institutions such as schools as well as self-help groups had flourished
in Newark during the late 1960's. The inflow of new ideas helped to
spawn a well articulated community development plan, frequently accom-
panied by detailed implementation schedules and cost estimates. The
programmatic and planning thinking which became widespread in the heyday
of OEO was immediately expanded with the entry of the very programmatic-
ally oriented Model Cities program, which blacks also dominated in the
latter days of the Addonizio regime. All of these 'plans', coupled with
equally well-articulated strategies for change in existing institutions
such as education and public housing were to serve as an ongoing theme
throughout the Gibson administration, acting occasionally as a pressure-
opportunity force for exercise of mayoral power, but more often creating
conflicts between the old and entrenched and new administrative person-
alities on one hand, and on the other community special interest groups
and activists.
Organization of the Chapter
This chapter examines the structure of constraints in Newark on a black
mayor. The constraint setting in this case comprises several key parts,
which interact and enforce each other. In particular, the legal insti-
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tutional structure of state and city governments set upper limits on
discretion for desired change by a temporal administration; to the
extent that they are conservative and traditional in inhibiting flexi-
bility for change, they have resulted in unanticipated political
outcomes in Newark which fragment and dissipate authority, overrepre-
sent some values and interests and generally create a government
organization primarily serving civil servants and managerial staff.
Another large constraint area is that of pressures outside government.
In this case, two interest groups are visible. One is constituents for
city services and other change. The other is regionally oriented' inter-
ests pressing reform and efficiency in government. Both are important
in inhibiting mayoral actions and in collapsing the time frame for
change.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines the general
framework for decisionmaking in resource allocation, and in particular
constraints posed by the legal institutional structure of the city.
A second part looks at political cultural constraints on change, parti-
cularly visible in the city's legislative, administrative and operations-
service system. Important constraints examined are the lag in administra-
tive reform, tradition of 'autonomy' and fragmentation and conservative
fiscal policy. A final part looks at the environmental constraints and
pressures from constituents and regional forces
A. State and Local Legal and Institutional Constraints
While Newark operates under a strong executive centered system, formal
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legal constraints on the state and local level severely limit policy
actions in resource allocation areas. Limits have both direct and
indirect sides. In the case of direct responsibilities, or those un-
ambiguously.stated such as responsibility for preparation of the city
budget or tax plan, the state exerts a strong constraining role and
can specify in detail the type and object of taxation, limits of levies-
or specify categories of exemptions. The city charter's role is also
direct as in specifying mayoral control or responsibility for general
fiscal policy oversight, or indirect, as in limiting choice of allow-
able new taxes to the joint consent of mayor and council. In both
the state and local case, legal and formal rules are reinforced by
strong political cultural traditions which serve to fragment control
on one hand and conserve some obsolescent notions of government respon-
sibility.
1) State and City Legal Constraints on Fiscal Policy
As in many other states, New Jersey exerts a strong direct control
over its largest city in general and mayoral authority in particular.
The city's resource allocation areas are a particularly important aspect
of control and thus the state focuses considera.ble attention on the
two sides of fiscal policy, expenditure and taxation. Both the expense
budget and taxation, borrowing and other revenue raising are controlled
through direct legislative action and through administrative monitoring
on a systematic basis. Indirectly the state also affects fiscal policy
in an important way by the mandating of certain expenditures which may
or may not overlap with local choice, such as police and fire pensions
or civil defence units.
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In the expenditure area, the state's primary instrument for budgetary
control is oversight and monitoring by the Office of Local Governments
in the Department of Community Affairs. While recognizing in legal
terms that the mayor is responsible for preparation and submission of
the annual budget, the state office nonetheless 'suggests' in persua-
sive terms the form and content of the local budget, as well as some
key aspects of the budget decision cycle.4 Further, the state must give
preliminary approval to annual budgets before they become local law,
as well as in-cycle amendments. Local observers in Newark suggest that
the operation has tended to be essentially a 'rubber stamp' in practice
on the allocation of expenditures and follows the state's "home rule"
philosophy, but a great deal of time is spent nonetheless in converting
the local budget to 'state' suggested formats and terms and checking
out new expenditure items for their acceptability to state
government administrators.5
In the revenue and tax area, state control in New Jersey is strongly
enforced, largely by the legislature. While the mayor is held
generally responsible for fiscal policy, taxation and debt management,
the state reserves major responsibility for quite detailed aspects of
types of revenue, objects and exemptions from taxation and fee collec-
tion, types of fees, fines and other charges levied by localities,
as well as authority over methods, timing and accounting for collections.6
Taxes are frequently authorized on a 'temporary' basis and objects of
taxation may be withdrawn by legislative action as has occurred over
the past decade.7 The state also sets a policy of very high reserves
"150
for 'uncollected taxes', a strategy which has received considerable
criticism from tax experts.8 Finally, strict debt limits are set
periodically by the legislature or the administrator of the Office of
Local Government Taxation upon legislative directive. In the case of
other revenue, localities also must receive permission to receive grants-
in-aid from the Federal government, other states or public authority
and private interests.9 General authority to set and update formulas
or other criteria for state grants-in-aid may be delegated to the
Governor, or remain with the state legislature.10
An important political cultural tradition in New Jersey has been the
rather narrow view of local government responsibility,which outcome is
most visible in tax policy. In the early 1960's, Robert Wood's study
of local governments in the urbanized portion of the state revealed an
extreme distance between the New Jersey and New York sides of the New
York-New Jersey-Con.necticut metropolitan area in terms of property tax
dependency, per capita expenditures and state grants-in-aid. While
the situation has improved considerably since that time, still, by the
1970's, the New Jersey State legislature has strongly resisted shifting
to higher growth taxes or those with a superior relationship to
wealth growth than the property tax. New tax authority is granted
grudgingly and questionable taxes such as payroll taxes (i.e. wage
taxes) are granted more frequently to localities than the more desir-
able option of larger grants-in-aid based on stronger and more equitable
state taxes with superior bases such as consumption or income.12 One
rationale for the state's revenue behavior pattern is the large degree
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of fragmentation of jurisdictions and relatively small size of taxing
units in the state. There is also a wide belief, however, that state
legislatures follow some mythical tradition widely shared by citizens
of the state that 'home rule' is enhanced by granting freedom for
everything but revenue to support expenditure.13
The state's conservative tradition appears to create a number of effects
in localities, visible in Newark. One is to set a 'conservative' upper
limit on local actions which are extremely stable over time. Local
councils and administrative actors 'anticipate' that they cannot do
much and often behave in discretionary choices as if there would be
few alternatives. 14 The traditional policy of 'pay as you go' developed
to some extent out of this influence and resulted in very low capital
replacement rates in the city's infrastructure in post war years; at
present, the cost of replacement is nearly prohibitive.15 Another
influence particularly visible in Newark is in the steady expansion of
ordinary services at the expense of newer types of services. Here,
in contrast to the usual case of general frugality cited by observers
in older cities,16 Newark permitted considerable expansion of expendi-
ture and activities but simply restricted it to areas 'less controver-
sial' in state terms. Although the state of New Jersey has never been
a leader' in innovation, it is not clear that objections would have
been raised over the extension of activities particularly on the admini-
strative level. A final influence which should be mentioned is in the
area of direct legislation for particular expenditures and tax treat-
ment, which serves to reinforce local 'hopelessness' about control as
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well as remove chunks of local resources available for other purposes. 1 7
While some state actions are undertaken with redistributive, apportion-
ment or other objectives, many clearly represent 'special interest'
overrule of local choice and at best wreck-havoc with fiscal planning
over time. 1 8 While the traditional pattern of single city legislation
has been overturned by the courts, much of the traditional view of the
state's single big city, Newark, as a resource for financing other
localities and the state itself still persists in subtle terms.
The city legal and institutional system which has grown out of the state
legal organizational setting and leg'islative tradition is reflected
in a structure constrained for policy making on the local level. In
principle, Newark's City Charter organizes and centralizes authority
and control for fiscal policy and expenditure under the chief executive.
As a strong mayor system, the charter delegates authority over specifics
of taxation, debt management, budget planning, purchasing and contract-
ing and personnel policy. Provisions for institutional sharing of
authority is limited; other officers of the administrative level of
government are appointed by the mayor, serve at his pleasure and are
ultimately responsible to him in fiscal and related matters. At the
same time, however, there is a subtle administrative division of power
through Charter outlined distribution of responsibilities, through
sharing of power with the Council and above all with the operations
or line agency structure of Newark's government.
The city's local ordinances and the Charter and supplementary administra-
tive codes reflect the general organizational structure of a 'strong
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mayor-council form' of government, selected by popular referendum in
Newark under the 1954 optional charter rules.19 Under the Charter,
responsibility is fairly simply centralized; there is no special
finance commission or board which shares fiscal decisionmaking with
the mayor, the comptroller is appointed rather than elected as in some
cities, and, finally, the main check on mayoral power is provided
through a rather weak institution of the Council. In the latter case,
the city council has discretionary choice over the type of budgetary
and fiscal check instrument it will use, and in Newark this has tradi=
tionally taken the form of simply using the City Clerk and a special
staff in the clerk's office. The clerk is an .officer appointed by the
council. 20 In the absence of specially instituted instruments, the
Council generally reviews the budget as a group before reacting to
the financing plan publically and in tax matters debates these
publically as with any other ordinance.
While the Council's authority over fiscal matters is generally fairly
limited in Newark in charter terms, practically any action can be
delayed indefinitely. The council's primary authority, however,
resides in the right to review and approve appointments and authorize
taxes. Mayoral appointments must receive confirmation by the council
and the council does have authority to overrule dismissal of an
appointed official by the mayor. 2 1 As the city's legislative body,
the council must approve state authorized taxes and any rates where
discretion is allowed. The council also has some authority over the
city's annual expense budget, emergency expenditures and any capital
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projects, since each of these constitute separate ordinances. In the
case of the expense budget or any amendments to it, the council is
limited to changes in the aggregate and cannot specify particular
increases or decreases on an item basis, but its general power to change
totals or withhold approval of the total is exercised often. 22  In the
case of capital expenditures, council authority has been jealously
guarded over the years to approve on a project by project basis and,
as a result, only recently has the city initiated any real capital
programming plan. 23 Finally, the council can refuse approval of any
local 'matching' share for external grants to the city; this has in-
hibited the inflow of many Federal grants-in-aid in the past in the
city. 24
B. The Newark City Council: Political Cultural Constraints
While formal institutional roles structured in the city's charter tended
to constrain policymaking and resource allocation in the city, the
informal tradition of government has played a very strong role. It is
impossible to understand how government operates in Newark without
comprehending the local political culture which grew up, particularly in
post war times and exerted a strong influence in stabilizing government
operations. The Newark city councils, though weak institutionally,
have played a strong informal role in stability primarily through
emphasis on parochial 'small town' politics and reward sharing.
The city's political tradition reflects the long experience of commis-
sion governments, blue collar ethnic politics of post world war II and
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a weak interest aggregation of voting constituents and near absence of
local elite influence in politics. These features of Newark were in
turn reflected in a fragmentation and autonomy in government operations,
an emphasis on operations and ordinary services at the expense of
growth of newer functions, interests in blue collar job expansion and
finally in general support for poor tax policies in the city.
The emphasis on operations strongly reflected the council role, parti-
cularly as it evolved after 1954, as well as the ethnic administrations
between 1954 and 1970. Composed primarily of representatives of the
major ethnic groups in the city, the council was oriented toward distri-
buting rewards along the lines of constituency divisions, whether public
employment, contracting or public housing, etc. Lacking the coherence
and stable power linkages of a genuine machine organization, however,
the council traditionally depended very much on mayoral willingness to
'share'. With a generally weak and shifting voting public, two main
issues dominated Council thinking. One was creation of traditional
rewards -- jobs for distribution to supporters and occasional extra-
legal sharing of spoils of contracting, etc., depending on a mayor's
willingness to share -- and another was oriented toward a check on the
mayor's power. The check effect generally took the form of challenges
to almost any proposed changes or actions of the mayor which appeared
potentially capable of enhancing Council bargaining on traditional
rewards. 25 A final tradition was more common among councils in other
cities, reacting to actions which became visible in the community,
particularly cutbacks in public employment.
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The Newark City Council has been traditionally more job-oriented than
stringency or tax-oriented and its pattern of operation reflects this.
For example, during Addonizio's first term, the Council's main battle
was over sharing of new jobs created out of new revenue and grants-in-
aid. In retaliation, the Council refused to vote on a series of other
issues unrelated to the job issue, including local matching shares for
federal grants.26 UnderGibson later, the Council repeatedly challenged
the mayor over job cuts, particularly in traditional operating areas
such as Public Works and the creation of new jobs viewed as 'black
jobs'. 27 While the Council had little sympathy towards preservation
of the two city health institutions (the City Hospital and a Nursing
Home), threatened with closing by the State Health Department, and
repeatedly refused to consider new appropriations to bring them up to
standards, the legislative body, noentheless refused to vote to close
the institutions when requested to by Gibson on grounds that 'jobs
would be lost'. 2 8
In viewing jobs as 'rewards', the Council served to reinforce thinking
among many key actors in the city bureaucracy, particularly those on
middle management levels (bureau chiefs, police officers, etc.) who
had themselves risen in the ranks. For both influence sources, employ-
ment was traditionally converted into existing and well-established lines
as 'increments' on existing operations; shifting of jobs to new categor-
ies, or higher salaried or more specialized jobs, professional cate-
gories and the like, were commonly viewed as means to 'convert' the
existing system and make possible the entry of 'outsiders', or minori-
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ties into the operations system.
Council composition generally reflected the political tradition of the
city and diverged little from the key actors in the city bureaucracy.
Between 1954 and 1974, with rare exceptions white members of the council
have been drawn from labor unions, the police department or county or
state employment, usually 'political''(i.e. no civil service) positions.
Few professional or business people were attracted to the office and
in many cases incumbancy seemed to guarantee automatic re-election. 29
Blacks by contrast have been drawn first from traditional machines
(Turne-, West), but later from the local Civil Rights and Black poverty
arena. The fact that the traditionally oriented white. majority tended
to view city operations much like many of the city's civil servants
tended to reinforce pro-labor, pro-operations spending in the city.
Under both Addonizio and Gibson, the City Council tended to play an
exaggeratedly obstructionist role when policy disagreements arose,
(principally over 'job sharing') with considerable public grandstanding
and disruptions at normal business meetings. Budget approvals have been
delayed for abnormally long periods, as well as approval of new state
authorized taxes and appointments past the required limits. Problems
were particularly acute under Gibson's first three years when most
meetings achieved a 'circus' atmosphere and little business was accom-
plished.3 0  For many older white members, on the other hand, attendance
at monthly meetings was very poor and one member reported that almost
no one showed up for the private budget reviews preceding the public
hearings. 31
k
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C. Administrative and Bureaucratic Constraints
In Newark, as in most other large cities, administrative authority and
control over fiscal policy is considerably fragmented through stable
institutions of government and a permanent staff. The overhead or
administrative agencies,while technically mandated to serve the temporal
executive in his policy making effort, can undercut or dissipate authority
or alter directions of policy considerably. Operating or line agencies
which in Newark are highly routinized, inflexible units staffed with
civil servants, are rarely responsive to policy shifts. The permanent
staff of both overhead and line agencies further -has tended to create
a hierarchical distribution of labor through promotion of lower level
workers to supervisory and middle management levels. This organizational
feature of Newark's agencies has tended to elaborate a pro-labor identi-
fication in city government operations and works against policy changes
from the top. Finally, the long standing tradition of racial discrimina-
tion in employment in the city acted to create considerable hostility
toward change from a black administration.
1) The Administrative Units as Constraints on Mayoral Fiscal Policy
A key feature of Newark's administrative units has been their general
underdevelopment relative to other parts of city government. While
the apparatus for control over fiscal policy, administration, legal
questions and physical development and planning were an important
feature of the 1954 Charter until 1970, these units underwent little
modernization in terms of their functions and responsibilities.32 Units
A 
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such as the divisions of taxes, accounting, treasury and assessments
evolved large clerical staff, performing essentially routine clerical
work and manual bookkeeping chores. There was little movement towards
consolidation or mechanization of many tasks and operations were char-
acterized by considerable duplication of accounting despite the intro-
duction of a high speed computer and information system in the late
331960's. Many tasks performed by units such as the assessments and
purchasing office were found to be 'duplicative' and inconsistent with
objectives of functions of the office during the Management by Objec-
tives planning process during 1973.34 In other cases, studies suggest-
ed that operations by line units such as the Motors Division of Public
Works was handicapped by the absence of a true city purchasing function
keeping track of orders and inventories of materials and supplies.35
Yet another theme which handicapped evolution of fiscal policy in ad-
ministrative units was the pattern of fragmentation and autonomy on
one hand and the general absence of a notion of leadership in policy
making on the other. True to Newark tradition, overhead units had
evolved first separately as 'autonomous units', with well separated
interest areas. Later, under Addonizio, development of overhead
functions was suppressed in the interest of 'maximizing' control over
financing, control and oversight over operating units by the mayor.
In the first case, the autonomy expressed itself in the evolution of
distinct areas of interest, function and control, with little coordina-
tion or interaction responsibility. Later, under Addonizio, functions
were reduced to fairly routine operations largely 'servicing' the
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autonomous operating units (police, fire, public works) and rubber-
stamping approval of most of their actions.36 Most of the key actors
(the Business Administrator, City Plan Director, Corporation Council,
Finance Director and Directors of Assessments, Controller, etc.) were
close political aides or political allies of Addonizio, and there was
little 'professional orientation' in appointments.37
The tradition of underdevelopment and fragmentation proved a major
constraint to innovation in 1970 along with new problems of introduc-
ing an executive-centered policy sense to government operations. While
considerable improvements were made in fiscal policy under a highly
credible professional appointment to the city's Finance Office, most of
the other administrative units remained stable. Large clerical staffs
of civil servants coupled with managerial staffs composed largely of
'internally promoted' clerks, created obstacles to introduction of
new techniques in accounting and other finance maintenance. The data
processing unit, introduced some years previously with the goal of
implementing a city-wide accounting and information system, was reduced
to 'service' at the request of units, had no formal timetable or
plan and had largely failed at expansion of managerial accounting and
control.38 Many of the managerial level staff tended to accept the
'turf' system, wherein each unit had well specified functions largely
separate from others. This has resulted in very low levels of coor-
dination between administrative units, and a fairly low level of control
from those with top responsibilities, notably the Business Administrator
and Finance Director.
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The sense of 'policy' proved a major constraint to change in the
functions of administrative units under Gibson. As several management
reports revealed, policy goals and objectives, whether outlined by the
mayor in his budget statement, or evolved during the Management by
Objectives process, a decisionmaking-managerial device introduced by
the Business Administrator during 1972, were not moved into operational
status. Central mechanisms simply did not work. As one report
suggested, after reviewing four separate 'policy mechanisms' fragmenta-
tion between groups and commitment was the problem.
...All four of the mechanisms are in varying stages of
development and none is more than two years old. Coor-
dination among the mechanisms and between the mechanisms
and individual planning units has not been fully develop-
ed. The lack of coordination appears to be due to the
development of mechanisms by separate groups and the lack
of an overall framework for coordinating the development
process. 4u Lemphasis added]
In addition to the absence of a 'programmatic' and cooperative tradition
in Newark's administration, under the first years of the Gibson admini-
stration two additional problems inhibited development of central
policy and managerial control. One was a distance created between
the Office of the Business Administrator and the executive; another
was the development of policy and planning appa'ratus in the federal
categorical grant system, attached to the Mayor's Office, but divorced
from the rest of the administration and ordinary operations. The first
-problem, that of the Business Administrator was in part a personal
misconception of the mayoral role in Newark on the part of the first
business administrator, who had served previously as city manager of a
small mid-west community, but who had never worked in a strong mayor
41system of government. Several assistants close to the business
162
administrator suggested that he came to Newark considerably handicapped
by the fact that he was the personal choice of the business community
and thus had no political allies in the city.42 He quickly alienated
himself from the mayor, then largely failed in an appeal to the
council for allies, which insiders suggested was entirely natural "since
the council knew where the power in the city lay, and who they had to
43
get along with". Largely because of the conflict between the Business
Administrator and the mayor's staff, however, several interest areas of
managerial change which had received Gibson's interest were dropped.44
In contrast to the problem with the business administrator's role in
administrative reform, the policy and planning functions represented
the evolution of the Federal grant system in Newark, under the Mayor's
control, but without executive attention and direction. Nominally
under the Community Development Administration (CDA), itself an adjunct
to the mayor's office, the federal grant programs proliferated under
Gibson's first years in office without central direction or control.
The grant system was itself fragmented, and it grew even more fragmented
in Newark, with a parallel proliferation of directors, sub-directors
and other administrative titles for each grant. There was extensive
duplication of administrative effort and little coordination.45 Although
initially organized under Addonizio as the city's Model Cities program,
by 1970 CDA comprised dozens of other types of categorical grants, a
staff of several hundred and was beginning to duplicate some of the
city's administrative functions.46 CDA posed several constraints on
mayoral control over general policy and allocation problems. First,
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its managerial staff and much of employment generated out of it was
nonwhite, serving to dissipate the demand and community pressures
for shifts in the city budget. Secondly, much executive attention
was diverted to the infighting generated within CDA and its numerous
arms which, given the shifting nature of the Federal grant system,
might have been more profitably spent on central administrative
functions. After three years of existence, CDA was finally integrated
into a planning and policy arm and many of the grants collapsed into
the city budget. 48
D. The Operations Units as Constraints on Mayoral Fiscal Policy
In 1970, Newark's operating units as traditional line agencies posed
major constraints on shifting the allocation of resources. Evolution
of a highly traditional staffing practice, coupled with institutionali-
zation of employment through civil service and unionization, largely
locked in existing personnel to jobs and the largest part of the
budget. In addition, the ethnic systems which had preceded Kenneth
Gibson had converted much of the employment to titles and functional
areas which reflected the ethnic labor force composition; many workers,
given seniority and status of public employment, might have found it
difficult to duplicate city jobs in the broader employment arena of the
region. 49 Much of the managerial staff as well had risen in the ranks,
through the promotional system. In the uniformed services and even in
lower status work such as sanitation, managerial status and salaries
for persons with little education would have been difficult to duplicate
elsewhere. 50
164
In addition to staff, the bureaucratic organization of line agencies
and the philosophy of 'operation' domination of city activities greatly
inhibited any change taking place in the distribution of the city's
resources.
The bureaucratic organization of Newark's line agencies exhibited a
high degree of autonomy, with the internal system setting most goals
for administrative activities, such as budget preparation, purchasing,
etc., as well as organizing and implementing output functions. Until
1970, there was little external interference or policy input from, the
mayor, or control from the administrative arm of city government. Cost
accounting, performance studies or other checks of work efficiency were
unknown. Budgets were formulated internally, based on internally
defined needs and the city's budget, as a result, became the sum of
the autonomous 'request' parts.51 Since little information was provided
other than through budgetary submissions, there was almost. no means for
control by the central administration. Under the 'ethnic' governments,
the system worked well. Since functions in service terms were rarely
an issue and further, since goals of employment could be reached as
easily through autonomy as not, there was little conflict between the
mayor, the council and line units. Addonizio-did challenge the
police system considerably in its hiring program, but he did so mainly
through instituting separate units inside the organization which gradu-
ally adapted the bureaucratic system to its control, rather than through
central administrative actions, Under Gibson, however, bureaucratic
autonomy posed major obstacles to shifting of resources to newer, more
modern services. Major efforts had to be devoted to gaining access to
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information on operations, staff distribution, and output. The Gibson
administration further was forced to initiate essentially duplicative
services to satisfy some pressing community demands through the Federal
grant programs.
The 'operations' domination of city activities has been made possible
by the autonomy of operations in part, but also by the political
tradition in the city which favored uniformed services and traditional
property and safety functions frequently at the expense of human re-
sources and service output destined for neighborhoods. Under the tradi-
tional regimes, police, fire and public works followed the emphasis of
the commission governments in emphasis in budgetary and other terms.
Attention was focused by the councils as well as mayors on these func-
tions as constituting the 'business' of city government. Many of the
human resources categories as a result also became oriented towards the
'operations' philosophy. The city's health department, for example,
limited its provision of direct services and devoted a considerable part
of its budget to functions in environmental services easily translated
into the operations routine such as buildings and environmental in-
spections, licenses and bureaucratic services such as vital statistics. 52
Great growth in the health area came mainly through institutions which
spawned large maintenance staffs, but provided few direct health
services. The operations philosophy proved a major constraint to
introduction of new services or modernization of the old and particularly
inhibited those responsive to human resources and population oriented
needs. As a result, many 'services' have been introduced through
federal and state grant-in-aid programs specifically flexible for
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neighborhood distribution, or through the more radical route of a
total reorganization of a function in the structure of government.
E. Constituent Expectations as Constraints on Resource Allocation
As one critic close to the Gibson campaign and the transitional govern-
ment phrased it, expectations raised by the election of a black mayor
are unrealistic given the general shape of problems and constraints
of political tradition, the civil service and institutions in govern-
ment:
After the election of a black mayor some blacks seem
to think there will be jobs for everyone. Others look
for immediate improvement of services and conditions
in their neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the mayor quickly
discovers he has little or no power over the bureaucracy
and can meet few demands of his supporters. The resul t
is that the people who comprise the major part of a
black mayor's constituency and make his election possi-
ble are likely to become his strongest critics.53
The problem of expectation of supporters during Gibson's first term
extended beyond the question of shifts in benefits, however. Having
won what many conceived was an ideological fight, minorities expected
or at least hoped for changes in attitudes of whites in government and
business and for greater 'respect' for nonwhite citizens. The fact that
white hostility remained high posed no mean pressures on Gibson once
in office.
A variety of specific grievances which underscored the campaign were
carried over as demands into city hall in 1970. As Robert Curvin
suggests, these could be grouped roughly into two categories: first,
there were questions of an essentially 'service' improvements nature;
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secondly, there were questions of minority participation in decisions
and employment in government. In the first case, issues tended to be
well articulated by a wide range of citizens' interest groups spawned
in part by the Civil Rights and poverty program movements of the
1960's; major issue areas were health (the City Hospital), police and
education where expectations were for major improvements. In the
case of participation and employment, minority employment in city
public works and construction contracts and city employment in general
were at issue. In many issue areas, considerable spadework had been
accomplished during the long years of protest serving to give the broad
impression that achievement of goals could move forward quickly. The
barriers posed by the position of mayor and the institution of city
government to implement change, however, were not well understood by
much of the community leadership.
In some cases, work groups and task forces had evolved very well
formulated plans and programs for service increments, or new programs
in neighborhoods. These programs, however, would have a direct impact
on the city budget, or existing agency programs.
The city hospital question as well as that of a less controversial
facility, a nursing home, revolved around demands for a state takeover
and improvements in the service level of the facility to meet what was
perceived as reaonable standards. Another demand formulated fairly
clearly by 1970 by neighborhood groups was for decentralization of
health care services. Several neighborhood groups were active in
developing 'plans' for such facilities.54 In the case of the Newark
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police, the question was complicated, involving a series of issues
including establishment of a civilian review board, increases in
minority officers, patrolmen and a minority police director.55 In the
case of education, an assortment of long-standing issues included
improvements of ghetto school programs, increased participation of
parents and students in program formulation and other decisions,
special services addressed to children with learning handicaps, cultural
and recreational services, etc. In addition to the more 'stable' in-
stitutional issues, special interest groups which had emerged from the
intense planning of the poverty program and Model Cities articulated
needs in a wide range of service areas from pre-school aged children
to environmental health and nutrition.
Minority participation in government service areas and in employment
was a particularly strong issue for the new mayor in 1970. A strong
thrust had developed around integration on public construction
contracts for which blacks and Puerto Ricans had been long under-
represented. 56 The absence of even a Federally required 'home town'
plan for integration was a major grievance and considerable efforts
went to convince the Mayor to initiate one.57 The city employment
picture was not much better, and there was a wide expectation that
employment increments would go to blacks and Puerto Ricans.
-The often well-formulated demands from the minority community worked
a considerable hardship in some areas, while at other times served to
some extent to accelerate changes. In some service areas -- health,
for example -- institutional change was promoted to some extent by
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pressures and by the existence of a 'head start' by neighborhood groups
on planning for decentralization of services.58 Similarly, in
employment areas, there was less white resistance to change, or an
'expectation' that minorities would somehow be favored in recruitment
and promotion. The case of -the Model Cities Administration represented
the latter case; there was a general expectation that nonwhites would
have priorities in employment generated by the agency. On the other
hand, the Gibson administration was heavily criticized for not appoint-
ing blacks to highly visible jobs such as the Police Director, or for
pressing more strongly for a police Civilian Review Board and other
control devices over police behavior.59 Similarly, the demand for
increased participation and control over public education in Newark was
perceived to be a mayoral responsibility, despite the limited legal
authority the mayor had over public school administration. While
Gibson did use his power of appointment to the Board of education
liberally to increase minority representation and even app'ointed a
17-year old high school student to the Board, the critical issue of
employment could not be attacked.60 When confronted at last by a
majority nonwhite board in 1970, the newly militant union walked out.
Since the issue was a disagreement over the expiration of a contract
(and the refusal of an extension by the black dominated Board of
Education which wanted to renegotiate the expired contract), and further
the strike was illegal, not surprisingly many observers felt the issue
behind the strike was nonwhite employment in the school system and
local control. 61
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One major problem facing Gibson in 1970 was typified by the strike;
community demands to some extent, as well as an emerging leadership,
tended to set demands very high, while (usually white) opposition
tended to harden into particularly resistant patterns. Issues
quickly escalated to 'crisis' proportion. In the case of the strike
of Newark teachers in 1970, militant parents as well as disorganized
groups of other interests, black and white, emerged to fan flames of
the confrontation. This served to inhibit any satisfactory settlement
.62
or compromise.
For the vast majority of Newark's nonwhites, however, it is possible
that some of the lowest expectations were the most difficult to deliver
given the institutionalization of values, civil service rules and
absence of reform mechanisms or legal redress available to the new
mayor. In areas where relief of abuse from the old system was the
primary demand, such as the case of police attitudes and harassment of
juveniles, or refuse collection in neighborhoods, constituent demands
were for modest change. To effect change, however, was to some extent
far more difficult that a major reorganization say of the city health
system. Such modest demands ran headlong into the entrenched system of
Newark's ethnic power structure at its lower ends. As Ron Porambo
reported pessimistically, after a year, police brutality was still
going on in Newark and the hated Dominick Spina, Addonizio's bullying
ex-Police Director, as well as most of the other police of 'questionable
behavior' were still on the city police payroll. 63 There were attempts
at change on the environmental level and a complaint bureau was decen-
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tralized into neighborhoods, staffed with neighborhood people.64 The
indifference in the city operating departments to responding to these
modest demands -- in sanitation, code enforcement, etc. -- however,
remained a serious problem which would only be solved over time.
Meanwhile, the more modest demands had to compete with big crises and
the city's serious financial state for the new administration's atten-
tion.
F. The Constraints of Regional Demands and Expectations
A major constraint on the new administration in addressing the question
of shifting city resources lay in the financial crisis which technically
produced a bankrupt situation in 1970, and which demanded almost full
attention to resolve in order to forestall an even deeper crisis. This
issue, however, was matched by an equal urgency for fiscal reform to
get the city on at least marginal footing so that it might meet its
payroll. Other reform was urgently needed in some areas threatened
with scandal or financial collapse, or both, including the city school
system and the Housing Authority. While the latter agency was inde-
pendent of city support (except for local matching shares on grants,
usually made through the city's capital budget), HUD investigations
that year indicated that the Housing Authority could easily be taken
receivership and considering the evidence on illegal activities per-
petuated on its contracts, probably should be.65 The demand for these
urgent changes and an accompanying need for general reform in city
operations was pressed primarily by regional forces, including the
state, federal interests and the city's corporate business elite. The
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problem of reform, already complex, was exaggerated by the urgency of
the time frame, the lack of real commitment to aid the new administra-
tion and, on the part of state government, the confusion generated by
conflict between 'those who would help' and those who were openly
hostile to the new administration.
1) The City's Fiscal Crisis
There is no question that the Gibson administration probably inherited
the worst public fiscal crisis in recent times in the U.S. What is less
well understood, however, was the state role both in creating the
crisis and shifting the burden for solution to the city. In 1971,
Newark faced a pending budget deficit of 42 to 63 million dollars. A
large part of this was directly traceable to the prior year. The out-
going administration had manipulated the tax rate by failing to budget
$17 million for the school budget and an additional 4.3 million for
teachers' salaries incurred in a strike settlement. Technically,. these
questions should have been raised by the state prior to approval of the
city's budget. Instead, however, the state simply reduced the city's
urban aid grant (a block grant based on reapportionment of the
state sales tax to urbanized localities,) to make up part of the deficit. 66
Without some kind of state assistance, a school closing was forecast.
Trenton was largely unsympathetic. While the new governor, Cahill,
generally sympathized with the problem, the state legislature, includ-
ing Newark's representatives, were unsympathetic, if not hostile. 67 The
best that Gibson could propose was new taxes since a state takeover of
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the city's school system was out of the question. The city was already
finding it difficult to get an agreement on a state medical school
takeover of the city's hospital. Gibson proposed a state takeover of
the City Hospital, a tax on fuel at Newark Airport, and either a two
per cent income tax or a two per cent business-paid payroll tax. The
income tax was preferred since it would be based on earnings, while
the payroll tax would be applied to all businesses, irrespective of
68
earnings, or of whether the business was operating at a loss. After
months of haggling, it was clear that the more equitable tax had no
chance. Suburbanites, who by now dominated the state legislature-were
unwilling to absorb any part of the city's budget and the Essex County
delegation, dominated by communiteis surrounding the city and a workforce
heavily composed of Newark commuters, refused to support the mayor's
proposals. The legislature finally grudgingly passed as a 'temporary
measure',subject to annual review, authority for ten new tax levies,
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comprising a series of nuisance taxes and a 1 percent payroll tax. 6
An additional 15 million dollars was added in the form of urban aid
but the potential impact of the total package was far less than needed
to bring the city out of its financial straits.
To the state legislature's hostility, however, was added that of the
white dominated city council which adamently refused to recognize the
deficit crisis. Initially the council rejected approval of any new
taxes, reportedly on grounds that the measures were punitive to Newark
and that they had not been consulted.70 A final reluctant approval was
granted, however, for only three of the authorized 10 taxes; clearly,
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the crisis was averted only temporarily and could recur annually.
2) Reform in Administrative Areas of Government
Added to the city's fiscal and tax crisis was that of demand for reform,
in part represented by pressures from regional interests, in part repre-
sented by demands from local residents. The eight preceding years of
neglect and use of the city apparatus for interests of political reward
generation had added to the fiscal crisis a dimension of disarray,
particularly on the administrative level. While the city's tax base
was being gradually chipped away by state rule changes. new exemptions
granted to urban renewal projects and expansion of large tax exempt
facilities such as the Port of New York Authority, the local tax and
assessments offices added to the problem by allowing a steady erosion
of assessments through court actions challenging local assessments and
through failure to track down properties 'lost' on the tax rolls. Fur-
ther, a backlog of uncollected taxes was mounting and totaled $13 million
annually. The effects both on the loss of assessments and the backlog
were devastating on the budget and, further, hinted that reasonable
reforms might have retrieved a not unimportant part of the deficit. 72
In addition to the tax and assessments problem stood the larger
questions of retrieving some order in the personnel system, and organiz-
ing some coherent centralized managerial function in the city. These
latter demands were expressed most often, however, as a simplistic
solution which avoided attacking the real problem of reorganization
of government in the city.
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The demands for reform were articulated to a very limited degree by
the city's business elite, or more properly, their paid lobby group,
the Newark Chamber of Commerce. In 1970, Gibson appealed to the
corporate elite to assist him during the transition period of govern-
ment in reorganizing the administrative and fiscal apparatus of the
city. While individuals in the corporate environment promised assist-
ance, very little materialized. Despite the concentration of corporate
wealth in the city, for example, about all that was contributed in the
way of assistance during the transitional government period was the
'loan' of some middle management advisors and a grant of $10,000 spread
over four years to supplement the salary of a new business administrator
for the city.73 Moreover, when Gibson appealed for support of the tax
package, key actors either remained silent, or accused the city of
breaking faith with business.74
Corporate demands for reform in the city government were in traditional
areas of reorganization and cost savings; these, however, were wholly
unrealistic given the state of the city, and the tremendous conflicts
of the business community's position in the city. Newark's business
elite had played a role of ruthless exploitation of the city, according
to some, beginning with the 1940's when corporate elites based in
Newark shifted pressuring city hall to Trenton, passing devastating
tax legislation. 75 By the 1960's, when the ethnic governments took over
the situation was even worse. Having continued to pressure the state
for removal of tax liability to the city, Newark's business elite
adopted a hit and miss approach to maintaining interest in the city when
I A
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it was profitable, then ignoring it when potential costs arose. With
a mainly suburbanized workforce and a local political leadership pre-
occupied with 'spoils', government reform hardly dominated business
interest thi.nking.
In proposing reforms, but offering little or no support for tax reforms
which would solve the initial crisis problem and lead to tax reform in
the city, the Gibson administration was left largely to fight the city
council over changes in the administrative structure and -the new taxes
granted by the state legislature. With no incentive or threat, the
hostile and irresponsible Italian-dominated council refused to consider
the most marginal changes, even when cost savings were introduced.
Approvals for state and federal grants-in-aid, which would have cost the
city nothing, for example, were denied. A reorganization plan designed
to save the city $4 million was turned down. Finally, after months of
delay and an eventual passage of a few of the taxes authorized by the
state, the council refused to pass on funds necessary to collect the
taxes. 76
G. Summary
The mayoral victory of 1970 was widely viewed as a victory of blacks over.
white power, corruption and neglect and an opportunity for representa-
.tion and sharing in the benefits of city government at last. On one
level, most blacks viewed the electoral victory as a symbolic victory
over the forces of racism for which the broad national community could
be proud; that it was won through black unity demonstrated yet another
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achievement. In 1970, as one participant suggested, blacks were
hardly concerned that the city was old, broken, and wornout or that
white business and white people were leaving or that the assessed
valuation of property was tumbling; "it's ours and we'll take it,
and furthermore how many blacks benefited from those jobs and busi-
nesses."77
The new administration, however, faced a different set of issues circum-
scribed in part by the office and in part by the necessity to manage a
city government within the institutional framework defined by law and
the office. For some blacks, furthermore, there were expectations
that change would occur, both modest and dramatic.
The constraints of instituting required steps merely to maintain the
city were enormous; the constraints to make changes to reach the
demands of nonwhite constituencies were even greater. A first major
constraint was posed by the institutional and legal constraints of the
city government and the office of mayor within the state framework.
Not only was New Jersey a relatively backward state in terms of its
attention to support and development of localities in the most general
sense, a dominant conservative and highly fragniented political culture
in state government was reinforced by the expansion of representation
in the state legislature of suburban interests, whose main objectives
-in areas like Newark were to keep the poor in check. The fact that
many suburbanites could escape support of their city workplaces through
an antiquated tax system assisted in a systematic veto of change in
state fiscal policy. City government institutional constraints
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reflected the state limits. While possessing a strong mayor-council
system, Newark's charter allocated enough authority to the council to
create the illusion of genuine power in the minds of councilmen over the
years. Long years of Commission government prior to 1954 created a
conception of government as 'the sum of the parts' and the ethnic
government tradition prior to 1970 reinforced the notion by 'dividing
the spoils' along ethnic lines. In 1970 the pattern was broken but a
white dominated council persisted in insisting on sharing spoils, or
thwarting development of black leadership in government.
A second large constraint lay in the underdevelopment of an administra-
tive or managerial apparatus in city government, an absolute requisite
for resolving the city's fiscal crisis as well as 'modernizing' the
operations parts of government. In Newark's tradition, a central ad-
ministrative part of government was viewed as unnecessary, if not dis-
ruptive of the system of power sharing and maximizing of employment
growth. The absence of an administrative core assisted in the growth of
a fragmented set of city functions, autonomous and unrelated to one
another or the whole. The functions were traditional operations of
government, emphasizing security, property maintenance and control
at the expense of newer human oriented service functions and over the
years had spawned a constituency of lower level civil servants and blue
collar workers. With the entry of a strong Civil Service system and
unionization in post war years, these units had become semi-permanent,
self-contained and nearly devoid of checks, either from the central
government or the external environment. The 'operations' philosophy
179
of the council and Newark's post-war mayors, however, had strong
overlaps with stability, job growth (particularly on a fairly low
level) and little diversification which might generate checks on the
system. As constraints on change, the operating units posed formid-
able barriers. A largely white workforce (many with low skills and
low mobility outside Newark) promised to resist integration and was
threatened by the appointment of black and white professionals alike as
department heads and middle management. The new planning philosophy
was an additional threat to those 'risen in the ranks' with little
education and little adaptability to new task requirements, policies
and the like. The civil service system and the unions were additional
strong barriers to change, and generally stabilized the internalized
system, obsolete or not.
A final constraint which figures in barriers to change was that of two
types of demands from the external service environment of the city.
On the one hand, nonwhite constituents had long lists of specific
grievances and demands for change and many had high expectations for
rapid execution of modest changes such as relief from the worst output
of the white power system. Others demanded rapid shifts in the alloca-
tion of jobs and contracting to benefit nonwhites. Still others hoped
for a filling of gaps in the array of city output more useful for use by
a poverty community. However posed, practically none could be met
immediately and many clearly could not be met without a fundamental
reorganization of government and total change in personnel. At the
other end of the scale were regional interests, including an ambivalent
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and shifting business elite, state government and Washington, D.C.
The business community's constraints were posed less by the expecta-
tion for reform than by the expectation for reform at no cost; despite
considerable resources, little direct assistance was provided to the
new administration immediately, future commitments were vague and
almost no support was given where it would count most, on tax reform
in the state legislature. The state played an equally negative role
on city assistance; a suburban dominated legislature promised to inhibit
genuine tax reform in the state while at the same time expecting 'clean',
stable government in the city. The Federal government, while more
lenient in grant assistance, only belatedly used-its authority to
'find' corruption, waste and disorder in its grant supported programs
after long years of looking the other way and made it clear it would
tolerate no similar errors on Gibson's part.
With formidable obstacles operating on all sides, and very meager
resources of the office of mayor, the first year of the Administration's
life saw dire predictions which ranged at best for very slow and mar-
ginal change and at worst for total failure.
.. ........ ..
I S.
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Chapter 5: A Black Administration in Power: Forcing Change
in Resource Allocation in Newark
While great-pressures were brought to bear early in the Gibson admini-
stration to force changes in the stable pattern of government opera-
tions, a great many initial plans were, scrapped and others modified to
reflect the real constraints of change in the city. Faced with major
legal, institutional and political limitations, efforts to base change
on planning and logic were quickly discarded. Instead, a pattern of
policy making emerged based on the opportunity presented by timing,
discovery of power vacuums, generation of new resources and the avail-
ability of strategic skills.
Early in the life of the new Gibson administration, a priority was
placed on shifting the allocation of the city's resources. Initial
failures in these areas resulted in generating new resources, princip-
ally through new taxes and grants-in-aid. The shift in allocation of
existing resources emerged as a later theme; with the threat of decline
in external resources and constraints on new taxes, the administration
turned to the city budget for 'slack' to reduce.deficits and redistri-
bute some long-sought for committed resources to human resources areas,
black employment and other goal areas.
In addition to the generating of external or new resources, considerable
attention was placed on reorganization of city departments in the Gibson
administration. Here again, constraints forced the 'shelving' of an
initial reorganization plan in favor of a less systematic reshuffling of
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responsibilities. While actual changes did create important impacts
on goals of increasing mayoral control and minority employment, nearly
all were made in the 'low profile' manner traditional to Newark. This
helped reduce alienation of the losers, particularly those retaining
considerable power.
A third priority area was in the area of appointments and personnel.
Attention in this area reflected the goals of expanding nonwhite per-
sonnel in city employment and gaining control and a mayoral perspective
on key operations. Gibson's policy on appointments was fairly dis-
jointed and in controversial areas encountered major stumbling blocks
with the council. The technique of 'redefining' key jobs in terms of
high qualifications (thereby excluding local whites with seniority and
undercutting other council objections) backfired frequently when few
qualified nonwhites willing to locate in Newark could be found. In
the more general personnel area, constraints to integration posed by the
civil service system and the growing influence of unions in the city
inhibited rapid change. Nonwhite increases in city employment thus
relied heavily on the creation of new spending areas, many of which
were weak in dependency on uncertain Federal grants.
This chapter examines the issues Gibson faced during his initial years
in office and the pattern of strategies taken to effect change.
The first part looks first at the area of budget and revenue policy
in the city, some of the efforts at change and outcomes of the Gibson
administration. In particular, the city's general budget situation, the
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results of tax and grant-in-aid efforts are examined during the Gibson
administration's first term and contrasted with trends up to its
entry into office.
A second part looks at the effort and effects of attempts to reorganize
city government during the initial years of the Gibson administration.
In particular, the pattern of attempts, resistance and outcomes and
use of mayoral prestige in the case of several operating departments
are evaluated. Some of the short and long range impacts of reorganiza-
tion changes on resource allocation in the city are also considered.
A third part of the chapter focuses on the administrations efforts,
successes and failures in promoting integration in city personnel and
stabilizing policy priorities in several agencies through the appoint-
ments rpocess. Issues behind the failure of the Gibson administration
to develop a personnel affirmative action plan as well as the constraints
on appointments are examined along with the issue of 'federal employment'
as integration safety valves operating in the city.
A. Changes in Budget and Tax Policy Changes in Newark
Gibson's fiscal policy evolved through two stages during his first
term. The first stage consisted of attention focused primarily on
resources and little on the budget. The second was characterized by
considerably more attention to departmental spending.
One reason was the administration's inability to change resources
without generating superior opportunities for success in the tax and
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grant-in-aid area. As a result, overall growth of expenditures during
Gibson's administration were higher than under the prior four years of
the Addonizio administration. Much of the overall growth reflected
increases in revenue available for spending, principally new taxes.
High growth in spending was true for all categories of expenditures,
whether property and safety, administration and control, or social and
human resources. The Gibson bias in favor of expansion of the latter
two categories over the first (comprising police, fire and public
works), however, is visible in higher growth rates of the latter and
in their growth as a proportion of total spending.
1) Changes in Spending Patterns Under Gibson
Expenditures in Newark increased substantially under Gibson compared
to the previous four year Addonizio administration. a 61.01 per cent
increase in total spending took place under the Gibson administration
compared to 30.69 per cent under Addonizio. Most of the increase,
moreover, took place in department expenditures, rather than 'fixed'
expenditures such as pensions, interest, school expenditures, etc.
For example, while departmental expenditures increased around 21 per
cent under Addonizio and fixed expenditures increased by 52.0 per
cent, under Gibson growth contrasted in these areas by around 75 per
cent and 36 per cent respectively. Moreover, most categories benefitted
-from the total increase. Of the three broad budgetary categories --
property and safety, administration and human resources -- all shared
in the overall growth. Of changes over the eight year period covering
the two administrations, no less than half the growth in the three
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Aggregate Expenditure Categories: Newark 1964-1974
% Change
1964-69 1970-74
1. Environmental/Property/Safety Categories
-Public Works
-Police
-Fire
Total Category
20.99
38.89
32.21
31.14
41.42
35.18
71.01
87.75
54.43 104.07
41.87 86.05
2. Administration/Control Finance Categories
-Administration
-Law
-Finance/Assessments
Total Category
-12.47
77.59
28.48
21.19
54.49 35.24
36.55 . 142.41
88.11 141.68
75.67 114.19
3. Social/Consumer Categories
-Library
-Museum
-Parks, Recreation
-Health and Welfare
Total Category
TOTAL Departmental
-2.28
16.75
31'. 90
11.54
28.91
30.11
35.78 150.74 239.76
13.78
12.53
30.69
31.23
73.75
61.01
49.32
95.52
110.52,
Source: City of Newark, Operating Budgets, Newark, New Jersey.
1964-74
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broad categories took place under the Gibson administration.
Much of the spending growth can be explained by changes in total revenue
available to the city under the two administrations. Revenue composi-
tion changes may also explain some changes. Finally, Addonizio's
budgetary policy during the final year of his administration did
exclude some expenditure which was shifted to the initial Gibson
budget year.
Revenue growth kept pace with expenditure growth during the two admini-
strations. A dramatic shift took place under Gibson with an increas-
ing dependency on non property-tax resources, possible mainly.
through the introduction of several new taxes (notably a payroll tax
and gross receipts taxes) and grants-in-aid from state and federal
levels. Under Gibson, non property tax income increased by 167 per
cent in contrast to 145 per cent under Addonizio; the proportion of
this income (in contrast to property tax as a proportion of total
revenue), however, increased from around 23 per cent under Addonizio
to around 70 per cent under Gibson.
Shifts in the composition of revenue in Newark under Gibson permitted
a change in emphasis in spending between categories of expenditures
in the budget. Shifts in composition also undoubtedly reflected
policy emphasis shifts of the two administrations which favored
growth of some spending categories over others. For example, while the
highest growth rates under Addonizio were in police and fire, by the
time the Gibson administration came in during the latter half of the
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Newark: Expenditure Composition 1964-1974
% Total
Unit 1964
Mayor's agencies
Clerk; Council
Administration
Law
Finance
Assessments
Public Works
Parks, Rec.
Police
Fire
Health & Welfare
Hospitals, Instit.
Unclassified
Total Departmental
6.87
0.87
1.16
0.37
2.16
0.77
19.97
24.26
14.38
10.80
16.00
2.39
1966
6.61
1.31
1.08
0.36
2.23
0.76
19.13
25.92
14.73
8.88
16.12
2.74
1968
5.95
1.00
1.03
0.41
2.64
0.63
19.01
25.16
14.59
11.20
15.82
2.54
1970
5.88
1.24
0.83
0.51
3.12
19. 106
28.69
16.28
21.19
3.18
1972
5.34
0.88
0.80
0.48
3.24
18
28
16
11
1974
5.43
1.09
3,88
0.42
3.33
.36 16.08
-- 2.77
.40 21.45
.95 13.82
.20 7.59
14.46 23.00
99.99 99.94 99.98 99.98 100.00 99.82
Source: City of Newark, Operating Budgets, Newark, New Jersey.
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decade, expenditure increases were concentrated in social and human
resource categories -- notably parks and recreation and health and
welfare -- and in general administration and finance.
Between 1970 and 1974 under Gibson, Parks and Recreation functions,
for example, increased by 150 per cent in contrast to around a 36 per
cent increase under the previous years. While Addonizio's administra-
tion had devoted somewhat more attention to this area than others
(at the time it was part of Public Works), it was emphasized even more
under Gibson as it was a 'newly' created department. Health and
Welfare increases under Gibson also reflected somewhat more liberal
welfare grant policy as well as the growth in spending in health
services and environmental inspections areas, particularly housing.1
The total effect was to increase health and welfare spending by 74 per
cent under Gibson in contrast to the 13 percent increase the previous
four years.
The remaining components of the social and human resources areas, the
cultural facilities (museum and library) received somewhat different
attention. The library expanded its program considerably under the
Gibson administration. Part of this expansion was supported by
increases in state 'sharing' of local budgeted expenditures which
permitted an increase of 32 percent in contrast to the 'loss' under
*the previous administration. The museum is a small facility incorpor-
ated into the city budget in post-war years when private resources
failed; its budgetary expansion during both administrations reflected
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a general ambivalence in the city towards its general future in the
city budget.2
Growth in the area of administration and fiscal categories was stronger
under Gibson than Addonizio, once again reflecting policy priorities,
particularly in the area of finance. The finance area (including
taxation, assessments, treasury, accounting and data processing)
increased budgeted expenditure by around 88 per cent under Gibson, in
contrast to 28 per cent under Addonizio and the administration
category (administration, budget and purchasing) also gained by appro-
ximately 55 per cent, in contrast to a 12 per cent loss under Addonizio.
The attention to the finance area under Gibson relfected the general
priority placed on increasing staff to accommodate an updated financial
planning and accounting system necessitated in part by the increase in
revenue in the city and in part by general disorder in the old system. 3
Changes in the property and safety categories of spending between.
Addonizio and Gibson only partly reflect policy. The growth of spend-
ing in these categories increased more under Gibson than Addonizio,
and all parts gained with the exception of police, though growth was
less than in other non property-safety cateogries of spending. For
example, despite the stripping away of substantial parts of Public
Works for creation of the new departments (Parks and Recreation and
Engineering), public works as a whole gained 41 per cent under Gibson
in contrast to around 21 per cent under Addonizio. Similarly, fire
expenditures also grew at a rate outstripping most other expenditure
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categories. Finally, while the total gains to the police d_-ortment
were lower than under Addonizio, the growth was still almost half of
the near doubling of the expenditure over the decade.
One general explanation which can be offered is that these categories
are highly stabilized in increase terms because of wage increments
and step and promotional increments are institutionalized in state
civil service systems and union contracting (again dominated by state
rules). Another explanation is found in some personnel increases. Per-
sonnel increases took place, for example, in police both in traditional
patrolman categories and in non-sworn categories (respectively approxi-
mately 50 additional patrolmen and 160 school traffic guards), adding
around 20% to the police budget. A third explanation is offered by
the fire category. While police and public works tended under Gibson
to be closely scrutinized, the 1974 budget hearings suggested that the
fire department was to some extent 'favored' in the budgetary system
for political reasons. The director, Caulfield, had supported Gibson's
1970 election, and thus more leniency was shown in 'cutting' requested
expenditure requests.
2) Revenue Growth Trends Under Gibson
Revenue growth was generally stronger under Gibson in all but the
property tax categories. A dramatic increase in the growth of non
property tax categories took place under Gibson as well as a growth
in grants-in-aid; both these trends relfected to some extent the Gibson
'success' in development of new, non property tax sources of revenue.
. S.-
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Revenue Growth Trends, Newark, New Jersey:
% Change
Surplus
Misc. Revenue
Receipts Delin-
quent Taxes
Property Tax:
Municipal
School
Total
GRAND TOTAL
1964-1969
11.73
145.29
50.00
125.95
-13.42
- 7.32
30.70
1970-1974
87.50
166.84
16.67
0.34
-31.54
-28.14
61.07
1964-1974
112.58
554.52
75.00
126.71
-40.73
-33.40
110.52
Source: Annual Operating Budgets, City of Newark, New Jersey.
1964-1974
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The growth in grants-in-aid, also reflected Gibson efforts, particularly
in changing the state grant formulas for the city. While overall
revenue grew under Gibson by 61 per cent (in contrast to around 31
per cent under the prior administration's last four years), property
tax growth for support of municipal budgeted expenditures declined.
Growth trends in the generalized categories of revenue are explained by
shifts in composition of revenue between Addonizio and Gibson. While
in 1968, 48 per cent of Newark's municipal expenditures were supported
by the property tax, by 1974 this had dropped to 21.5 per cent with
the slack and growth taken up by a combination of new taxes and
grants-in-aid. New taxes (a payroll tax, parking lot receipts tax, a
gross receipts tax and franchise taxes) added an additional 22 million
dollars to the city's revenue by 1974. During the initial short period
since approval, these taxes have shown growth superior to property
assessment gains over the decade. Other revenue increases have
occurred in the area of grants-in-aid. Gibson succeeded in renegotiat-
ing the state's urban aid grant, a grant for the larger, more troubled
municipalities; this is a 'flat grant', however, rather than a formula,
and remains stable irrespective of shifts in spending, as has other
state per capita apportionment taxes. In the case of the apportion-
ment taxes, Newark has gained nothing at all because of the 'losses'
in population.4 Another category of gain was in a renegotiated lease
on land to the Port of New York-New Jersey Authority which produced
an additional $1.5 million and, finally, Federal State and Local Fiscal
Assistance (revenue sharing) produced an approximate addition to local
revenue of $12 million in 1973 and 1974.
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Revenue Composition Trends, Newark, New Jersey: 1964-1974
% Total Revenue
Type
Surplus
Misc. Revenue
Receipts Delin-
quent Taxes
Property Taxes:
School
Municipal
Total
GRAND TOTAL
1964
4.53
22.68
5.06
2.97
64.99
67.96
99.99
1966
6.91
26.04
8.04
3.35
55.65
59.00
99.99
1968
7.53
38.43
5.52
5.14
46.44
48.51
99.99
1970
7.82
1972 1974
1,89 4.51
39.82 62.93 69.78
6.22
4.01
23.85
46. 08
7.58 ' 4.21
5.08
22.51
27.59
3.20
18.30
21 .50
99.94 99.99 100.00
Source: Annual Operatinq Budqets, City of Newark, New
*Includes school emergencies and debt service only.
Note: 1974 composition based on revenue estimates only.
Jersey.
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Miscellaneous Revenue, Newark, New Jersey:
1974* 1973
Municipal Courts
Franchise Taxes
Gross Receipts Tax
Interest on Investments
and Deposits
Fox-Lance Limited Dividend
Receipts
Franchise Tax-Domestic
Life Insurance Cos.
Sewer Service Charges
Payroll Tax
Parking Lot Receipts
Port Newark-Port Lease
N.Y.N.J. Authority
*Note: Estimate only.
Source: Annual Operating
2,056,300
3,711,400
4,813,800
1,000,000
2,242,600
5,004,300
2,111,700
11,656,000
1,400,000
2,263,000
2,056,388
3,711,420
4,813,810
1,729,525
2,242,615
5,004,341
2,111,722
2,040,003
3,406,834
3,944,866
799,741
2,178,158
4,608,381
1,685,480
11,657,071 11,545,684
1,412,719
579,000
1,345,926
579,000
1,692,113
3,000,263
2,883,320
176,980
569,799
4,417,225
1,000,001
8,296,109
737,321
579,000
Budgets, City of Newark, New Jersey.
Category
1971-1974
1972 1971
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Major State and Federal Taxes, Transfers and Grants-in-Aid
in Newark, New Jersey: 1971-1974
Category 1974* 1973. 1972
State Taxes and Aid:
State Aid Railroad
Tax (R.S. r:29A)
Replacement Revenue
Business Prop. Tax
1,209,538
12,222,679
1,238,629
16,886,990
1,266,732
15,646,632
1,301,130
15.,222,679
State Sales Tax
Interest on Aid
Per Capita
State Aid: School
Building Act
State Aid: Building
Allowance for Schools
Urban Aid Funds
1,335,021.
1,433,498
3,717,682
11,152,639
Federal Aid:
Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972
Planned Variations
*Note: Estimate only.
11,214,703
11,604-,028
13,563,788
930,0_00
Source: Annual Operating Budgets, City of Newark, New Jersey.
1971
1,332,407
1,419,883
3,245,782
7,435,889
1,332,407
1,409,355
2,882,154
7,435,889
1,671,150
74,250
2,448,794
7,435,889
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Apart from revenue sharing, much of the additional revenue growth in
the city beginning in 1970 could be attributed to a priority to
resource raising by theGibson administration. Gibson personally
pressed the state strongly during the initial six months of his
election for creation of new taxes and for changes in the reapportion-
ment and urban aid formulas. While the effort was often an uphill
struggle and Gibson failed in an attempt to get the state's permission
for an income tax, new tax authority was granted as well as changes in
some state grants-in-aid to benefit the city.5 Observers suggest that
had the strong effort not been made it is unlikely that a state
.6
response would have been forthcoming.
Grants-in-aid from the Federal government were also pressed strongly by
the Gibson administration. Most are not reflected in the budget, how-
ever, since they are special purpose categorical grants. Many did,
however, provide for supplemental services in human resources areas
and were used to support key administrative appointments and planning
activities in the administration.7
B. Effort and Impact of Structural Reorganization of City Activities
Structural reorganization of government played an important role in
changing the city's resource allocation picture within a relatively
.short time. Changes which can be identified include direct shifts of
past budgeted expenditure into essentially new functions (including
new personnel categories, etc.), growth in expenditures in new areas,
probable acceleration of racial integration on workforces where new
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areas have been initiated and some psychological changes directly
related to new perceptions of mayoral power. While an early attempt
was made to introduce a systematic reorganization plan, a quick
failure discouraged any new strong attempts. Instead, structural reor-
ganization of the city under Gibson proceeded on an ad hoc basis
following no formal plan. Two types of changes were achieved, how-
ever. One was the creation of new departments and another was the
elimination of old departments. Within some old departments, in
addition, other functional changes took place owing to an additional
pressure which built during the middle of the term, the withdrawal of
several large categorical grant programs from the city and integration
of others into the city budget formally.
1) Problems of Structural Reorganization of Government
Newark's functional organization remained fairly stable between 1954
and 1970, when the city government was reorganized from a five part
commission structure to a six part organization.
The City Charter required that six primary departments be established,
and few changes had been made to the initial six over the 1954-1970
period.
In 1970, Gibson attempted, in presenting a total policy package to the
Council to reorganize some functions.8 A high priority was placed on
elimination of the 'institutions' category, long a sore spot in Newark,
a special generator of black community wrath over the years, and
finally, an area that the state of New Jersey Health Department had
hinted made the city in violation of state health codes. 9 Both the
198
overall plan and the plan for elimination of the institutions were
opposed by the Council. 10 Gibson then dropped the overall reorgani-
zation plan and turned back to the state for assistance in picking up
the City Hospital, under the administration of the New Jersey College
of Medicine and Dentistry. The second health institution, a 'nursing
home',which appeared to have as clients mainly elderly Jewish patients,
was left for the state to finally close as a 'hazard' a year later. 1 1
Reorganization policy from that time on proceeded primarily on an ad
hoc basis, with the administration 'fighting it out' with the council
on each of the changes.
Initial changes were modified considerably. A plan to modify the
Health and Welfare Department was dropped entirely. Reorganization of
the Police Department, never formally demanded, was left largely to the
director, John Redden, as was the Fire Department to its director, John
Caulfield. This left among operating departments Public Works and
several administrative divisions.
It is difficult to relate the council's attitude toward structural
change to refusals to approve reorganization and change initially. The
council systematically disapproved almost everything proposed by
Gibson, including grants-in-aid from the Federal government, which
required no local share. There was, however, eventual approval of
-many radical structural changes. Robert Curvin, who served during
the transitional administration period, suggests that the failure of
Gibson to talk about 'patronage' (Curvin suggests, because there
wasn't any to talk about) accounts more than anything for the shift in
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behavior.12 Another explanation, however, may have been the initial
fear of alienating older (mainly Italian) workers, thus reducing
further the remaining Italian power base in the city.13 This factor
may have declined as a problem later.
C. Implementing Structural Reorganization: New Departments Versus Old
Two key themes dominated Gibson policy on reorganization. One was the
creation of new departments, conceived as the highest priority, given
the considerable constraints of council agreement. Another was the
internal reorganization of existing departments. Public Works emerged
early along with Health and Welfare as likely target areas for radical
changes, while the police department, Finance and the the Community
Development Administration (CDA) in the mayor's office were prime
targets for the latter type of change.
1) Creation of Two New Departments: Politics of Public Works, Parks
and Engineering
Public Works in 1970 was a sprawling complex agency comprising separate
divisions, divided into a complex of functional types: (1) environmental
maintenance, sanitation, (2) maintenance of city property, and (3) ser-
vice to city equipment. In addition, some social programs were included
in the parks and recreation program, the locus of which was in the
Office of the Director of Public Works. Theoretically, an engineer
headed the department; under Addonizio the job had shifted to a
political appointee and the City Engineer (a state requirement), had no
personal staff and appeared to work on a part time basis. 19
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The structural reorganization plan which emerged for Public Works
took only general account of the operating problems (identified to
some extent in consultant reports), but focused more on getting
radical changes through the council. Three were proposed and
executed under Gibson: (l)-removal of parks and recreation to be
reconstituted as a separate department; (2) removal of 'engineering'
types of functions to be reconstituted as a separate department;
(3) shifting to public works of a 'traffic and signals'division from
the Police Department Principally because of the council question,
policy and preference questions underlying the changes counted more
probably than efficiency or other 'objective' administrative criteria.
In the case of parks and recreation functions, the policy and prefer-
ence criteria were most visible. An obvious service area and parti-
cularly addressed to the question of critical juvenile problems in
Newark, in 1970 the functions were scattered in several bureaus in
Public Works.14 Further, the character of the functions was dominated
by the 'operations' and maintenance philosophy. Two of three divisions,
Parks and Grounds and Baths and Pools, were staffed primarily with blue
collar personnel concerned primarily with facility maintenance, while a
third, Recreation Centers, supplied staff for programs in neighborhood
recreation centers and parks. During the riot years, substantial
increases in activities did take place, aided primarily by Federal
grants; the buildup was mainly during the summer, however, and large
decreases took place once summer was over. 15 Removal of the activities
from Public Works could be interpreted either as a move to stabilize
201
the output part of the program, or to reduce the overwhelming main-
tenance orientation. One observer suggested that it was one of the
most logical shifts in the city.16
In 1971, the Gibson administration had gained general agreement with
the Director of Public Works, an older employee retained by Gibson to
undercut potential objections by the mainly Italian workforce, to
remove the three bureaus. The plan was presented to the council. A
struggle over several months ensued because of the Mayor's insistance
on 'retirement' of around 70 workers in the Parks and Grounds component.
Following a management consultant report that 83 budgeted mainly blue
collar category employees would reduce the. unrealistically high 'person-
nel to park activities ratios', as well as withdraw city payments for
what was private responsibilities, the Mayor's recommendation focused
on older employees with low or negligible productivity.17 The labor
unions protested and the council refused approval. Only after going
through a court suit was the city able to 'retire' some of the workers,
and gain council approval over the reorganization plan.18
The real impact of the change of shifting Parks and Recreation from
Public Works was more psychological than real iTi functional terms,
although its impact in budgetary terms was fairly dramatic. There was
an immediate loss to public works of $2 million of its budget and 178
-workers, but the initial years saw functions nominally concentrated
in task areas merely shifted under a new director. Within three years,
however, budgeted personnel expansions had taken place with 100 addi-
tional employees and an approximate doubling of expenditures by 1974.
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Newark, New Jersey: Parks and Recreation Department Expenditures
Category: 1971 1973 1974
Salaries $1,445,127 $2,188,909 $2,711,844
Service by Contract 197,253 289,635 289,659
Materials 65,138 70,525 104,650
Equipment 51,446 16,151 6,250
Miscellaneous 40,000 -0- 100,000
Total $1,798,964 $2,565,220 $3,212,403
Personnel (Number 178 248 297
Source: Operating Budgets, Newark, New Jersey
In evaluating the choice of parks and recreation functions as a focus
for creation of a new department in the city, two factors seem to have
been important. One is the function itself, as one of some utility to
black communities. Already fairly decentralized on a neighborhood
basis geographically, a new recreation center had been opened during
1970 in the mainly black Central Ward in the city, making the activities
even more visible and useful potentially to black neighborhoods.
Secondly, a large proportion of the workforce and staff could comprise
minority jobs. Many staff jobs either did not .come under stable civil
service rules and many could be defined anew to be effectively tailored
to local recruiting pools, or particular programs, Summer programs
and jobs could be directed to expanded numbers of ghetto youth. The
black emphasis on employment would be normally expected in the area
in Newark further because of past patterns of use of recreation jobs
for patronage under ethnic governments. 19 A final factor was that the
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high concentration of whites in black neighborhoods performing city
services could be eliminated.20 As a result, according to Newark Human
Rights Commission data, nonwhite employment in Parks and Recreation
activities increased from 20% to around 40% between 1970 and 1973.
Creation of an Engineering Department in Newark was intended to consoli-
date a number of existing engineering type functions scattered in various
divisions of Public Works as well as create a stronger focus on this
function in the city. Other aims which were identified included
initiating a genuine capital programming function and gaining information
and control over city contracting, which the fragmentation pattern estab-
lished under the Italian public works system had dispersed. A final aim
was to move towards implementation of racial integration of public con-
struction work in the city.22
In 1970, no engineering function effectively existed in the city of
Newark. While there was a city engineer in the office of the Director
of Public Works, there was no staff and the engineer's position had been
occupied by an elderly man who appeared to work only part time. 2 3 While
the city did undertake major construction works both as part of the
long range capital improvement program and as a part of current expendi-
tures on rehabilitation improvements to existing buildings, contracting
previously appeared to involve the Mayor's office extensively.24 Many
of the so-called engineering functions -- preparation of plans and
specifications -- were scattered in several bureaus and divisions. In
1968, for example, the bureau of sewers, bureau of streets and sidewalks
and the office of Director of Public Works all contained some personnel
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associated with plan and specification preparation as well as contract
monitoring. However, the bulk of these personnel were concentrated in
'draftsman'work categories and only two out of 18 persons were actually
qualified engineers.25 Further, all but one were concentrated in sewers
and sidewalks.
The strategy of creation of the engineering department was largley incre-
mental and posed, initially at least, very little challenge to the
existing distribution of influence. The council, for example, was not
concerned because no jobs were threatened. While the creation of a new
department promised to create additional jobs, unlike other bureaucracies
the engineering department was projected to remain small. Similarly
objections from Public Works were minimal. No large numbers of employ-
ment were threatened and, at least from Addonizio's time, few of the
contracting functions were really controlled by Public Works anyway.
While there was some delay during 1971 with approval, by 1973 the new
Engineering Department had been approved, a chief hired and a partial
budget allocated.
The impact of creation of the Engineering Department was small relative
to both the Public Works budget as a whole and t those divisions most
impacted (Streets and Sidewalks and Dewers). However, the real impact
will lie more in the level of control over contracting in the city and
over integration on construction sites and use of black contractors in
future years.
I X,
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Newark, New Jersey: Engineering Department Expenditures
Category: 1971 1973 1974
Salaries 288,189 586,090 684,355
Services by contract -0- 322,820 263,667
Materials, supplies -0- 1,550 175,855
Equipment 
-0- -0- 350
Total 288,189 910,460 1,124,197
Personnel (number) 35 42 72
Another impact visible both in creation of the Engineering Department and
Parks and Recreation were the effects of automatic growth of expenditures
following removal of functions to new areas. While council approval of
these units may have assumed 'stabilized' levels of expenditures (little
or no new spending), in fact in both cases it is not clear what funding
levels will emerge in longer run terms.27
In contrast to the relatively 'successful' new unit creation experiences
of the Engineering and Parks and Recreation Departments, the efforts to
institute radical changes in Health and Welfare through similar strate-
gies largely failed. While the health area emerged as a 'strong'
community issue during the late 1960's, most of the effort was concen-
trated on changing the city hospital, Martland. While this made the
problem raised somewhat easier to resolve from the perspective of city
responsibility, it left larger questions of community health over which
there was some city control unaddressed. Other community issues over
which the Health and Welfare Department had jurisdiction were also
fairly easy to ignore; the city's responsibility for public assistance,
. A-
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for example, except for a small general assistance program, was mainly
on the level of tax contribution since the county was the direct admini-
strating unit. A final functional responsibility, environmental pro-
tection and health and food and housing inspections were easy to
tradeoff as 'outside city control'.
2) Trial and Error at Internal Reorganization: Health and Welfare
In 1970, Health and Welfare was organized as one complex unit and a
department of institutions comprised another unit responsible for
operating two facilities, the city hospital and Ivy Haven nursing home.
Health and Welfare was divided into three large divisions, health,
welfare and inspections. Health was further divided into a bewilder-
ing array of fragmented components, ranging from direct services
(parochial school services, operation of a city dispensary for the
indigent, operation of baby health stations and specialized clinics
and preventive disease programs) to vital statistics, and water, food
and other environmental inspection and testing. Many of the functions
played only lip service to some problems such as the consumer inspec-
tions, but were built in generally incrementally over the years
mainly under state impetus. 2 8 The health agency, in fact, had become
responsible for undertaking many state delegated functions for which
the city was only partly reimbursed.29 While some of the testing was
contracted out to commercial testing laboratories, staff specialists
were hired nominally to perform many.30 Welfare was a much simpler
operation, mainly administering the city's home relief and emergency
relief programs; the bulk of public assistance, i.e. Aid to Families
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with Dependent Children (AFDC), was administered through the Essex
County Welfare department. Finally, the division of inspections was
actually Newark's building Department, responsible for housing code
enforcement.and building permits. This was primarily a public works
operation, staffed with personnel recruited in the main from building
construction trades, but also comprised small operations in environ-
mental sanitation inspections, air quality control, and consumer pro-
tection areas. 31 The institutions department, while nominally under the
Health and Welfare Director, in fact, was largely autonomous and
responsible only for administering the two institutions, the city'
hospital and the nursing home.
Both institutions in the health area had come under heavy attack by
the Newark community, citizen advocates, medical professionals and
finally the state on grounds of obsolete facilities and practices. 32
Beginning in 1970, the state continued to pressure the city to close the
nursing home, located in a structurally deficient facility, and for
which it was estimated at least $200,000 would be required to repair.33
Gibson elected as an early priority to close the nursing home completely
and transfer the hospital to state control. In the case of the nursing
home, the council immediately balked on the question of personnel. By
1970, the nursing home's staff had undergone a major expansion of staff
shifted from the hospital and regarded as either unqualified or unneces-
sary.34 At the same time, illogically, the council refused to vote
the necessary appropriation for repairs to the nursing home. Finally,
after a standoff approaching the ludicrous, the New Jersey Department of
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Public Health closed the nursing home and transferred the patients
elsewhere. Despite the state's firm position on the nursing home, there
was less help over the hospital question. During 1970 and 1971, the
Board of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry continued its
ambivalence toward a takeover of the hospital. In addition, Gibson
was forced to make several trips to Trenton to convince the state to
complete the turnover and finally to get agreement to absorbing the
hospital budget during the transfer transition period. 3 5
Other components of the Health and Welfare Department were subject to
initial scrutiny and evaluation during 1970 and 1971. Several studies
were undertaken as part of the in-house 'Management by Objectives'
process and by consultants in health services areas. The MBO studies
were aimed primarily at looking at the organizational structure and
administrative issues, and promoting some rational re-design of the
agency. 36 The basic plan provided for three sub-divisions to be created
in a Department of Human Resources, re-oriented towards external ser-
vice, consumer protection and environmental health. A basic core
thrust was an increasing externalization of health services through
expansion of neighborhood health clinics on a systematic citywide basis
and the reduction of internal health service functions. The completed
service network would comprise three existing units, and an additional
five health centers and four reorganized baby and child care units.
The city dispensary -- caring mainly on a 'walk-in' basis for the
indigent -- would be phased out, as would 'floating' service personnel
staffed in central offices. 37
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The plans for reorganization of the Health Department were stopped
before they got off the ground. A number of problems emerged early.
One was the stability in the director of the overall Health and
Welfare function. Another was an unanticipated problem with the
position of Director of Health. A third problem was the institutional
structure in health, which proved considerably more resistant than
that of say Public Works.
The strategy of reorganization in Helath and Welfare rested squarely on
the shoulders of a director, but the position proved very difficult to
fill. After a considerable lag time in search, a black director was
found with a health administrative background and a commitment to inno-
vation, particularly in the services area. He lasted, however, only
about a year before receiving a superior employment offer in the District
of Columbia. 38 Two additional directors followed in rapid succession
and, in each case, the basic reorganization strategy implementation
was postponed. Meanwhile, the problem of a director for the health
division grew to crisis proportions. In 1971, the prior health
director, an elderly doctor, had been absent from the city for more
than two years. He had suffered a stroke and appeared to be indefin-
itely incapacitated in assuming his former role. The city proceeded
to search for a new director. The old director (apparently at the time
only in an 'acting' status -- that is, not in the civil service position
of the title) decided to challenge the city in court over his 'rights'
to the job, thus preventing the hiring of a real director. After two
years, the case was still undecided and no major changes were made in
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the department organization.39 One of the key outcomes of the absence
of a director was reinforcement of fragmentation in the area, which
inhibited development of a coherent program. One observer, who spent
a year working intensively with the health department developing a
budget, suggested that the problem of the agency was directly attribut-
able to the absence of a director. While there was no one around for
two years, each of the 17 different divisions got accustomed to operat-
ing on their own.40 At the same time, the structure itself is difficult
to manage.
Part of the problem of course stems from health
itself. Health is run by doctors and it is one of
the most fragmented and notoriously ill managed
operations in the city. Much of health's trouble
and its failure in an operational sense in Newark's
problem stems from health in general...but doctors
are hard to manage. They have no idea how to organ-
ize health functions, but won't take directions.
They are very insensitive to planning.41
The combination of absence of an overview, struggle with a, key personnel
issue and structural fragmentation largely left the reorganization plans
for Health and Welfare stalled. Other components of the agency --
namely the home relief program and inspections -- also fared little
better. In the case of welfare, as a small unit, changes proposed were
limited primarily to improvements of the fiscal accounting system and a
shift to increasing use of 'paraprofessional' workers for counseling
work. Shifts in the inspections divisions foreseen were also relatively
minor in structural terms, although a gradual emphasis on consumer
issue areas was idealized in the reorganization. plan.42
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Newark, New Jersey: Health Institutions and Health and Welfare
Category:
City Hospital
Nursing Home
Wages, salaries
Services by contract
Materials, supplies
Equipment
Total
Receipts
Employment
1970
7,400,000
930,875
72,510
150,148
1,400
1,154,933
(730,800)
172
D. Police, Finance and Community Development Administration: Reorgani-
zation without Structural Change
In direct contrast to Public Works and parallel with the case of Health
and Welfare, the police, finance, and Community Development Administra-
tion units in Newark were important priorities for changes of a wide
variety. Functional reorganization, output shifts and personnel changes
all figured high initially in the Gibson administration. Few changes,
however, were implemented as swiftly as public works changes. Most
changes which did occur were internalized, followed no specific logic
or order and budgetary impact was slight. In each instance, further,
both the nature of the oepration and its particular constituents were
important in inhibiting planned or deliberate changes.
Probably no single unit, with the possible exception of education, had
come under such serious fire preceding Gibson's election as police and
1973 1974
167,188
167,188
-0-
18
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probably none was so overdue for change. 4 3 Partly as a result of the
Addonizio system which grew within, the traditional militaristic hier-
archy had crumbled and a large part of the top echelon of officers were
insulated from the bulk of the force. Moreover, the department had a
singularly poor reputation for corruption, for brutality and indis-
criminate harassment of citizens (particularly blacks), and for poor
recruitment and hiring practices. 44 Gibson's strategy in handling the
police situation involved focusing on redistributing the influence
structure within the police system through the appointment of a director
and a continuing general support of the office. A second strategy was
effort in integration of minorities in police staffing.
One of Gibson's first actions was to name the police director. Before
even being sworn in as mayor, Gibson announced that John Redden, an
Irishman known as a tough, honest cop and a star witness against the
Addonizio police system before the state commission on civil disorders,
would take over the job and clean up the department. While an excel-
lent choice from some points of view, the Redden appointment was dis-
appointing to many, especially blacks who expected appointment of a
black director. Basically, however, Gibson had little choice. As one
Newarker suggested, no one out of town wanted the job and there were
no blacks high enough in the echelon to command any authority; thus
that left only the Irish department elite. 45
In Redden, Gibson had a man with excellent status and respect inside
the police system, particularly for being fair and tough.46 While
Redden had no particular affinity with the black community and was
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widely criticized for his refusal to support the civilian police review
board, he proceeded to clean up the department, forcing out some 400
members of the force considered to be the worst of the Addonizio
system.47 He also restructured the chain of command internally to cope
better with the problem of control over lower levels of the department
and introduced a strong monitoring system internally over behavior.48
While there was no particularly organized thrust on minority recruitment,
Redden assisted in the city's efforts which did result in dramatic
increases in minority staffing. Under Redden, minority members of the
force increased from 145 blacks and one Puerto Rican under Addonizio
in 1969 to 374 blacks and 23 Puerto Ricans in 1973.49
In attacking the question of police reform, Gibson clearly depended on
the operation of the internal power system to effect change rather
than external thrusts. In 1971, a large LEAA grant to Newark was
assigned to a tri-partite control structure comprising the, police
director Redden, a Community Development Administration planner and the
city's corporation counsel. 50 A complex action plan for police depart-
ment changes was investigated by CDA, but in a struggle which ensued,
Redden managed to gain control over the grant and actions to disperse
in a way more securely linked with internal reform. Gibson's support
of Redden was in a large sense a display of the greater confidence he
had in ability of 'insiders' to effect change than outside thrusts. 51
In another way, Gibson's 'faith' in internal reform was weak in need
for identifying single men, however. When Redden resigned for the
fourth or fifth time, over the issue of control over his own men, Gibson
I .L-
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was forced to accept and name a black with little respect or force in
internal department terms. 52
Changes in the Finance Department largely followed the pattern of police
with the strong emphasis on identification of a single actor capable of
asserting control over a key issue area in government. The absence of
external issues, a smaller (though key) function and the general invisi-
bility of finance, however, made the strategy somewhat more effective
than in the case of police.
The administrator chosen elected to focus primarily on reorganization
of the city's fiscal and accounting system and particularly to restruc-
ture tax policy in the city. He took a strong leadership role in design-
ing a city tax package for submission to Trenton in 1971 and in arguing
for implementation in Newark. 53 He was also a catalyst for reorganiza-
tion of the city's obsolete fiscal, accounting and information system.
While very little in policy or actions were strikingly innovative, by
1973 the city could claim capability for reasonable revenue forecasts,
acceleration in tax and other revenue collection and was able to pay
most of its bills on time. 54 Progress was also made towards establish-
ment of a long-range borrowing plan, which realistically recognized
the city's decaying infrastructure. 55
By contrast, the Community Development Administration was an organiza-
tion which was not so much obsolete as incoherent and fragmented.
Attached to the Mayor's Office, CDA has grown up under the volatile
Federal grant expansion program, and particularly Model Cities, during
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the late 1960's. Fragmented into a disorganized and sprawling opera-
tion, grants had been added incrementally along functional, planning
and operations lines. By 1971, the unit was characterized by multiple
turfs, duplication and started to present budgetary problems. One
problem was the basic uncertainty of continuation of categorical
grants around which personnel and functions had developed. With each
shift, new clients andcommitments were also built. Another problem
was fragmentation itself which prevented development of central leader-
ship or control, and was starting to cause central treasury problems.56
A final problem wasthat while federal grants represented a great deal
of 'slack' for nonwhite employment in the city under the mayor' s
control, grant hiring brought major uncertainty over the future integra-
tion of employment in the civil service system at the termination of
grant periods. A separate pay schedule and benefit system had also
developed under federal rules which made many employees difficult to
integrate and many of the job titles were nonexistent in the civil
service system. 57
During his first two years, Gibson ignored most of the problems in CDA.
Despite its organizational defects, CDA was an effective grant getter
and employment generator. A forceful young civil rights lawyer was named
as director and Gibson largely delegated authority initially to him.
A shift in Gibson's assertion of central control, however, resulted in
major conflicts between the director and executive, eventually leading
to dismissal of the director. Thereafter, there was an increasing
trend toward centralization of the agency in the mayor's office. 58 In
I .
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1973, yet another change took place with the retirement of the old
CDA structure and its replacement with a new model, the Mayor's Policy
and Development Office (MPDO) which largely restored the mayor's
control over the federal grant program and anticipated the change in
policy to non-categorical forms. 5 9
The basic changes in CDA's organization format, and the question of
control (particularly over staffing, external contracting and chain
of command) followed both mayoral interpretation of the benefits of
the program and the weaving and often incoherent pattern of federal
grants. While centralization was a big issue in CDA, unlike the case
of Police and Finance, the issue was never well articulated. The
shifting in the Federal grant system also made planning difficult.
Model Cities, for example, was still CDA's major program in 1970, but
by 1971, it had already been 'planned' for a phase out. In 1972, Newark
was chosen -- in part because of considerable lobbying and courting of
the Nixon Administration grantors by the city -- as one of eight
'Planned Variations' cities. This latter program was designed to expand
Model Cities to a city-wide format and program, but by 1973, before
Planned Variations was even underway, cities were told to anticipate yet
another radically different program, Community Development Revenue
Sharing (CDRS). 60
-By 1974, there was considerably more centralization of authority under
the mayor through an institutional format called the Mayor's Policy
and Development Office (MPDO). MPDO replaced CDA and integrated city
planning functions under a single office. The real realignment of the
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dispersed CDA functions, however, was made less because of any real
structural reorganization intent than the practical outcome of shifts
and losses of the Federal grant programs in categorical areas.
E. Impacts of Structural and Reorganization Changes in Newark
Of the two types of change attempted by the Gibson administration,
structural reorganization or establishment of new functions on one
hand and internal realignment of functions in an existing structure,
the former had the most important impact in allocating resources and
achieving control by the new administration. In the case of Newark's
two new departments, Parks and Recreation and Engineering, budgetary
impacts were visible. The Public Works Department, an old, traditional
and Italian-dominated unit, suffered losses while the new functions
exhibited faster budgetary growth. The new units also performed
entirely different functions with new emphases outside the Public Works
system. The establishment of new agencies was facilitated by priori-
ties placed by the administration on some of the areas under new unit
control, as well as the timing of changes fairly early during the
administration's life. Early timing assisted in channeling new resources
available and possibly undercut some resistance, particularly by labor.
Establishment of new units was probably also facilitated, however, by
the fact that the losing agency, Public Works, was impacted very little
by the change. By contrast, the failure to achieve major changes in
attempts in Health and Welfare may be attributed to a combination of
personnel resistance, absence of leadership, council hostility and the
genuine fragmentation of functions. No single simple solution to the
S.-
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case of Health, for example, was possible as in the case of Engineering
and Parks and Recreation functions.
Internal reorganization attempts by the Gibson administration also had
mixed results. A central strategy focused on identification of strong
leadership capable and forceful in reorganizing personnel and tasks
while at the same time capable of commanding respect of a large staff
of subordinates. In the case of Police and Finance, the leadership
trategy worked to a certain degree; once leadership was removed, however,
the psychological effects were largely lost. The impact of internal
reorganization is also less visible and has a less quantifiable impact.
Because much of the psychological value of change is lost both in and
outside government, administration commitment also waned.
Underlying all changes, however, were the extreme constraints of the
political tradition of the Newark City Council, the behavior of labor
groups in resisting change in city functions and even the external
limitations on actions set by state and Federal governments. At best,
the Gibson administration's strong commitments and best strategies were
systematically limited and a source of conflict. The uncertainty of
approval of changes frequently guided priority Or choice over change
to electing the 'path of least resistance'.
-F. Changes in City Personnel and Personnel Policy
Two levels of change efforts and outcomes are important in the personnel
area of the Gibson Administration: one was in the area of appointments
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at the administrative and managerial level and a second was in eneral
personnel policy in the city. In the case of appointments, while there
was a general recognition of the importance of managerial and admini-
strative staff in effectuating changes in resource allocation as well
as other areas affecting how the city's institutional resources were
utilized, there was no systematic plan or strategy in the area and in
general the administration suffered from this failure. The fact that
leadership became very critical to change in some areas such as the
Police Department served to confirm the errors of judgement in other
areas where appointments were not taken very seriously very early' in the
administration's life. In the case of more general personnel policy,
there was a stronger action commitment, particularly in integration of
nonwhite personnel in the city; at the same time, however, institutional
and legal constraints were even greater than in the appointments area
and the absence of an early strategy formulation or plan undercut the
advantage and possible momentum of expectations of major personnel
change.
1) Appointments on the Managerial Level
Under Newark's City Charter, the mayor has authority to appoint with
advice and consent of the city council, heads of the major divisions
of city government.61 In addition, appointive authority extends to
governing boards of two other major city organizations, the Newark
Board of Education and the Board of Commissioners of the Newark Housing
Authority, and to a dozen or more regulatory and special purpose
boards. 62 Appointive power is fairly strong in municipal areas despite
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the necessity of council approval, primarily because of two-thirds
ouncil vote requirement for disapproval of appointments, or veto of
a mayoral removal. 63 The council's primary weapon in the appointments
process is 'delay' on approval of appointments, an action which was
exercised liberally under the early years of the Gibson administration.
Beyond the top appointments, however, mayoral authority can and
normally does extend below the 'Department' or top organizational level
to the division level immediately below, at least informally. Divi-
sions of Budget, Personnel, Purchasing, Treasury and Tax collection
in the 'line' administration are normally mayoral appointment areas
in Newark. 64
Gibson's policy in appointments to top administration level and to lower
managerial levels reserved by tradition to mayoral control (i.e. the
division level) was one of the weakest in 1970, and reflected, according
to observers, the mayor's personal position on structuring government
as much as any real constraints.65 Constraints of the council and
existing personnel held over from the prior administration did play s
role at a later time, however.
Exercising of mayoral option for appointments by Gibson was guarded.
One appointment was identified prior to Gibson's inauguration as mayor,
that of John Redden for Police Director, but the remainder were left to
the first year of the administration's life, posing immediate problems
in recruitment for outside. A second major problem in the more incre-
mental approach taken by Gibson was that many appointments were immedi-
ately bogged down in the council approval process. With each taken
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separately, the council tended to scrutinize each case on its individual
merit; no overview or 'tradeoff' was possible, as would have been
possible with a 'package'. 66
Of 27 top level appointments during the initial two years of the Admini-
stration's life, 13 were filled with persons already working in the
system and 14 recruited from outside. In terms of department heads,
Police and Fire were filled with high level senior officers, one was
Redden, mentioned previously, generally regarded as a sound choice,
given the difficulty of the Police organization, and one, Caulfield in
the Fire Department, a political opponent. In Caulfield's case, however,
this Irish American was generally highly regarded both in and out of
government and largely unaffected by the Italian system.67 Public
Works was filled with an older Italian American formerly employed in
the administrative level of Public Works as the chief clerk. While
this employee was not regarded as the 'old' system, the fact that he
was internally recruited created the impression that the Italians
were still in control. 68 In the case of the remaining departments,
Health and Welfare, Law, Finance, Business Administration, and CDA,
as well as the two new departments, Parks and Recreation and Engineer-
ing, positions were largely filled from outside the city system,
either through open recruitment entirely outside the city or in the
city but external to the city employment and operations system.69
In the appointments area, many of Gibson's initial actions appeared to
reflect a philosophy of delegation of authority which initially at
least strongly underlay the mayor's attitude about operations in
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Source of Recruitment for Appointive Positions:
Newark, New Jersey: 1970-1973
Source of Recruitment
City Government Outside White
Race*
Nonwhite
Health and Welfare
Director
Divisions
Public Works
Director
Divisions
Fire
Director
Police
Director
Law
Director
Finance
Director
Divisions
(3)
(6)
(3)
Business Administration
Director
Divisions (5)
Communi ty Devel opment
Director
Parks, Recreation
Director
Enqineering
Director
Total
*By 1974, racial composition had shifted with nonwhites occupying posi-
tions of Police Director, Business Administrator and Budget Director.
Division
1 122
1
4 2 1
1
5
1
3
1
1
3
1
Adm.
1
4
1
3
1
2
1
1
13
1
14 16 10
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government. In electing to preserve some of the power structure in
Public Works, for example, through an Italian American appointment,
Gibson personally displayed a considerable confidence in the divi-
sion's ability to respond to administrative priorities. Gibson
was much criticized, however, for the general assumption that
responsiveness would happen, if the appointment choice was
reasonable. One criticism, for example. was over integration in the
Fire Department, which some observers felt lagged because of low
pressures placed on the director, Caulfield.70 An additional problem
cited was the general problem of respect of a black mayor in a formerly
white dominated system. While delegation of authority might work well
where racial hostility did not divide or separate the mayor from his
subordinates, in the case of Gibson less control may have been less
realistic. Some observers felt that the mayor had almost no control
where hostility to blacks was greatest and where the option for appoint-
ment authority had not been exercised.71
Chief constraints prohibiting exercise of mayoral power apart from the
mayor's choice included council resistance of approvals, the general
'pool of' available qualified candidates and internal hostility to
shifting values, both in racial and other terms. The council, as
suggested, stalled heavily on approval of Gibson's appointments almost
systematically during his initial two years. In the case of filling
the police director's appointment, following the resignation of Redden,
for example, the council held up approval through. delays for over six
months. Similar delays were exercised on the Health and Welfare
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director, in Parks and Recreation and in Engineering.72 The primary
logic behind delays appeared to be less genuine hostility over the
choice (even in the case of nonwhites, except for police director)
than over 'bargaining' for a share of city spoils.73
The Gibson administration had a difficult problem in recruiting quali.-
fied personnel for administrative positions; this was made even more
difficult by the need and pressure to search for nonwhites. The
reputation and image of the city was very bad, salaries were low
and many potentially interested were discouraged by the magnitude of
problems perceived to exist in most operations. Thus, while on the
one hand a sprinkling of bright young professionals were attracted to
the city, the great majority approached were disinterested.74  In the
case of blacks, the situation was worse. Not only was the pool of
potentials smaller, but as public and private institutions rushed to
initiate affirmative action plans, competition was fierce over those
qualified in experience or educational background. Even those com-
mitted enough to come to Newark were often subject to competitive
offers almost immediately after assuming positions, creating a high
turnover both on the managerial and higher administrative levels. 75
The council also played a major negative role in its relentless
refusal to approve higher pay scales more competitive with the region
and other parts of government.
Internal staff also proved obstructive to the full utilization of the
appointive authority of the Mayor. Much resistance may have been
racially motivated, as white staff perceived loss of status in working
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for a 'black boss' in addition to a black mayor. However, white appoint-
ments by Gibson were also reportedly reluctant to recognize the
executive authority or policy on increasing blacks in managerial posi-
tions. 76 One example was the case of the business administrator who
named whites to positions under his control without consultation with
the mayor, while overlooking more qualified nonwhites.77
G. Personnel Policy and Personnel Changes
In more general personnel policy, the Gibson administration faced major
problems with resource allocation. The constraints were similar to
those of other cities in some senses, and more exaggerated in others.
New Jersey's civil service system and local 'lock-in' of the job struc-
ture was not unlike more general constraint problems faced by all
mayors. On the other hand, Newark had not been a traditionally highly
unionized city. Under the machine ethnic systems, many of the best
features of the unions -- locking in jobs, for example -- were already
incorporated into the machine structure. Further, the substantial
overlap between political leadership in elected offices in the city
and union leadership or their representatives in the region reduced the
need for public unions. With Gibson, however, the informal arrangement
fell apart and a very rapid unionization occurred on all levels of city
government, and particularly where ethnic-group-dominated jobs were
strong. The administration's personnel policy foresaw little of the
problems. While strongly oriented towards increasing the numbers of
nonwhites in government from the low levels of the Addonizio administra-
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tion, other than recruitment, training and scrutinizing promotions,
there was little in the way of planning for the existing staff. Rates
of turnover and attrition were also grossly underestimated. While there
was hostility and dissatisfaction after the changeover, there was no
massive exodus of white workers from public employment in Newark.
Faced with the problem of an incremental solution at best, a strategy
developed to emphasize by passing of traditional employment systems
use of federal grants for 'safety valves' for nonwhite pressures on
public jobs and a variety of pressures for changes in the state civil
system. By 1973, however, a great deal of the effort was undercut by
the growing budget gap between revenue and expenditure. The combination
of unionization and civil service threatened to undercut any strategy
and even erode job gains already achieved.
1) Labor Questions
Total public job growth in the city in recent years has been modest.
During the past five years, employment has remained very stable in
traditional municipal areas, with only slight increases or around 8.0%.
Most of the increases gained in municipal functions, however, were
offset by losses in education employment. In all functions (excluding
the hospital, which was turned over to state administration), less
than 4% gains took place between 1967 and 1973.
By contrast, however, the growth in payroll expenditure for municipal
functions increased over the period by nearly 40%. Thus, by most
measures, productivity in existing workforces was far outstripped by
wage gains by existing workers.
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Newark, New Jersey:
Category
Common Municipal
Education
Hospitals
Newark Housing Authority
Total
Total (excluding Hos-
pitals)
General Personnel Trends
1967
5,884
6,658
1 ,403
877
14,822
13,419
1973
6,351
6,442
1,150
13,944
13,944
47,800,000 67,611,400 41.84
*Transferred to New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry.
Source: U.S. Census of Local Governments and Newark Budget Data.
I .-
Change
7.93
(03.25)
*
31.13
Municipal Payroll
0.04
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Employment increases did take place outside traditional municipal
expenditure areas, mainly in those expenditure areas supported by
Federal and state grants. Approximately 250 additional workers were
employed on Community Development Administration staff, and an addi-
tional 325 on Public Employment programs (employed in traditional
municipal activities as 'supplemental staff') and around 300 on Newark
Housing Authority payroll. Except for the Housing Authority which
comprises permanent staff for operation of public housing and urban
renewal, however, other federal and state supported staff were tempor-
ary employees and not included in the city's payroll. 78
Key explanations for the general growth in payroll relative to employ-
ment growth has been changes in civil service salary scales and more
favorable collective bargaining agreements with the city. In the
first case, while Newark still lags behind public sector salary scales
of the region, growth has been impressive in most employment categor-
ies. Newark's scales also reflect the effects of the city's traditional
shorter work week, which has been institutionalized quite firmly and
which presents difficulties in pressures on wage scales. While city
white collar workers, for example, work a 35 hour week, county and state
workers, as well as workers in New York municipalities, work a 40 hour
week. This is reflected in the lower municipal scales; from the
employees perspective, however, the gains in wages are important and
the city's competitive position in the region is reduced.79 Pressures
are constant on the city to increase salaries, either by raising the
scales, or pressing individually or collectively for promotions.
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Organized labor in public employment has a long history dating from the
last century when fire fighters achieved initial bargaining rights on
the state level. 80 Following this tradition, the uniformed services
have strong, established power in the state legislature which directly
81
and indirectly limits municipal bargaining authority. In the post
war period, however, significant gains were made by all workers, includ-
ing normally less active white collar clerical workers and professionals.
In Newark, increased activity on all levels and among all categories
of public labor seems directly related to the changes in local popula-
tion composition and the growth of uncertainty in employment in the
private sector.
Blue collar organized labor was an important factor in influencing
growth of collective bargaining in city employment, particularly under
the ethnic regimes. In pre-war times, blue collar work categories
were established along craft lines in the state civil service codes.
As in many parts of the northeast, job descriptions were literally
written by craft unions to dominate functional categories.82 As a
result, for example, the construction trades type categories have
defined titles such that six different categories of 'laborer' exist,
distinguished by functional area as in street repair, sanitation,
building construction, building maintenance, etc. Each is largely
not interchangeable with the other and each is subject to a different
wage scale at collective bargaining time.
The growth both in unionization and collective bargaining in recent
times in Newark -- as in the rest of the country -- has been strongest
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in white collar and professional employment. In the professional areas,
the growth of the Newark Teachers Union, mentioned earlier, was a
prominent feature of the trend. Bolstered by the growth of organiz-
ing and strike successes in neighboring New York City, as well as
technical assistance from the professional organizers of New York's
United Teachers Federation, the Newark Teachers Union became a powerful
bargaining force during the initial years of the Gibson administra-
tion.83 While only about half of the teachers actually participated
in the strike of 1970 and heavy fines were imposed on striking teachers,
contract gains continued to be impressive.
White collar administrative employees are still the least organized of
Newark workers. An increase in interest in unions has been noticeable,
however, and according to some observers, most of the interest followed
Gibson's election. 84 The bulk of clerical workers are white and
fears of job loss are attributed to some union gains as much as desire
for higher wages, benefits, etc.8 5 The unions have been helpful in
wage negotiations and in a series of court challenges to the city over
expansion of the work week, civil service title questions, etc. While
it is estimated that only around 25% of the clerical staff are actually
union members, 86 all benefit from the increased activity. One observer
suggested that the form of collective bargaining had helped considerably
in the increase in union authority. Use of professional negotiators
and the absence of participation of administrative staff in collective
bargaining is reported to have strengthened the union position and
weakened management.87 The professional negotiator, who has little
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information on operations, policy or productivity, can only argue in
very general terms on the management side. As a result, for example,
the city has acquired some rather bad contracts.88
The Gibson Administration's impact is considered by many to have been a
negative force in inducing labor organizing and actions aimed primarily
at stabilizing the majority white workforce structure. Many of the
workers in the city are older civil servants and many were hired under
the ethnic regimes, following the ethnic political patronage system.
Having lost ethnic leadership support, they have turned to the unions
and civil service system to assure stability of jobs. Another problem
which reinforces this general tendency is the proliferation of very
low wage, undifferentiated work titles in many divisions. Many of the
workers, particularly in white collar clerical work, have limited
mobility out of city employment because of age, educational background,
ability, etc. Seniority also brings some benefits, although the Newark
tradition had created very limited benefits in white collar employment.
A second major problem which follows on the problem of race and mobility
which has hurt the administration has been the traditional city employ-
ment policy structure. Newark's personnel system is extremely archaic
and undeveloped in terms of contemporary public standards. In addition
to the short work week mentioned earlier -- which seems to have its
-entire rationale in a 'false economy' or savings on salaries -- there
is a proliferation of benefit rules governing different categories of
workers. While there is general retirement, the city's niggardly past
has promoted creation of special retirement funds for librarians, police,
I A
232
firemen, and teachers. The remaining employees -- blue collar and
white collar workers -- thus tend to remain on the job long past
retirement age because of the small retirement benefits. This also
creates important pressures on raising current wages, particularly
89in the blue collar work areas.
2) Personnel Policy Under Gibson
The personnel policy which evolved under the Gibson administration is
best characterized as falling into two distinct parts. First, the
question of racial integration of the city's workforce and secondly,
the problem of increasing productivity in the existing workforce. Both
issues were tackled intermittently and as a result generally suffered
from inconsistant building towards permanent change.
In 1970, racial integration of the city's workforce was one, if not
the single biggest issue. While no data is available on the total
number of nonwhites employed at the time of Gibson's entry into city
hall, the New Jersey Commission investigation of civil disorders
published the previous year estimated that nonwhite employment was
extremely low in all parts of city government.90 A key policy issue
developed around increasing the numbers of nonwhties, particularly in
controversial areas such as police, education and public works. The
strategy, however, focused primarily on recruitment and training for
indirect entry into government jobs and immediately ran into trouble.
On the one hand, recruitment and training were largely undermined by
existing personnel as responsibilities for implementation were dele-
gated downward. In the case of recruitment of police, for example,
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traditional methods of local sign posting and advertisement of civil
service examinations were used and no special outreach took place.
Furthermore, some programs intended to accelerate the integration of
nonwhites such as the police cadet program, a work-study, police pre-
training program -- were actually filled with whites by white super-
visory staff.91 As a result, there was low response to recruitment
and increases in nonwhites probably lagged. Another problem with
recruitment was orientation of the city's personnel department. Run
primarily as an internal bookkepping operation and traditionally con-
cerned with existing record keeping on personnel , the principal staff
were clerks oriented towards routine operations, unfamiliar with
personnel recruitment, screening, training, etc.9 2  While a young black
professional did take over the job as director, it was fully two
years before any major changes were made in the orientation of the
division. At that time, new staff, training and control over the city's
pension program to the division took place. 93
In the absence of a reasonable personnel recruitment, much of Newark's
nonwhite public employment growth took place as a result of other
efforts, principally those of the city's Human Rights Division, indivi-
dual departments and the Federal grant programs, principally public
employment and grants under administration of the Community Development
Administration (CDA). The Human Rights Division, headed by an agres-
sive black director, had a broad mandate, including more general problems
of discrimination against nonwhites outside government in the city.
Police brutality complaints, complaints about discrimination in the
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private sector, housing, etc., were frequently funneled through this
body. The division, however, lacked statutory authority to prosecute
employment cases which handicapped followup on complaints. Nonetheless,
the division did take on an increased role as an advocate for nonwhite
workers on city staff, principally in the promotions area. 94 Another
key role was in following state and Federal policy changes in affirma-
tive action rules over public employment, in offering technical assist-
ance to the state's weak fair employment practices enforcement appara-
tus and finally in undertaking Newark's public employment census
which included a racial breakdown of city employees. 95
The federal grant programs served partly as a safety value to relieve
pressures of nonwhite employment demands in the city and partly as an
indirect means for channeling nonwhites into city work more rapidly
than through the civil service system. The Federal Public Employment
Program (PEP) resulted in the hiring of around two-thirds, of the total
350 mainly nonwhite participants. 96  In the case of CDA and some of the
health programs (environmental health and health services), 70% to
80% of the employment increases went to nonwhites. Finally, in blue
collar areas, apprenticeship programs and the city's federally financed
demolition program added some 100 employees, mainly nonwhite, to
municipal employment. 97
-As a result primarily of the increases of Federal and state grants in
the city and use of these grants to increase city employment, nonwhite
employment has grown far faster than employment as a whole. According
to Newark Human Rights Commission data, nonwhite employment increased
. X-
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between 1971 and 1973 by 30% while overall city jobs declined by almost
2%. The proportion of nonwhites in total employment also increased
from 28% to 35% over the two year period with the biggest proportional
gains occurring in police, public works and environmental health areas.
H. Conclusions and Summary
Strategies for reallocation of city resources under the Gibson Admini-
stration's early years were centered on efforts at external generation
of new resources, principally taxes and grants-in-aid, and an intern-
ally-oriented ad hoc series of reorganization and personnel measures.
The first effort was necessary to provide the city with fiscal stability
for operations but, in addition, was the only means at the administra-
tions's disposal to increase 'slack' for shifting directions of internal
operations and increase nonwhite employment. The state political system
proved as much a real barrier to stability as local political tradition
and hostility to the new administration. Almost no assistance from
regional and business elites or state political influentials based in
Newark was forthcoming. This considerably handicapped the administration
in the state capital. In the case of internal efforts, the general
tradition of Newark,as well as hostility and resistance from the
council and existing workers, reduced the effectiveness of 'planning'
for systematic change. Initial plans for reorganization were abandoned
or drastically modified to reduce the visibility and impact of change.
High invisibility and good timing resulted in the most radical changes
and those with the most allocation impact, creation of two new depart-
ments and the phasing out of two others. Structural changes,ihough more
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radical in impact than internal functional shifts, restructuring of
staffs and increases in nonwhite workers, were surprisingly easier to
effectuate. This may be explained by 'higher expectations' for radical
changes in some areas following the succession of a city to nonwhite
government.
A major Gibson strategy involved depending heavily on key appointments
through which authority would be delegated to institute a variety of
changes. The appointment strategy was a weak one, however, in part
because of the difficulty of identification of strong, aggressive and
experienced administrative staff, particularly nonwhites, and in part
because of frustrations of administrative staff to gain compliance from
units. The failure of the mayor to intervene and monitor both appointed
department heads' actions and employee problems also contributed to
erosion of the general effectiveness of the strategy.
Employment expansion of nonwhites in city functions was handicapped by
a variety of unanticipated difficulties. A major problem was the
absence of a strong personnel function in the city capable of developing
a systematic recruitment, screening, hiring and promotional effort.
Pressures from nonwhites on Gibson's administration were also so slight
that the Human Rights Commisssion was forced to take a major advocate
role to keep the issue alive. Increases in nonwhite employment have
been nonetheless fairly impressive in the city; the key strategy
involved in these increases, however, has been strong efforts to capture
Federal and state grants which assist in initial hiring, then channel
nonwhites into municipal employment. Declines in the grants, however,
risk slowing geperal trends.
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Chapter 6: Impact of a Black Administration on the Budgetary Process
Along with structural and institutional changes, revenue effort and
personnel policy, the annual budget cycle can be considered as a final
mechanism for allocating resources. In Newark, the budgetary decision
process which covers three months of intensive debate between central
administration forces, spending units and the legislature, traditionally
has been a weak instrument for determining outcomes. The pattern estab-
lished over the years confirms much of political analysis of the
budgetary process in governmnet in the U.S.; only very marginal changes
are affected during the process and most of the action lies outside the
cycle. In Newark the process was particularly weak for additional
reasons, however, The long-standing autonomy of major units operating
in government, coupled with a basic disinterest on the part of the
executive and council, produced a weak central budget office. Under
Gibson, the trend continued. Efforts at reallocation of the city's
resources were concentrated in the three areas of revenue, structural
change and personnel policy. The business administrator, left in con-
trol of a budget strategy, turned instead to promoting an ill-fated
'efficiency' program and a more general struggle with the mayor over
executive authority. A strong public administration 'cutting' bias
did come in to dominate budgeting; however, this policy was supported
neither by the mayor, spending units, the council or, finally, the
business administrator himself. In 1973 the process changed radically
with an increased concern by the mayor over the budget in an election
year.
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Observations during the 1973 process which form the basis for this
evaluation suggest that that budgetmaking during the cycle serves
other purposes than those of direct resource allocation changes. The
process can be used to generate information about city operations,
programs and output for other decisions. It can review spending in
the context of revenue generation, particularly by revenue producing
units. Most importantly, in long run terms, the process can provide
means for asserting control over decentralized actions of many types
of a recurring nature. In a broad sense, the budgeting process presents
one excellent opportunity since it is the one time in the year when
central control and operating units are face to face in a discussion
of a variety of issues.
The Gibson administration's experience during the 1973 budget cycle
suggests there are two principal means for asserting short run changes
in spending programs. The first might be termed the 'traditional'
approach. This involves the use of the budget office as a central
instrument of communication of policy, political views of the admini-
stration as well as the more general administrative control or discipline
themes of the current budget year. There are two points in time where
themes or strategies may be developed, at the start and at the finish
of the proposed executive budget. To be effective for policy actions,
or temporal changes, desired by the mayor, however, there must be con-
siderable confidence in the budget officer and other parts of the
central control apparatus. Few conflicts must exist in terms of
priority actions and the executive must be willing to back the budget
I A
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office where other conflicts -- with spending units or the council --
a rise.
A second means for assertion of the mayor's views or other key policy
changes is through the use of a special task force, or an ad hoc
working staff assigned directly to the mayor's staff for work exclu-
sively during the budget cycle. The uses of such a task force can be
of a wide range. In 1973 the group worked exclusively during the
budget cycle on moving a few, selected issues, following development of
an overall strategy of selection and mayoral approval. In general such
a task force possesses certain advantages for change over the budget
office. It can duplicate information collection, specific studies and
analysis carried out by the budget office as a 'check' on the efficiency
of that unit. It can undertake studies not undertaken by the budget
office but specifically identified by policymakers in other areas.
Because it works on a temporary basis out of the mayor's office, it
is somewhat freer to reflect the mayor's bias and is somewhat more
free from the traditional budget subculture, roles and expectations
built up over time. Disadvantages are in the required resource expen-
diture for staff, the uncertainty of the usefulness of much analysis,
the suspicion generated by other 'established' roles in the process,
and, finally, in the absence of follow-up authority once the cycle is
completed.
In 1973, an ad hoc budget force was put into operation for the first
time during the Gibson administration. The reasons were obstensibly
for a look at the budget during an 'election year'.2 A larger role was
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assumed, however, primarily through the efforts of the aide in charge
in creating a much stronger balance between the traditional Newark
election year budget cutting approach and a thesis of "spending in
areas where spending is appropriate". This chapter reviews the influence
of the Gibson administration in shifting spending to 'desired' areas,
through use of the budgetary decision process itself.
The chapter is divided into four principal parts. The first describes
the budget cycle in Newark as a mechanism for influencing spending
outcomes. The cycle's overall structure, participants and roles and
the distributionof authority visible in Newark's budgetary subculture
are reviewed from observations and interviews taken during the 1973
cycle. The question of how much influence budgetary decisionmaking
has on outcomes is examined from interviews with participants in the
process.
A second part of the chapter looks more closely at the instruments
available for executive influence, particularly in issue areas identi-
fied more generally outside the budget cycle. Two means for influence,
that of the traditional budget system and the budget office and the ad
hoc budget task force set up in 1973 provide coTitrasting experiences.
A third part of the chapter reviews key events and typical strategies
used by actors on several sides to gain desired outcomes in the process
-itself. Four types of role-strategies are viewed which are particularly
appropriate for describing interaction of participants in Newark's
decisionmaking process. Finally, the council role and outcomes in terms
of successes and failures in preserving 'gains' made during preparation
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of the executive budget provide a concluding summary.
A. The Budget Cycle in Newark: Overall Structure, Participants and Roles
Newark's budget cycle is a complex, interactive process, covering a
period of four to five months, including a two to three month period
of intensive budget analysis and preparation work.3 The cycle resembles
that of other large cities in that it comprises a set of meeting-sessions
designed to bargain, challenge and accommodate to reach common agreement
and it is highly internalized in participant terms.4  This is reflected
in the types of roles which emerge strongly and in the influence posi-
tions they assume which underscores the 'sub-culture'. The city's budget
cycle is also highly traditionally patterned in structure; it strongly
resembles the recommended 'model budgets' prescribed in public admini-
stration literature. 5
Most of the theory behind budget cycle organization in Newark, in fact,
reflects public administration standards rather than the state prescribed
standards. In contrast to Newark's generally elaborate cycle, state
standards are geared to smaller localities and assume a less extensive
budgetary decision process within.6 The Newark overall structure com-
prises a calendar divided roughly into four parts corresponding to four
stages in advancement towards the final document:
1) initial revenue estimates, including revenue forecasts and general
instructions
2) request budget preprartion, including department estimates and sub-
missions, and compilation by the Budget Office of a 'request budget'
3) executive budget preparation
4) final or council approved budget, including council review and appro-
vals, submission to and approval by the State Department of Community
Affairs
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On one level participants in budgetary decisionmaking in Newark gener-
ally fall into generalized 'roles' and expected behavior patterns
described by analysts; in other ways, however, there are strong varia-
tions which appear to grow out of Newark's tradition and setting of
government. In conventional terms, participants fall into the roles of
'cutters' and 'spenders', which reflect the formal positions occupied
by spending and control units. But strong variations are visible in
positions which are strong because of past 'strength' of the spending
unit in the city's allocation pie, which supercedes other behavioral
characteristics. Secondly, roles in Newark are also derived from'lower
institutional positions, particularly on the clerical level. Budget
examiners and chief clerks of departments have considerable control
over the preparation of detailed estimates of budgets and frequently
these values dominate the decision process, reducing it to trivial
levels. Finally, functional roles are important. The long tradition
of autonomy in city operations has created budgetary roles which
reflect the unit's values and ways of doing things more than any
overall strategy for preserving a unit's budget.
1) Request Limits and the Calendar
The overall structure in Newark is set primarily by the limits on spend-
ing given to departments along with instructions for budget request
preparations and the budget calendar which shapes the sequence of
events in the process. Both play important roles in final outcomes of
budgets in the city.
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The limits placed on requests are set partly by the revenue forecast
prepared by the financial officer in consultation with the chief
executive officer and in part by the budget office. Around mid-
summer, normally, revenue and tax forecasts are made, based on a
combination of past revenue trends, anticipated new taxes and grants-
in-aid and a 'test' of impacts of likely aggregate spending on the
residual property tax.7 Since the property tax is highly visible and
controversial in Newark, the problem of rate changes is reviewed
carefully in consultation with the mayor. Tax increases are highly
political decisions and the chief executive officer must agree to*
defending them. A second step in the limit determination process is
handled by the budget office. The budget office calculates rough
allocations of aggregate revenue based on statutory requirements'
increases (such as contract wage settlements, pension and other contri-
butions requirements), and potential inflation or deflation in non-
personnel costs which serve as a 'base budget'. Normally, a simple
formula is used for these base budgets which assumes 'holding the
line' on spending.
In 1973, the role of the request limits was redefined slightly. During
the prior two years, the Business Administrator had instituted a new
modified performance analysis budget system for operating units called
management by objectives (MBO). The budget office in turn evolved a
way of incorporating MBO into the 1973 operating budget, first by
requiring requesting units to submit data from MBO analysis to justify
continued expenditure and secondly to justify future additions to budgets
I .-
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which exceeded stated limits in the form of a 'new program request'.
This process was intended first to 'force' reallocation and use of
any 'slack' which might be present in budgets and secondly to give
notions of the future budgetary impacts of requests. Along with the
new program request, divisions were required to forecast five year
impacts of the proposed programs.
The 'limits' allocated to spending divisions were generally adhered to
in requests. The new program requests, or requests outside limits,
however, did not follow the required format or provide adequate infor-
mation to test the 'necessity' or usefulness of the program in city
priority terms. Only a few, for example, took the trouble of forecast-
ing five year impacts of increases on their budgets and many were so
traditionally oriented that they merely added in traditional 'line
item code' terms, on a separate page giving no indication of the
functional necessity of the request.
The budget calendar in Newark can play an important influence role.
The calendar normally set by the budget director can limit the amount
of time spent on any part of the process and thus constrain debate,
study and information flow to participants so critical to challenges
to spending or cutting. During the Gibson administration's first
term, the calendar had been gradually set to restrict the amount of
-time allocated to unit request preparation and council review to the
gain of the budget office review and preparation of the request and
executive budgets. This reflected the philosophy and strategy of the
budget office to 'get more control' over the process. The strategy,
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however, also resulted in cutting off the mayor's office from much time
for review over budget office changes. By 1973 there was considerable
grumbling among mayor's office aides that not enough time and informa-
tion was provided for the mayor's review, putting the mayor in the
position of 'rubber stamping' what the budget office (and its main
ally, the Business Administrator) thought was 'right'. for the city. As
relations tended to sour between the Business Administrator and the
mayor, the schedule as well as other actions of the budget office became
more and more subject of suspicion.
The calendar sets the overall schedule for the cycle of meetings, analy-
sis, submissions and decisions. Meetings have traditionally comprised
two types: (1) informal, preliminary meetings between the budget
office and departments, mainly to 'feel out' the importance of requests
to the unit, detect weak areas or 'slack' and filter out the relationship
between requests and actual operations; (2) budget hearings, also fairly
informal but intended to represent a 'defense' by departments and final
agreements over what cuts or increases should take place. In reality
both of the forums considerably violated these intentions. In the
case of the informal meetings, during the 1973 cycle, most of the
meeting time was taken up by discussion of matters peripheral to
budgetary, spending or operations matters. Spending units for example
provided very little data on operations, strongly defended their
requests and generally engaged in a 'diversionary' strategy of taking
up discussions over personnel problems, budget amendments and cost over-
runs of the current budget year and the like. This generally forced
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the budget director into the position of 'helping' to straighten out
problems, or advocate spending unit positions against recalcitrant
labor groups, rather than strongly addressing problems in operations
or the content of budgetary requests. The second type of meeting,
the budget hearing meeting, was also considerably stretched from its
more ideal goals, although in 1973 at least, the stronger role of the
mayor's office did result in more of a confrontation over budget
requests. Traditionally, the budget hearings have been dominated by
the chief clerks of spending units. These are lower level civil
servants who are responsible for budget request preparation, for keeping
personnel and supplies records and for generally communicating- on an
ongoing basis with managerial staff over requirements for operations
and other budgetary matters. This pattern left administrators and
managers with little familiarity with actual budgets and the request
budgets of of their own spending units. Thus, the budget hearings
frequently boil down to a 'squaring off' between the better-informed
budget and executive staff and the less informed department heads, on
emotional rather than analytical levels, with the chief clerks shoulder-
ing responsibility for most justifications of the requests.9
2) The Budgetary Process: Roles, Participants and Interactions
The budgetary decision process in Newark, as in other large cities,
consists of a fairly complex interaction between affected participants.
Since nearly everyone is affected by outcomes, nearly all of the admini-
strative and managerial staff do participate at one time or another
during the cycle. In addition to the generalized participation by
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stage in the cycle mentioned, activity is heavily concentrated in the
preparation of the mayor's budget. This key document really involves
an appraisal by the central control and policy staff -- the budget
office, administrator, finance officer and the mayor's staff -- of
what spending units 'want' as compared to what the city can afford and
what the mayor wants. In 1973, it particularly focused more attention
to what the mayor wanted, or some key policy issues dealing mainly
with services. This latter direction had the tendency during 1973 to
make the process somewhat more complicated than previously and resulted
in challenging some of the strengths of traditional roles and asserting
some new ones.
a) Newark's Budgetary Subculture: Participants and Roles
Analytical literature on the budgetary process suggests that specific
subcultures develop in government around decisionmaking which are
closely connected to the roles of affected participants. 10 This sub-
culture exists somewhat separately from other decisions in the city,
has its own tradition and sets of expectations. The roles developed
in the subculture are important to its operation. They are sets of
expectations and behavior of participants whick are partly defined by
the institutional position of participants (i.e. locus in the hierarchy,
legal authority, etc.) and partly by traditional activities in the
.budgetary decisionmaking process itself, such as 'cutting' or 'spending',
or advocating certain kinds of stability or change. Budgetary litera-
ture reduces roles to several generalized characteristics. First,
there are the 'cutters'. These are generally the administrative and
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control units such as the budget office, the finance office, or the
city manager or mayor. Secondly, there are the 'spenders', generally
department heads who advocate if not increasing strength of budgets
at least 'maintaining the status quo'. Within spending unit behavior,
there are other types of roles, those advocating internal staff, or
external clients. Finally, there are legislative roles. One contribut-
ing factor to the subculture's stability, highly predicatable roles and
behavior rules is the highly internalized character of municipal bud-
geting. Because there is little in the way of external pressures during
the cycle and, further, because legislative rol-es and impact tend to be
weak in cities, the internal process and subculture become stabilized.1
Newark's subculture measured by standards and observations from the
federal level and other cities is underdeveloped and not strongly
visible. While there is a sub-structure of budgeting in the city,
it is of relatively recent origin when the changeover in 1970 reconsti-
tuted some authority over the budget in the budget office and there was
increased attention to fiscal policy. The lengthy prior years of
fragmented, sum-of-the-parts budgeting when the budget office served
mainly as a 'rubber stamp' on requests is still-strongly felt in the
city. Interaction with the budget office staff, information exchange
and justifications for requests are strongly resented by many spending
divisions. There is little understanding of the expectations of the
budgetary process, there are few well developed strategies utilized
by spending units and many managers behave as though they have no
basic understanding of their own units, relative to requests. In some
249
units, department heads appear almost unaware of the budgetary process
or of the process by which internal budgets are created. While some
of this may flow from authority delegated to subordinates, most
appears related to the long history of 'self-contained' operations,
where little monitoring or control threatened spending levels. It may
be years before a strong level of communications and a budgetary sub-
culture develops at all.
Budgetary roles are thus defined to some extent in Newark as traditional
literature suggests, in cutting and spending terms and by type of
participants. On the other hand, budgetary roles are developed which
appear to reflect 'individual personality' and whim to some degree.
The following summarizes four major categories of roles in the city:
Overall
Budgetary Roles Characteristics Behavior
1) Administrative-Control Bias
a) Business Administrator
b) Budget Director
c) Finance officer
2) Policy Political Rewards Bias
a) Mayor's Office Staff
b) Planning Office Staff
3) Internal Client Oriented Bias
a) Public Works Department
b) Police Department
c) Fire Department
d) Data Processing
cutting, control
tax saving
spending;
sanctions-
rewards; control
over excess re-
venue
stable budgets;
spending in-
creases
oppose increases to
human.resources
areas; pro-business;
efficiency/perform-
ance bias
increased spending
for particular ob-
jectives
bureaucratic; defence
of authority; auto-
nomy; oriented to
'staff' needs
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Overall
Budgetary Roles Characteristics Behavior
4) External Client Oriented Bias
a) Welfare Department stable or in- 'advocate of exter-
b) Parks, Recreation Department creasing spend- nal clients'; com-
c) Libraries ing munity clients
b) The Administrative-Control Bias
The administrative control bias is reflected to some extent in a 'cutting
or efficiency emphasis in Newark. The role of the business administrator
under Gibson was oriented strongly towards advocating benefits for the
business interests in the city which were widely interpreted as
general opposition to increases in human resources expenditures, trim-
ming of excess expenditures and an emphasis on stabilizing tax rates. 12
Some of this influence was transferred to the budget office during the
latter part of 1973 with the resignation of the business administrator.
The budget director, however, reviewed his role as somewhat different
from that of the Business Administrator. He felt that while he was
the primary 'control force' in limiting budget expansion he was also a
kind of balance between those needs which were 'genuine' on the depart-
mental level and those which were 'slack' or habit, or both. 13 He
only weakly represented any policy or priority in the city, however,
except for the MBO process guidelines. A good example of the 'mixed'
philosophy of the budget office role was expressed in a comment which
argued for across the board cutting during a meeting during 1973.
I think if you want to cut something, you ought to
do it across the board. This is the fairest way.
If you do it on an item by item basis, you risk not
knowing what is real and what is unreal in spending.
You may get a dangerous challenge first thing, then
you'll really be in trouble. 14
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Several observers suggested that the efficiency-public administration
bias in the budget and administration roles in Newark reflected more
than anything else the racial distance between workers in those roles
and the black mayor on one hand and the mayor's constituencies on the
other hand. Suggesting that the bias of the public administration norm
usually boils down to 'cutting back' on human resources and 'people-
oriented' programs while leaving expenditures oriented towards central
control nad property protection such as police and fire intact, many
mayor's aides reflected frustration in working with the business admini-
strator and budget office personnel. 15
In addition to the bias reflected in the distance between the orienta-
tion of a black administration and the public administration role, other
criticism of the role centered around the 'tax cutting' philosophy to
attract business (or stabilize business) in the city. One observer
suggested that while tax and budget cuts are as important to black
homeowners as to white business in the city, people have demanded and
are willing to pay for neighborhood services. Following this reasoning,
there is not necessarily a tax cutting overlap of interest between
needs of black homeowners and needs of white businesses. 16
In summarizing the real problems with the cutting role, one aide sug-
gested that the real biases are very distant from the reality of Newark-
-and additionally handicapped both by the capacity and personality of
particular individuals occupying key roles:
The major failure was with the business administrator.
He doesn't know anything about budgeting...has no
understanding of contemporary budgeting techniques,
A .
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of the budget as a planning and policy or management
statement and plan. A second failure is on the value
side. Neither the business administrator, nor the
budget office has any idea of the type of constituency
they have to serve in Newark. This is to suggest that
the kind of traditional formula stress in budgeting
used...simply isn't designed to be adapted to public
service dependency rates which are say higher than the
norm....The majority of services constitutents are
black and poor. This means that the garbage pickups
have to be more frequent than in the suburbs like the
Oranges, etc.17
Observations in Newark suggest that the efficiency or cutting bias may
also hide some other failures and, in particular, the failure of those
responsible for budgeting to perceive or care about abuses to depart-
mental spending. While the budget officer argued that the 'across the
board' cut would be lower risk than particularistic cutting, it could
be argued that if the budget office was familiar with the departmental
budgets, cutting could be made on a meaningful basis. Further, it was
clearly within the control and responsibility of the budget office and
administrator's office (and strongly instituted under the MBO process)
to request the kind of information necessary to determine whether cuts
would hurt services or not.
By 1973, however, it was clear that the efficiency bias in Newark had
fairly marginal commitments on the part of the business administrator or
the budget office. This was visible in the ill-fated MBO process, which
initially had promised to bring genuine performance budgeting to the
city. Not only did the commitment to it by the business administrator
wane, but little or no effort was made to pressure spending units to
follow through on monthly progress reports, or to include expanded data
253
in requests for the 1974 budget. The failure extended beyond iaBO to
other actions necessary to institute contemporary management techniques
such as cost accounting in key operations, utilization of the exten-
sive high speed computer information system available in the city and
other monitoring and control. It was fairly clear that the real
extent of interest in the public administration bias was limited to
very traditional behavior of 'cutting taxes' to favor the business
community and steering clear of assessing the real impact of spending
in the city.
c) The City's Spenders
There are basically three types of spending roles in Newark: (1) a
policy oriented spending role, (2) external 'client' oriented spenders
and (3) internal bureaucratic staff-oriented spenders. The first case,
that of the policy oriented spenders, is a diverse and often competitive
group and includes the mayor's immediate staff, scattered 'policy' or
program oriented planning staff, the traditional city planning depart-
ment and the administrative heads of the city's Federal grant system,
the Community Development Adaministration (CDA). All view themselves
as the mayor's advocates, but they are often in-conflict with each
other and possibly stated executive policy. They are also in constant
conflict with the city's administrative actors and see themselves as
representing the true priorities and values of the administration.
Executive policies or priorities in Newark, as in most political admini-
strations, are not easy to interpret. The mayor rarely makes policy
statements and when he does they are often quite generalized. Further,
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while Gibson has tended to follow a more programmatic direction,
in part led by the Federal grant system where much new money in the
city is generated, in many cases the interpretation in implementation
terms such as the city budget are difficult.
A major handicap of policy oriented spending roles is the absence of
information about the existing allocation of spending and city opera-
tions. Most of the participants are not concerned with advocating
their own departments as much as advocating the mayor's position in
planning expenditure for city operations. Thus, without detailed
information about what is happening, it is difficult to interpret
the mayor's views in the budget. Because of the failure of the policy
oriented staff during prior years, in 1973, Gibson made a decision to
set up a special study group, or ad hoc budgeting team to review the
budget and report directly to the mayor during the process. The
development of the policy role by the ad hoc stass is reviewed in detail
below.
The third and fourth group of spender participants in the budgetary
process fall into two groups: those oriented toward external clients
-- particularly in the case of Newark poverty and community groups --
and those oriented toward their own bureaucracies and staff. The
external client advocate role represents a role new to Newark and a
-strategy oriented toward what is considered the 'mayor's clients'.
While Gibson has tended to stress services improvements questions in
policy statements, rarely does the overlap between voter-oriented
services such as 'clean streets' overlap with the non-voter clients
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most of the advocate agencies such as welfare, parks and recreation and
libraries basically serve. As one administrator cynically suggested,
"his department really needed to get a more affluent and vocal and
less transient clientele to back him up. Services to neighborhoods
are nonetheless stressed. Services to poverty groups, drug addicts,
juvenile delinquents and welfare recipients and even illiterate adults
are frequently emphasized in justifying 'priority rankings' in the
budget, or justification for budget requests.
Budgetary roles which emphasize the external clientele are almost
always in direct conflict with the budget director and business admini-
strator. The welfare director, for example, will argue that her budget
must expand to reduce the legwork of welfare recipients being shuffled
through the fragmented system for health care, family counseling,
daycare or legal needs. Another request is justified on grounds that
additional personnel hired are actually ex-recipients who will cost the
city less in the long run than the professionals they will eventually
replace. The director of the Newark Public Library, a facility con-
sidered 'tough' in the budget vernacular because it is both low in the
priority list but would be controversial if cut, attempts to justify
additional expenditure based on needs to shift the program to the 'slow-
reading" adult, or Newark's large non-reading public, or to the neigh-
borhoods, so 'people won't be so fearful to venture out to use the
libraries after dark'.
In common with the spenders oriented towards 'external' service clients,
the bureaucratic spenders emphasize clients of the internal system. While
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in some cases these are legitimate -- the motors division of public
works, for example, does largely service 'internal' clients, or the
vehicles of the city -- in most cases the internal orientation reflects
long traditions of work staff orientation, the pressures and strengths
of unions and the absence of a well-defined external clientele, parti-
cularly a 'respectable' one. Examples cover the full range, from
police to sanitation, but with the increase of nonwhite populations in
the city the trend seems on the increase. Police services expansion,
for example, are justified not on grounds of 'saving life and protect-
ing property', but rather to improve morale, improve working conditions
and the like. In sanitation and inspections or data processing, justi-
fications for budget growth focused strongly on worker morale and
'competitive' working conditions or salary scales in the region. In
some cases -- for example in the streets bureau of public works --
the need for new and more 'comfortable' vehicles was justified on grounds
that the workers were tired of riding in open trucks, got wet when it
rained, and risked getting hurt if equipment and materials transported
simultaneously to worksites should happen to fall on them.
Within spending divisions of Newark's government, there are, in addi-
tion, other budgetary roles which have grown up with the autonomous
budgeting tradition. Chief among these are the internal budget makers,
or chief clerks. The chief clerk of a spending unit is responsible for
preparing the annual request budget for the spending division and for
updating it throughout the year between cycles. Often additional
responsibilities include: maintaining personnel records, handling divi-
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sion materials and supplies purchases (in the absence of a centralized
purchasing function in the city), and serving as a general administra-
tive assistant to the director or manager. In many divisions, the
chief clerk may, through virtue of a veritable monopoly on administrative
information, or through disinterest on the part of the administrator,
literally gain complete administrative control over the spending divi-
sion. Newer black administrators who have come into the city have
found themselves literally unable to plan coherently or by-pass older
chief clerks entrenched in their positions and basically hostile to
their new bosses.18 The chief clerks, with very few exceptions are
drawn almost exclusively from older civil servants promoted through the
ranks. The salaries are very low relative to responsibility and the
requirements and training are thus minimal.
Practically without exception, participants queried as to "who was
most influential in the budgetary process" named the chief. clerk. 19
The influence, however, as one observer pointed out, is a very special
influence role of the 'lower level civil servant'.
The department clerks make up the budget and the
responsibility falls to them to justify and execute
budgets once they are adopted. Secondly, it is what
the clerks want that they will request and their range
of requests are of requests are those least questioned
such as typewriters, pencils, etc. What the manager
gets is uncertain but the clerks do get what they
want. In a sense, they have considerable power and
influence. 3
In Newark thus, the lower civil servant is perceived to be influential
and convert much of the budgeting philosophy or strategy into trivial
problems and solutions. The fact that clerks are permitted to dominate
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unit budgetmaking, however, suggests that the autonomous system is
still strongly supported by their superiors.
Although budgetary roles are not well-developed in Newark, the manager
and administrative staff nonetheless do have standard expectations.
Most, for example, expect immense stability in their budgets and a
few cannot begin to even conceptualize a 'cut'. In the case of the
police, for example, there is a strong expectation that the request will
be left intact, no matter how wild, if for no other reason than that
the police have always gotten what they asked for. There is consequent-
ly a total reluctance during meetings to bargain or discuss many items
in the budget with clerks doggedly insisting nothing could possibly
be left out. The strategy in justifying numerous items that just seem
to arbitrarily 'grow' is based on two reasons. First, the budget is
sacrosanct -- that is, no one but the police or fire or sanitation is
really able to judge department needs -- and secondly, the 'spread the
problem' philosophy. In the first case, the director of the unit
may have little information on what is actually requested, but defend
it nonetheless:
Budget Director: The police budget i-s 750,000 over the
limit which makes the total request two million over
with the new program proposed; the new program, however,
provides for 150 new patrolmen of which 92 are to be
paid out of Federal funds. What do we do if the LEAA
funds don't materialize?
Police Director: Well, now look, it's really a moot
point to challenge this; the guys have to be paid. There
is no firm Federal money until we get a letter. Therefore
we have to budget it in the city operating budget.
In the second case, administrators will rely heavily on the external
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pressures to defend budget requests, depicting the agency as a 'victim'
of almost anything -- state or city statutes, contract settlements,
inflation, etc., even when other requests and actions are in direct
conflict with the justifications.
Mayor's Aide: What about this airconditioning item for
the West and East precincts? Do we really need these?
Police Director: Well, this is a long story, Last year
where the horses were stabled in the North precinct, we
put in air conditioning. It was really unbearable,
really smelly if the windows were open during the summer.
We knew at the time it was a precedent. Well now, the
three other districts have followed in wanting them.
'Expecting the worse' is another strategy widely used by departments to
justify demands. The threat of civil unrest in the case of the Human
Rights Commission, a big snow blizzard in the case of sanitation, or
a total breakdown in the electric power system in the city to justify
purchase of an 'emergency generator' by Civil Defense all represent
disaster justifications.
Whatever strategy used, however, the general overall aim of the Newark
administrator or manager -- often working in concert with chief clerks --
is to reduce the effectiveness of the monitoring and report-in system
and to retain the autonomous budget. Each operation thus must be
justified as unique and of unique concern, even if only to its workers.
Even when there are obvious direct conflicts as in one case where both
-the Police Department and the Purchasing Department budgeted the same
postage costs for mailing of traffic warrents, there is an attempt to
preserve or fight out rights to get the money, even if the responsibility
is removed.
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This problem is not helped by the general administrative practices
in the city. Since there is little performance budgeting or cost
accounting which would identify overlaps, duplication or changes in
output from-year to year, the old system is preserved very well.
About the only way to detect errors, for example, is by checking
detailed accounts on an item by item basis against actual expenditures
(from vouchers or payroll records), then adopting a harsh rule. This
strategy does work, but until 1973 was rarely applied.
d) The Mayor's Ad Hoc Team Role
The ad hoc budgeting team initiated during the 1974 budget cycle was the
Gibson's administration's first attempt at strongly influencing the city
budget cycle.20 The two preceding budget years left most of the
translation of priorities to the business administrator and the budget
director while the mayor's efforts were concentrated on revenue and
Federal grants, themselves increasingly an allocation prob'lem with
shifts to the 'block' grant forms. A gradual change did develop, how-
ever, and in 1974, an election year, Gibson took renewed interest in
establishing control over city activities and was persuaded to start
with the budget. There was a final reason for focusing on the city
budget, however. Relations between the business administrator and the
mayor had deteriorated, the business administrator's attempt at
initiating some kind of managerial control had largely failed and a
good opportunity for reestablishing control seemed possible. It
was in this general morass of fail.ures and pressures of an election
year that the ad hoc process was instituted. 21
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The ad hoc role was largely defined by a mayoral aide assigned to the
task of assembling a team to review the budget for the mayor. Hired
the previous year by the business administrator as an assistant, the
aide, Howard Gary, had a solid background in budgeting. He had
graduated from University of Michigan's School of Public Administration
and had worked both in Detroit suburbs and in Dade County, Florida. In
the latter case, he had been responsible for assisting in setting up one
of the few operating performance budgeting systems in the country.22
Gary's strategy, once he was assigned to the mayor's office and a review
strategy, was to set up a separate small staff -- borrowed from other
divisions, but knowledgeable about the budgetary process in the city --
compile a mass of detailed information and to review each request in
detail, line by line. Next, groups of priorities were to be identified
emphasizing the service and management side, and, finally, the big
question of 'slack' was to be answered by first identifying it and then
searching for methods to achieve reallocation. One important test of
the mayor's role was the information generating capacity the ad hoc
team was able to assert. One factor was clear initially, the mayor's
name did have some clout; materials were made available on short notice,
including payroll and invoice accounts, internaT department and divi-
sion records, records on inventories, contracts and Federal grant
allocations. Another important test was in dealing with the spending
divisions. A direct and rapid relationship was established which
avoided the constraints of the established relationships between the
budget office and spending departments.
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Both advantages and disadvantages were visible at the start in using
a task force essentially organized on a temporary basis outside
the traditional budgetary process. The advantages include the general
effects of the unexpected and of a new undefined role which among other
things appeared to have authority, but which had little vested interest
in establishing and cultivating ongoing relationships for the future.
The disadvantages include the general hostility generated, particularly
by the budget office which saw its role 'usurped' and saw the task
force as interfering with routine patterns. A second problem was
that of the impermanence of the task force. It was neither permanently
attached to the mayor's staff, nor to the budget office. The mayor's
staff historically had avoided confrontation with the budget office
and restricted inputs to a quick review of the budget prior to the
mayor's 'rubber stamp' approval. The budget office saw the task force
as potentially 'monitoring' its activities as well as that of the
spending departments.
As a general approach, the task force head, however, was strong on the
necessity to aggressively promote the mayor's control role, a role
interpreted as generally absent in administrative quarters in the city:
There are a lot of people around here who give lip
service to the mayor's policies, then turn around
and frankly do the same old thing they have always
done. Some of the people who are supposed to be
working for the mayor, or the city, who are supposed
to be implementing goals, do everything they can to
stop them. Part of the problem is race. Many of
these people resent having a boss who is black, or
one they feel is giving too much to blacks. In one
instance, a top official rejected a program even
though it cost the city nothing, because it would
go to black youth. This is being completely out of
263
touch. There is a great deal of insensitivity to
the real needs of the black community for basic
service improvements like trash collection....23
Translated into more specific implementation terms, the process involved
several steps. First, there was a general review of past budgets and
trends and new requests were related to these. Secondly, an attempt
was made to identify 'slack' through a detailed sifting of unspent
items, questionable, or unjustified requests and the like. Thirdly, an
attempt was made to identify and focus on priorities.
During the first and second steps in the process, review of line item
requests and prior budgets resulted in considerable 'potential'
retrieval of slack for bargaining purposes, if not for actual realloca-
tion. Possibly because the process was more intensive and did not
involve the departments as is normal practice when budget examiners
review requests, longer lists of potential slack were generated by
the task force than by the budget office, reviewing the same budgets.
Since the starting level of 'slack' does in many cases determine the
amount retrieved in the end, starting at higher levels did make more
sense. Another important strategy in the case of slack was retrieval
of 'attrition' of personnel. In the highly ins-titutionalized system
of Newark, most civil servants 'expect' to get promoted as vacancies
occur. By removing vacant positions, however, promotions can be
-delayed, if not halted when older civil servants are in fact not quali-
fied for promotion, or have not passed civil service tests. Under
Gibson, the budget office tended to essentially ignore these patterns,
bowing to pressures which were in violation of civil service rules, but
I S.-
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which resulted in stabilizing of lower level employment. The task force
played a key role in identifying and dampening this trend.
In handling the problem of identification of ways in which to incorpor-
ate policy priorities in the budget, the task force had a difficult job.
Under the MBO process, instructions had gone out to the departments and
divisions that additional requests were required to be put not only
in programmatic form, but had as well to address goals identified by
the mayor, derived from the MBO divisional goals. Few spending divi-
sions bothered to put requests in this form, leavingthe task force to
define the goals in terms of the overall budget, then look for ways
to implement them in request budgets. It was a frustrating process.
As Gary suggested, much of the managerial staff had no idea how to go
about formulating their requests in policy terms; one favored agency
identified as a priority area even requested a reduction in the budget.
Moreover, addressing some priorities in several environmental maintenance
areas (vacant lot cleaning, sanitation and inspections), had become
recalcitrant following neighborhood demonstrations against the declin-
ing services in neighborhoods. The dilemma posed was how to beef up
the budgets of such units while at the same ting avoiding the appearance
of rewarding 'poor' behavior. An additional problem was how to attack
the long needed 'administrative' reform priorities, particularly the
restoration of executive control over spending abuses such as that
visible in the vehicle budgets of spending units.
The strategy development phase was handled primarily by a rough check
list divided between the service and reform priorities, generally
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correlated to units mainly affected. Thus sanitation, youth programs
and recreation and health services programs along with machinery and
equipment, vehicles and 'priority departments' strongly suspected of
high levels of discretionary spending (police, public works) were
principal targets during the bargaining sessions between the units
and central control forces.
B. Key Issues, Obstacles and Actions in the Budgetary Process
The budgetary process during 1973 can be viewed on two levels. One is
the traditional level of 'budgeting by habit' underscored by a weak
budget office as the lead agency and which is characterized by a great
deal of energy spent on 'haggling' over what departments are doing
in operations. In many cases, the meetings during the process reflected
this in a very weak discipline over the agenda, and in more information
exchange on department complaints than actual exploration of the budget
requests and spending patterns. Another level introduced in 1973
which proved somewhat more effective as an instrument of central
control was the approach of the ad hoc task force. By contrast, the
second strategy focused after an initial analysis period, on
pressuring for a few simple outcomes, either determined in advance, or
discovered as vulnerable for change during the questioning session.
Much of the focus was on key target areas of public works and police.
1) Traditional Budgeting
The budget by habit is a strong tradition in Newark and it is particularly
reinforced during the budget process by a defensive attitude on the
. S.-
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question of 'preserving autonomy' of spending units. As suggested,
many managers of spending units attempt to hold the line, even when they
possess very little information on actual patterns of spending. The
defense is based generally on the theory that the agency knows its
operation best, that worker morale requires it, or that external
factors make things uncertain and therefore it is needed. There is not
a great deal of discretionary spending available to single units,
but in the aggregate -- especially when units favored over the years
such as the police are accounted for, discretionary amounts can be
important.
The primary failure of the budgetary process to constitute a genuine
planning process in Newark, however, rests with the weakness of the
budget director. While the institutional role is weak (located under
the business administrator), under Gibson the role was weakened con-
siderably by the personalities who occupied the office and by the
absence of any genuine strategies. As the lead in the budgetary process,
the budget director assumed a 'semi-tough' role, while attempting to
ferret out some knowledge of operation, alternating between the carrot
and the stick approach. The staff, while well trained and alert, were
poorly used. While the budget staff was assigned the role of emphasiz-
ing performance questions and efficiency and cost savings, in the
budget sessions there was no logical place for this analysis and the
budget director was only mildly supportive of the research.
The weakness of the tradition and the budget director's role carried
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over to characterize the entire process, including the 'hard' bargain-
ing sessions which were supposed to gain agreement over what to cut
and what to save. In actual fact, however, most o- the 'hardness' of
the bargaining deteriorated immediately. As an example, the budget
director in challenging the sanitation director suggested that he
couldn't understand why there was only a marginal increase request.
The Manager, an old traditionalist to Newark and strongly identified
with the existing workforce in his division, played an excellent
strategy of keeping the meddlers out by asking for very little. The
budget director was left with almost nothing to bargain over. As' the
following indicates, a weak attempt at 'pressuring' for qualitative
improvements in sanitation services largely failed since the budget came
in too low to provide the budget director with ammunition:
Budget Director: I think that your goals really don't
show anything. Let's take 'reduce absenteeism' -- this
has no meaning. We need something which can measure
effort.
Sanitation Manager: Listen, there are some things you
can't measure, can't put in these terms. For example,
in the bulk pickups, we can't really measure this.
There is a survey going on now...
Budget Director: What about these districts for collection?
Now I understand these haven't been changed since 1954.
What about this? You are using old maps for everything.
Doesn't it make sense if people have been moved by renewal
the workforce ought to be reallocated?
Sanitation Manager: Well, we have these color coded systems
to represent the sweeping, bulk, salting, everything.
Budget Director: Yes, but that's not the point. What
happened to all that money that was spent last year for
new maps?
Sanitation Manager: Well, I think that map money went for
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reproducing the old maps for scheduling purposes. Now
on this redistricting thing, we have a study underway.
We have crew problems you know. So I am putting new
men on the refuse collection so the more experienced men
can be put on the bulk trucks...
As the questions raised with sanitation remained unanswered, the general
established 'priority' fell. The task force did retrieve a commitment
to an increase in bulk deliveries and an expansion of lot cleanups in
the neighborhoods, but the serious question of the redistricting of
existing workers largely faded. The case was not unique, however.
Similar experiences characterized the meetings with other unit managers
with similarly poor results.
A great weakness of the budget director is carried over to the handling
of units who, by tradtiion, avoid making decisions unpopular with labor
or where risks are high. In the traditional environment, the parochial
decision environment requires that the manager become a 'buddy' with
his workers and in the Italian system there is an aversion'to assuming
the distance managerial roles require. The budget director, however,
also tended to assume a fairly unaggressive 'get along' attitude.
Budget Director: Do we need 54 people to clean City Hall?
Buildings Department Manager: We, we-need four people for
each of the four floors plus 24, then the rest are movers,
night elevator operators, then if two people are out sick,
we have to replace.... My personal advice is don't get tough
during an election year.
Budget Director: What about this complicated shift stuff...
7-9 then 7-9. What is this, A.M. or P.M.?
Buildings Department Manager: Well, years ago the employees
took a vote. The prior administration went along with it.
Last year the issue was so hot that the business administra-
tor backed down. They should be on a 7 hour day. Now they
work 5 hours, get the work done in 3 or 4 and spend the rest
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of the time downstairs in the locker room. They also
get 60 cents more per hour than a laborer.
Budget Director: 22 highly influential people, huh?
The budget director has very little faith in the process to retrieve
slack, and while considerable questioning and haggling along these lines
does go on in meetings with spending units, very little is accomplished.
In part this is because of the general bias accepted that nothing can
really be done in Newark, given the traditional way of doing things.
To some extent this is visible in an internal session between the
mayor's task force aide and over general strategies and approaches being
pushed by the task force:
Mayor's Aide: Now this machinery repair budget is really
slack, isn't it: Public works or police or fire use it as
discretionary.
Budget Director (to budget examiner): This is true, isn't it?
Budget Examiner: Yes, but it wouldn't make any difference.
You could take away $160,000 or the whole thing and they'd
just put it back.
Budget Director: Yes by shuffling around the codes. Look,
I suggest if you really want to cut, it is more politically
feasible to get the mayor to use the austerity angle and
cut a flat 5% across the board off everyone. Most of the
items, let's fact it, are there for eyewash. There is nothing
real in there. Now if we proceed to try to cut particular
items, there is the risk that our inilial choices will be
genuine stuff; the mayor will get hit directly from the depart-
ments and the system will be permanently abandoned.... If you
want to discipline people, you have got to have a defensible
position. If you are wrong on the first few items, you don't
get a second chance.
2) The Ad Hoc Task Force Budgeting Strategy
Several key issues which dominated the 1973 hearings were brought forward
mainly through the efforts of the ad hoc task force set up in the mayor's
1974 Newark Budget Requests: Miscellaneous Codes
Division
Mayor
Clerk/Counc.
Admini strati on
Law
Finance'
Rec. Parks
Public Works
Police
Fire
Health, Welfare
Engineer
TOTAL
. Personnel
Relatedl
34,575
9,000
4,250
0
70,341
357,002
491,868
1,427,230
629,200
3,000
6,9000
3,032,466
Service
Contracts
315,295
312,100
161,893
111,000
502,920
308,659
3,727,364
476,100
135,595
273,197
417,708
6,741,831
Material s,
Suppl ies
85,343
33, 550
14, 815
8,800
112, 390
104,650
1,006,730
842,900
447,942
169,860
8,495
2,835,475
Equi pment
13,774
2,050
2,850
5,000
10,592
34,250
15,700
472,900
64,885
14,900
1,546
638,477
Miscellaneous
3,431 ,256
290,000
2,206,800
0
0
0
1,641,475
0
0
2,727,176
0
10,296,707
Total
3,880,243
646,700
2,390,608
124,800
696,243
804,561
6,883,137
3,219,130
1,277,622
3,188,133
433,749
23,544,936
Source: City of Newark 1974 Budget.
Ilncludes: part-time/seasonal help; overtime; change of rate; miscellaneous allowances.
0
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office. The experience of reasonable successes in three areas suggest
that the budgetary process can be used to enforce general discipline
and carry out sanctions against spending departments, despite the
formidable obstacles placed by traditional budgeting in the city and
resistant participants. Three issues which are useful to examine as
cases include decisions on the citywide vehicle budget, the sanitation
budget and police.
1) The Vehicle Budget
The city's vehicle purchases were identified early by the mayor's.budget
staff as a 'likely' area for 'success' in gaining control over. runaway
unit purchases and reducing overall expenditure in the area. The
vehicle problem had been approached early, however, during 1970 in a
consultant report and later during 1973 in a state report on a proposed
motor vehicle repair facility. Both reports suggest that the city unit
was operating at a low capacity and blamed general disorder in the unit.
The state report, however, went further to say that many of the unit's
problems were genuinely outside its control.
The consultant report, one of the Gibson administration's first under-
takings focused on the city garages and motors division.24 At the
time, the unit had two responsibilities: (1) operation of the city
repair facilities and (2) control over the use of city-owned motor vehi-
cles which at the time numbered 924. The vehicles themselves included
a range of equipment from fire trucks and sanitation packers, motor
brooms and sewer cleaning equipment to light equipment such as auto-
mobiles and light duty trucks. 116 persons were budgeted in the motors
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division, of which less than half were assigned to repair work and
as parking lot attendants. The remainder constituted clerical p
tions. The report found that compared to other cities operating
similar types of shops, Newark's repairs were far less frequent, and
45% of the jobs exceeded maximum time allowances for typical repairs.
One reason identified was the absence of a preventative maintenance
program. Another was the large abuse practiced by the assigned user
units. There was also absence of control over specifications
causing extreme inventory problems with repair parts. Finally, in
the case of automobiles, the report suggested that the three-year'life
assigned was highly unrealistic based on trade-in values obtained by
the city and that a yearly trade-in would save considerably on repair
costs.
The state report -- undertaken by the New Jersey Administrative Assist-
ance Unit of the Department of Community Affairs in 1973 -- suggested
further that while there were large problems in the unit and the
facilities themselves were inefficient, a key problem lay with the
external pressures on the budget.
All costs of repairing vehicles are now borne by Motors...
This leads to a general feeling of lack of responsibility
for vehicle damage on the part of user agencies. Another
detrimental effect is that users press to have old vehicles
repaired, charging Motor's budget, rather than take some
other action which affect their own budget.
There are special demands made by police and fire department
for emergency repairs. Sometimes these demands are unavoid-
able. However, they are not conducive to efficient utili-
zation of manpower. In addition, there are special demands
by high administration officials for special services...
which throw work schedules out of order.25
I X
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The report concluded by recommending that the police vehicles, which
formed a large part of motor department's workload and budget, be
removed and converted to a two-year leasing program.26 A subsequent
reaction by the police department, however, resulted in the police
department's own report which was strongly opposed to the leasing
scheme on 'cost grounds' and the uncertainty of implementation.27
An additional reason for police opposition which was not mentioned
in the police study but which was apparent in an interview with one
officer was the control the police exercised over their own purchasing
contracts. 28 As the officer suggested, the police units liked to
control their own purchases of materials and equipment, since they
could often get a better bargain on equipment than the city.
By the time of the budget decisions on vehicles, the controversy
appeared to dissipate. The motors division repair budget was still out
of control, however, and the impact on rising fuel costs, and other
purchases promised to be serious. The ad hoc budget force thus
adopted a strategy centered on removing all the vehicle purchases
from discretionary control of the units. First, the budget was
cleared of heavy equipment in categories of more than five years life;
these were reconstituted into a new capital budget.29 One hope was
that the somewhat longer waiting time would discourage 'new purchases'
-and offer incentives to prolong life through preventive maintenance.
A second step then involved the remainder of the vehicles. This
involved several problems, including removing the vehicles from budgeted
units and secondly finding some 'safe' place to assign and monitor the
budget.
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Centralization of the vehicle budget meant stripping away some
$500,000 in vehicles budgeted from 12 larger divisions in the city,
representing a large portion or around 50% of the total annual
vehicles purchased in the city. 30 The annual budget, however, was
heavily weighted toward one powerful and privileged unit, the police
department. Police alone absorbed 85% of the vehicle budget. In
addition to the sticky problem of confronting individual departments,
there was the problem of finding somewhere 'reasonable' to put the
consolidated budget for monitoring and control purposes. While the
logical place would have been the Central Purchase division, years of
fragmentation and autonomous budgeting had reduced this unit to a
paper processing unit, with little clear responsibility and a pattern of
behavior distrusted by most officials in the city.31 After long
deliberation, an agreement was made that the department of administra-
tion (headed by a now new business administrator) would take over the
function.
Vehicle Budgets in Newark: 1973, 1974
Department 1973 1974
Mayor's agencies 3,500 0
Clerk/council 0 0
Administration 0 0
Law 0 5,000
Finance 0 0
Recreation/Parks 0 27,000
Public Works 55,000 9,000
Police 443,900 403,000
Fire 17,400 26,100
Health/Welfare 0 4,000
Engineering 0 0
Total 519,800 474,100
I . -
-I
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The next part of the strategy involved gaining the mayor's general
approval for carrying the reform forward and undercutting any possible
objections from units, particularly the police. Having been burned
already by supporting the state proposed police car rental system
which the police beat back, the mayor's task force strategist took an
indirect approach, first convincing the mayor on cost grounds, then
confronting the divisions with a fait accompli. The strategy worked.
The departments were muted by the specter of a fuel crisis, potential
problems with contracting purchases, etc. The unit most affected, the
police, was forced to cave in on the loss of the purchasing privilege
since political resources had been exhausted in the fight over the
leasing scheme.
b) The Police Department Strategy
Newark's police department had a long tradition of privilege in the
city's autonomous budgeting system, big budget growth and little inter-
ference or challenge from central authority. The pattern continued
under Gibson,in part because the mayor played little role in the budget
in general, but also because of the mayor's decision to delegate
authority to its first director, John Redden, t'o 'clean out' the unit.
In budgetary matters, a chief clerk with a strong and aggressive per-
sonality dominated. A middle-aged woman with over 20 years of work as
-chief clerk in the police department, the role was enhanced through
cultivating of confidence of successive directors and strongly guard-
ing the budget against encroachment by the budget office or other central
authorities. As a result, there was more discretionary spending in the
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police budget than in any other unit. One observer suggested that,
further, much of the miscellaneous and non-personnel codes constituted
a strong internal reward system of the units.32 In the case of
police, $3,220,000 was assigned to discretionary codes of one type or
another out of around 21 million dollars total discretionary codes in
the city budget.
The strategies for challenging the police budget mainly involved the
miscellaneous codes and attacking some $1.3 million budgeted for ser-
vice contracts, materials and supplies and overtime. The problemlof
overtime was identified during the process as 'out of control' of the
police administration and almost entirely under the control of the
patrolmen:
Budget Director: There is a real need to reduce this
overtime. What is the real reason for all this?
Clerk: We have already used $597,000 worth of overtime
this year and we still have one month before the-end of
the year. The problem of overtime is really the courts.
All the cops have to appear in court. They changed the
county court system and now they require that the guys
hang around for appearances to speed up the court
schedules.
Mayor's Aide: Well, I simply don't believe this. There
is no control being exercised by you people. We did a
check and found the court house parking lot on any given
weekday filled with patrol cars. Why, there are more
patrol cars there than on the city streets and none
of the cops are in there. What exactly are the proce-
dures on police getting 'permission for court appearances'
from the department and why should this affect overtime?
Clerk: Well, they come in and sign slips each time for
court appearances; they get paid for any part of the hour
at a full overtime rate.
Mayor's Aide: Well, this is a real abuse area. I think
we will simply have to restore some order here on this.
This is really unfair to the city.
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Police Director: Well, we tried to get the courts to
pay part of this but they refused. They say that if
the cops aren't on hand, they'll have more cases dis-
missed. There are some abuses, true. We have two more
courts and the cops get paid for three hours even if
the card is just punched. We are getting 500 cards per
week. One man got two subpoenas last week for the same
court appearance and we had to pay him for three hours
for each.
The overtime request was cut, but most participants were cynical over
the ability or interest in the police department in enforcing this.
Both the mayor's aide and the budget office felt that until there were
substantial reforms made in the police department system on the admini-
strative level there would be no real chance for control.
On other items scrutinized in the police budget, the problem boiled
down to a confrontation with the chief clerk. Insisting that everything
requested represented necessities (including two dozen 35 mm Nikon
Cameras which regularly disappeared from the police department supply
room), she strongly defended the police department's right-to determine
its own needs and was even stronger in her defense of a 'surplus' as
necessary in case. The surplus and abuse items were finally cut,
however, when most of the items appeared to be genuine slack, or frankly
incorrectly budgeted where Federal grant programs would cover costs.33
c) Public Works Strategies
The public works budget strategy centered mainly on the two issues of
personnel budgeting in sanitation (including an overbudgeting of person-
nel) and the vehicle question. A major problem encountered early during
the process was that $1.6 million had to be added to the city budget to
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cover 'costs of joint sewerage district agreements' because the Council
had failed to vote on a rate increase to cover the normally self-
sufficient utility.34
As with the police, sanitation costs in personnel categories were grow-
ing and a large part of growth was overtime. Since numbers of refuse
pickups had been cut, overtime had increased, indicating that substan-
tial abuses in the personnel monitoring system were taking place.
400,000 was paid in overtime in 1973; most of this went for refuse and
the 1974 budget request came in at nearly $100,000 more. At the same
time, the numbers of men assigned to refuse pickup on the weekly pickups
(down from 3 to 2 times per week) had increased.
The sanitation manager argued that there was no abuse in the system and
that it was monitored closely. He admitted, however, that field super-
vision was possible only through spot checks and that supervisory person-
nel themselves were 'overbudgeted' on overtime. A study conducted by
the mayor's office personnel further showed that because of the failure
to redistrict the work crews, many of the crews assigned to low refuse
districts finished early, then went to high refuse districts and 'worked
35overtime'. The study confirmed the very high ratio of personnel to
bulk collected and households served, and suggested that much of the
problem was the large number of men 'doing nothing' on the job.
The sought for cuts in overtime in sanitation, in contrast to the police
situation, were fairly successfully resisted by the manager. A series
of manipulations, including the device of submitting a low budget (con-
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cealing potential 'unbudgeted' costs for snow removal and overtime),
were used by the manager to undercut demands for retrieving some over-
time clask.
Public Works Director: This budget submission is really 'bare
boned'; we followed directions; however, this is really un-
realistic. We have an energy crisis. For the last three
years we have had no increase in personnel. Now we are get-
ting these state EPA controls. We definitely need a sanita-
tion budget increase.
Sanitation Manager: We have budgeted $50,000 in overtime for
snow. Actually this is only startup money. As soon as the
snow starts, I have to go to the council for 'emergency money'.
Budget Director: So snow is entirely structured on overtime?
Trenton got burned by the cities not putting in snow overtime
to keep the taxes low. Now you say the actual amount is
$500,000?
Sanitation Manager: Well, a few years ago we got burned. We
didn't put it in to lower the tax rate but the snow came and
the Council refused to vote on the emergency so now we put it
in as overtime.
The real problem remained unsolved. With overtime linked to the 'snow
emergency' situation, the overtime budget stayed for non-snow purposes.
Another undercutting tendency, however, was the general problem of
conflicts between mayor priority goals of increasing performance in the
neighborhoods. A few weeks prior to the time of the hearing, a big
contingent or irate citizens from the mainly middle classed black south
ward participated in a demonstration on city hall steps over 'deteriorat-
ing' sanitation services in south ward neighborhoods. The result was
enormous pressures on the administration just prior to an election to
do something about refuse collection and litter in the neighborhoods.
Despite considerable haggling, however, it was clear that the sanitation
manager had little intention of making adjustements or change. A single
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agreement was made for an effort at publicity in the neighborhoods for
what the sanitation head suggested was 'education for the public'. 36
C. City Council Influence in Resource Allocation
Another indicator of success during the 1973 cycle was the achievement
of more control over Council changes to the budget. Although Newark's
city council as a statutorily weak body had exerted little influence on
city budgets in the past, during the initial years of the Gibson admini-
stration the general hostility between council and mayor was felt in
delays on budget approval and in numerous changes, primarily in the
form of restoration of personnel cuts, to the proposed spending plan.
By 1973, however, the council had retreated somewhat in budgetary
matters, there were few changes and almost no council resistance to
key budgetary actions.
The council role in the city's budgetary process had changed little over
the years and reflected an obsession by council members -- particularly
older ones -- with what the mayor may be getting for himself. The
council's reaction has typically been based on using leverage of approvals
to get a council share of whatever it is. There is little sensitivity
by the body or individual members to overall concepts of fiscal planning
or policy and,while there is talk of taxes, council behavior in this
area has occasionally bordered on irresponsibility.
Some observers questioned during the 1973 cycle suggested that the
council is largely disinterested in the city budget, spends little time
on the review sessions and haggles mainly over 'rewards'.37 One council-
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man suggested that his fellow legislators seldom attended the internal
briefings and had little knowledge about the budget.38 A review of
public hearings of prior years suggested that the council interest was
limited to responding to visible issues raised during public hearings
such as personnel layoffs.
1) Newark City Council Review of the Budget
The council review of the budget involves several weeks of examination
of the executive budget by the council's professional staff, internal
briefings with council members meeting as a unit, additional meetings
where desired with city administrative officials and a final public
meeting where the revised budget, incorporating any council changes, is
presented for public review. The whole process can take over the alloted
four weeks in the overall plan of the calendar, thus delaying the sub-
mission to the state for final approval before the budget becomes law.
The review of the budget is, according to observers, dominated by the
council staff. The budget staff consists of four persons led by the
council-appointed City Clerk who are chiefly concerned with the city
budget review. Most observers evaluate the council staff competency as
equal to that of the city's budget office, and, during the process,
council staff does have access to city records for its detailed review.
The review consists mainly of 'flagging' changes by the mayor in items
which may be controversial, or otherwise of interest to the council,
then presenting them with recommendations for action to council sessions.
The internal review sessions, which are closed to outsiders, according
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to one councilman, are very poorly attended. This councilman suggested
that council behavior was inexcusable, since there were few other re-
sponsibilities and the job was a part time job. Review sessions with
the budget office and other city officials consists of a fairly tough
grilling by the council staff, but again, poor attendance was shown by
the councilmen themselves. As a result, most of the strong leadership
in the review process is taken by the council staff and the City Clerk.
It is the staff which flags controversial items, or those of special
interest to the council and provides the council with whatever ammuni-
tion members may need to challenge items in the proposed budget. 'The
most controversial issues which have emerged have been those involving
personnel cutbacks. The council sees its duty in part as protecting
the existing labor force, particularly where there are workers with
'political connections'. As with other issues as well, the council
may use its leverage over budget approval as a weapon for attempts to
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extract bargains or deals out of the mayor.
The final step in the council review is public presentation of the
budget with council changes at a public hearing session. The hearings
are publically advertised but poorly attended. In Newark, there is
almost no public awareness of the expense budget, even from the key
leadership in the community. Observers believe that Newark's black
leadership, for example, does not fully understand the budgetary process
or the importance of the document itself in influencing how money gets
spent in the city.40
Highlights of the mayor's proposed budget are usually reported in the
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local press, along with a statement by the mayor outlining priorities
and programs. This appears to be a device designed more to 'undercut'
Council changes, than a public advertisement of the budget. By
the time the public hearings do come around, however, nearly a month
has passed and the public interest, if any, has waned and the public
is once again asleep. As a result, public hearings are attended mainly
by a sprinkling of representatives from the local business lobby
groups, public labor groupswho have not managed to achieve changes
behind closed doors and other government officials. Citizen attendance
is almost unheard of.
Council behavior at the public hearings is -very typical of the Newark
council 'style' which has evolved over the years and seems to have grown
in importance under Gibson. There are scattered speeches on subjects
which may or may not be relevant to the budget. If there is a special
side issue which the council or individual members are particularly
strong on, there may be some typical public grandstanding. The really
key issues in the budget, however, have already been settled in the
closed sessions long before the budget is presented to the public.
During 1973, in contrast to the two prior years; there were few council
changes to the executive budget. Two main reasons can be identified,
since council composition and the disruptive racial divisions in the
council had not changed. One was that proposed changes were largely well
worked out in advance with agreements made with affected departments
and labor cuts were fairly modest and scattered. In prior years, in
contrast, Gibson had perhaps unwisely chosen to confront a hostile
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council with some major personnel changes it was unable to accept. A
second reason may be explained by the council's behavior itself.
During election years the council has typically looked to the executive
for leadership while members maintain a somewhat lower profile. Gibson
also, in contrast to Addonizio, did not engage in typical election-
year-type cutting such as in human resource areas or on the welfare
budget. Gibson's main theme for his re-election was improvements of city
services which could only be achieved by increasing expenditure in key
service areas. This behavior served to leave the council without much
of a case to argue; even the Italians would not have advocated cutting
the welfare budget.
2) Impact of the 1973 Budget Process on Resource Allocation in Newark
Budgetary process changes in Newark, as most budgetary process litera-
ture suggests, are limited. The traditional format and subculture, with
strongly identified roles and behavior, exert formidable constraints on
change. The 1973 cycle in Newark also suggests, however, that the
strong 'public administration' bias used frequently by budget officers
also works to inhibit change. Because the 'public administration' bias
emphasizes normative abstract conceptions of what budgets ought somehow
to do, they fit poorly to the real constraints of political operations.
Moreover, they inhibit addressing priorities of a political administra-
tion which are more often in 'spending' rather than saving. The dual
precept of 'cutting back' and emphasis on performance criteria in Newark
simply do not work. It is not particularly in the interest of the
central administration to cut popular or vulnerable areas such as human
resources spending. Moreover, given the very slight development of
I .-
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Selected Budget Changes 1973: Newark, N.J.
Unit/Item Changes During Budqet Cycle:*
1)Request- 2)Mayor- 3) Net Add. Low
Mayor Council Skilled Empl.
Human Resources Cateqories:
Health:
a) wages, salaries
Welfare
a) wages, salaries
b) general assistance
Inspections
a) wages, salaries
Parks Division:
a) wages, salaries
Maintenance
a) wages, salaries
Programs
a) wages, salaries
Net Changes
'Property, Safety, Environment:
Police
a) overtime
b) services contracted
c) materials
d) equipment
Fire
a) equipment
Motors
a) wages, salaries
Public Property
a) wages, salaries
Sewers
a) wages, salaries
S.anitation
a) wages, salaries
Streets
a) wages, salaries
Engineering
a) wages, salaries
Net Changes
135,400
286,700
(13,100)
(66,800)
141,700
136,400
126,300
746,600
(200,000)
( 44,700)( 83,700)
(430,300)
( 32,900)
162,600
143,600
40,100
( 68,800)
18,800
214,000
(100,400)
None
None
None
162,300
None
15
- 31
11
24
7,600 7
16
169,900 104
0None
None
None
None
None
None
None
155,700
None
None
0
0
15
13
28
0
1410,900
166,600 70
Source: 1974 Budget Data, Newark, New Jersey.
*Changes represent: a) changes between department requests and the proposed
executive budget; b) executive and council approved budget; low skilled
additional employment include lowest wage categories and entry levels in
clerical and blue collar hourly wage categories.
4,
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administrative organization and capability in most of the units of
government in Newark, it is nearly impossible to enforce performance
planning in the short run. Thus, one success of 1973 was the intro-
duction of what might be called a more realistic view of process and
a fuller recognition of its limitations.
Two types of direct changes in spending were achieved during the 1973
cycle. Both appear attributable to the presence of a strong input
into the cycle on the executive budget preparation side provided mainly
by the ad hoc staff. One type of change was expansion in staff categor-
ies in human resources and to some extent in environmental protection
areas of spending. Around 700,000 was provided primarily for hiring
workers in lower level entry skills in health, welfare and recreation
programs. Additional net gains in employment in the environmental
(sanitation, sewers) lower skills categories were achieved with even
more modest additions to the budget, through re-allocation of existing
vacancies and 'slack'. Many of the additional workers were nonwhites
integrated into city expense lines from various Federal manpower and
training programs, thus avoiding projected 'layoffs' and at the same
time providing for priorities on civil service system entry. In the
case of the welfare department, for example, the impact may extend
somewhat further; the gain in 'investigators' will permit continued
conversion of prior 'professional' staff categories with higher educa-
tion requirements to lower skills requirements where most of the city's
unemployment- is concentrated.
A second type of achievement made during the cycle, visible in changes
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in other operating agencies, were more of a control nature. While
immediate impacts were to retrieve some spending 'slack', the long
run achievement may be in regaining central control through a strong
re-statement of executive authority. This was particularly desired in
police and fire where, over the years, nearly autonomous budgetmaking
had developed with little input from the central administration and
created wide distance between the services and the new black mayor.
The initial attempts of the budget office generally were unsuccessful
primarily because they emphasized the 'public administration' bias of
agreements over small cuts which could be more easily avoided in larger
budgets.42  Later efforts were probably more successful in challenging
the budget form, inconsistencies between budgets and spending and some
larger non-personnel categories which were producing important impacts
on other unit spending. Such was the case with police vehicles and the
motors division of public works.
Changes of a control nature may have much longer range implications. For
example, the shift of the equipment and vehicles budget to central con-
trol not only provides for monitoring of the purchase contracts, speci-
fications and use patterns of this equipment 'outside of the internal
user department', but also permits some additional opportunities for
efficiency or other gains. Opportunities are regained, for example,
to re-open the investigation of leasing arrangements to preferred con-
tractors such as minority businesses. Similar possibilities exist for
other city service contracts such as minor maintenance repairs, cleaning
work, printing, etc., currently under contracts negotiated primarily by
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'user' units. The fact that many such contracts currently hire outside
of the civil service makes minority employment opportunities somewhat
larger than in city work.43
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Chapter 7: Implications of Newark for Black Cities and Future U.S.
Urban Policy
In 1974, Kenneth Gibson was re-elcted to a second term as mayor of
Newark. Over the four years since Gibson became the first black mayor
of a major eastern U.S. city, he has been joined by several other black
mayors in major cities. Most face an astonishingly parallel set of
problems to those of Gibson, including a general fiscal crisis in govern-
ment, a set of rigid institutions, a weak and fragmented authority
system and the prospect of little help coming from either the state or
Federal.level. Many of these mayors also face the similar problem of
responding to demands of poor constituents, pressures from regional
elites and city bureaucracies and the daily crisis of financing 'needs'
where there are fewer resources available. The key question which was
once asked, whether or not blacks ought to take over city hall, has
changed. The new question is, what do they do once in to 'save the
cities?'
While the Gibson experience in Newark must be used with some caution
in drawing parallels with other cities, there are nonetheless some use-
ful overall lessons to be drawn. After four years of black government
in Newark, by some indicators few improvements have taken place and
some things worsened. By other standards, however, substantial changes
have taken place. On the side of the worst, poverty -and unemployment
certainly remain and probably have deepened as the region and the nation
have plunged into the worst economic crisis since the 1930's. The
physical environment has also shown little outward visible improvement.
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Over the four years, slums have spread as white owners have abandoned
rapidly deteriorating older housing and unemployment and rising costs
have forced new nonwhite owners out of the market. The physical
environment under public control has also probably worsened in many
ways. The city's enormous public housing projects have deteriorated
steadily, assisted by Federal moratoriums on financing maintenance
costs, the inherited effects of a corrupt machine on the local housing
authority and the country's longest rent strike. Finally, huge tracts
of vacant land, cleared during the 1960's for highways and renewal
projects which never materialized, remain vacant after 10 years as an
ironic reminder of Federal policy failures. There have been some physi-
cal improvements in the city, such as construction of a few new schools,
a few new housing projects and a vast new complex of higher educational
facilities. In the main, however, these were far outdistanced by
losses and much of the development hardly reflects the crisis economic
and housing needs of most Newarkers.
Both urban physical development and the city's economic situation, how-
ever, were victims not so much of local administrative failures. Rather
they symbolize in many ways the vast failures of Federal and state urban
policies. The new black administration was guilty of vacillating on
urban redevelopment, mistrusted developers and the city's own redevelop-
ment arm and thus seldom proved effective in developing a coherent
approach to these problems. However, Federal policy, the most important
resource for urban problem solving in both issue areas, literally
closed shop during the Gibson administration's first term. There is
no doubt that Federal moratoriums and similarly negative actions in
A
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renewal and existing subsidized housing programs, for example, went far
to devastate rebuilding strategies in Newark. The plans patiently
evolved during the first two years of Gibson's administration -- in
housing, economic development, infrastructure and transportation --
were abruptly shelved following Federal policy changes. Much of the
initial optimism and momentum generated in the city over 'rebuilding'
waned.
City services were areas closer to the legal responsibility and span of
control of the administration and this study has reviewed key strategies,
efforts and experiences in attempts to shift the past pattern of
resource allocation and make qualitative and quantitative changes. But
for many who went to the polls in 1974, there was very little visible
change. Services which touched neighborhoods and citizens most, such
as trash collection, police and education were in all likelihood still
poor, if less outwardly brutal.
As suggested by a current article, the impact of the Gibson administration
experienced both achievements and failures. The article which reviewed
the experiences of the six largest cities in the U.S. with black mayors
was on the whole sympathetic with Gibson's achievements:
How has Ken Gibson coped with that frightening array of
conditions? Remarkably well....He has restored a large
measure of public confidence in the integrity of the
government and of the mayor (Gibson's white predecessor
went to jail for taking kickbacks). He has eliminated a
$65 million budget deficit, reduced the crime rate, and
made at least modest improvements in city services. He
has also demonstrated, by working openly and on a shared-
interest basis with willing whites...that Newark's seem-
ingly extreme racial polarization is more a polarization
of leadership than of people....None of the black mayors
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has been more innovative than Gibson. To attract new
businesses as well as the good will of white resdet
he has lower property taxes two years in a row, using
federal revenue sharing....Faced with a rapid rate of
housing abandonment, he has demolished some 800 build-
ings .... Says Gibson of his 'impossible' mayorship:
"As long as white people want these jobs, black people
are gonna want 'em too." 2
While many of Gibson's achievements were visible and clearly improved
the lives of many Newarkers, many were invisible. One key problem with
black government in Newark is that most changes have had to wait a dis-
entanglement of institutional chaos in the city and these latter achieve-
ments are the least visible.
Visible achievements have nonetheless occurred in increases in nonwhite
public employment in the city, in the expansion of black participation
in construction contracting and in the growth of important neighborhood
services such as health care, youth programs and other 'consumer'
oriented activities. While the police still pose major problems for
nonwhites in the city, the worst of the discretionary anti-black police
system and major corruption has disappeared. There have been major
changes in the two large autonomous agencies outside direct control of
City Hall, the Housing authority and the Board of Education. Gibson
has exercised his prestige and influence to reshape both these agencies
in more responsive terms to the citizens they serve. There have also
been symbolic gains. The doors of City Hall are open: on any given
day, black youth can be seen crowding the steps. And when Newark's
first major civil disorder since 1968 was threatened in 1974 following
a clash between Essex County police and Puerto Rican picknickers in a
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Newark park, Gibson personally led the enraged citizens back to city
hall to air grievances, thereby avoiding an open confrontation.
Changes which are less visible in either real or symbolic terms, how-
ever, have probably been of equal magnitude to those more visible.
Many changes have moved toward more fundamental reorganization of the
city's problem solving apparatus and many have succeded in forcing
existing operations to address service needs, or treat the clients of
government with some dignity. Gibson succeeded, for example, in creat-
ing two major new operating units in the city for the first time in
half a century. As the study indicates, these changes in turn permit-
ted expansion of programs to service people, accelerated minority
hiring and contract participation and increased citizen involvement.
As importantly, changes were achieved by avoiding the confrontations
which hurt the city so much in the past. Finally, many changes such
as the centralizing of control over city spending and finances and a
start on managerial organization of city activities, while modest, if
continued promise to achieve major impact over the city's ability to
respond to needs in the future.
This chapter is divided into two principal parts and addresses some of
the implications of the study and the Newark case for future urban
policy. The first part looks at the successes and failures of Gibson's
-first term in office in the context of the current growth in numbers
of black administrations in U.S. cities. There has been a veritable
revolution in black electoral politics in recent years and where concen-
tration of nonwhites exists, black mayors have been elected. All of
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these administrations face similar problems of extreme population
change, economic contractions, and needs to increase city output at a
time when resources available are shrinking. Cities likely to elect
black mayors over the next decade -- Baltimore, St. Louis, Oakland
and possibly Chicago, Cleveland and New Orleans -- all have big
problems likely to worsen as the decade is completed. How Gibson
has handled his problems may offer some clues to how other cities can
handle parallel problems.
A second part of the chapter looks briefly at implications of Gibson's
experience in Newark for future U.S. policies on urban problems. Current
trends in urban policy both on the state and Federal level are not
bright for cities. Many of the deep problems in the Federal system
itself are responsible for the symptomatic problem outcomes of the
nation's Newarks. There is, thus far, little recognition of how much
obsolescence in the Federal system creates problem outcomes in urban
areas. Moreover, the general effects of fragmentation and powerless-
ness visible locally and direct outcomes of the Federal institutional
system inhibit collective solutions and responses when appropriate and
even desired by a majority of the people. This.part focuses on insti-
tutional arrangements -- particularly those which are responsible for
financing domestic service needs -- which will continue to circumscribe
the potential impact black mayor's will have on 'saving the cities'.
A. The Gibson Administration and Black Cities
There has been a rapid increase in black administrations in U.S. cities
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during the past five years, reflecting an increase in turning of blacks
to organized government and particularly the executive branch of local
government for redressing grievances and affecting social change.
There are currently almost 3,000 black elected officials in the United
States, representing an increase of over 120% during the past five
years. Most of these gains are in local government and include mayors
of six major cities of over 150,000 population and 98 mayors in smaller
cities. Of major cities, Detroit, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Newark, Raleigh
and Gary have elected black mayors and an additional half dozen cities
are likely to elect black mayors over the next decade. According to a
report by the Joint Center for Political Studies of Washington, D.C.,
in addition to the six named, an additional seven of the 30 largest
cities in the United States have voting age populations at or exceeding
one-third of the total vote. This suggests that these cities (Baltimore,
New Orleans, Memphis, St. Louis, Cleveland, Philadelphia and Chicago)
are likely candidates for black mayoral victories over the .next few
years.3
The list of cities either with recently elected black administrations,
or likely to elect them, includes many with much in common with Newark
in institutional organization, political culture, demographic and
economic character. In all there are first extreme limits on mayoral
power to make change posed by the institutional organization of city
government, its relation to the state system and all have state civil
service systems, entrenched bureaucracies and rapidly unionizing labor
forces. The distribution of services is pretty much fixed in a combina-
296
tion of charter defined arrays and past budgeting practices. The
fiscal problems of shrinking resources and obsolescent tax systems are
also common. A recent study by Roy Bahl and Alan K. Campbell of the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University suggests that budgetary and
fiscal pressures in these majority black cities are very high and
generally exceed those of mostly 'white cities'. 4 While some
problems may be less extreme than Newark, parallel racial tensions,
council racial divisions, police control problems and the like have
already characterized infant black administrations of many and bear
5
great similarity to Newark. For example, Young in Detroit and Jackson
in Atlanta have in common with Gibson in Newark major problems in man-
aging the police hierarchy, naming new police directors and ridding
departments of past anti-black behavior patterns. 6
There are other parallels in the demands of constituents and regional
interests. As Coleman Young, Mayor of Detroit, suggested in a recent
article:
The general belief in Detroit is that there are a
thousand jobs out there on the Christmas tree, and
people with limited abilities are promoting themselves
as prospective commissioners of major departments. In
fact, I have about one hundred appointments open to me
and most of them require special background qualifica-
tions. 7
In addition to unrealistic expectations of jobs, there is the problem
of demands for making very modest changes -- litter in the streets or
dignity of treatment by the police -- which suggest 'equality' rather
than special attention to nonwhites. While generally modest, such
changes as the Newark case suggests are likely to be difficult at best
to deliver.
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1) Learning from Gibson's Mistakes
Beyond the question of general limits of mayoral power to respond to
nonwhite needs in cities, there are other key lessons to be learned
from the experience of efforts and outcomes of a black mayor. Gibson's
experience along with that of Richard Hatcher in Gary, as seniors in the
school of black city government, presents some clear lessons. Some of
the errors are particularly useful to examine. This study has suggested
that within the sometimes narrow margin of choice there are are some
actions which might have been handled differently and in retrospect
may have produced somewhat different outcomes. While it is generally
difficult to speculate and,further, each locality has peculiarities
in its political environment which critically affect risk structure of
decisions, there are possibly some areas where risks are small. In
these cases, better information, advice and 'tests' of decisions might
have brought the issues into sharper focus, allowing different treatment
and outcomes. There are four such areas which appear important in
Gibson's case, all of which involve resource allocation:
a) centralization of authority over operations and use of mayoral resources
b) timing of strategies and actions
c) provisions of stable channels for constituent grievances and feedback
d) early identification and settlement, where pessible, of major obstruc-
tion areas
a) Centralization of Authority, Use of Mayoral Resources
-Cities differ in the amount of real authority conveyed by legal and
institutional means to their chief executive officers and all are
limited by the authority of states. Nonetheless, even in the weakest
situation, the use of mayoral resources can make vast differences. One
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political analyst suggests that the use of a mayor's personal resources
and prestige of the office had considerable impact on the real effective-
ness of leadership:
Although mayors in Oakland are limited both by govern-
mental structure and political disorganization, there
are still opportunities for an inventive political man
to make the most of the situation -- by social lobbying,
persuasion, publicity, and the creation of groups which
will support him. But, as James Young has noted, all
this requires adroitness, ingenuity and political exper-
tise. Even given Oakland's constraining structure, per-
sonality can make a difference... .American cities are
unlikely to find their revenue constraints greatly eased
in the near future and the jurisdictional fragmentation
about which so many mayors complain is not likely to dis-
appear. Thus, the techniques of low resource leadership
...appear to have wide applicability...8
During the initial part of Gibson's term, important sources of mayoral
authority were delegated to subordinates, considerably weakening the
resources of the office. While this reflected Gibson's preference
to play a conciliatory role towards managerial staff as well as
cultivate initiative in government, it failed because it .ignored
Newark's traditional unresponsive behavior patterns and dissipated
mayoral power. In reasserting control in later years, Gibson managed
to eliminate much of the 'negative' filtering of executive priorities
for the city and achieve much more meaningful-change.
b) Timing of strategies and actions
In reviewing the experience of efforts at making change in Newark, a
clear notion of the value of timing actions emerges which suggests
that careful and early timing of actions might have achieved results
in some cases earlier. Two important questions overlooked by Gibson
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were the general expectations for change, early in the administration's
life, and the special importance of rapid starts which capitalize on
vulnerability of interests, and undercut the tendency for mobiliza-
tion of opposition and hardened positions to develop.
Changeovers as drastic as those of 1970 in Newark tended to raise
the anticipation of affecled parLticipants i government for change.
Many older civil servants, while hostile to the new black mayor, also
expected that the mayor's people, and especially nonwhite supporters,
would be given preferential treatment in employment and other rewards
of government. Gibson failed to capitalize on this kind of expecta-
tion in the interest of 'fairness', but he may have delayed some
changes possible, given overall expectations,while not really
achieving the reduction in tensions he had hoped for by failing to
take control. Delaying changes a system is 'prepared to accept
as inevitable' may be costly in future growth of more obstructionist
attitude, if participants feel 'weakness' in carrying out change.
c) provision of access for new constituencies
Gibson did open the doors to City Hall and kept them open to citizens,
despite the grumbling of the maintenance staff that things would get
stolen, or the windows broken. On the other hand, Gibson suffered
particularly for his failure -- as did Hatcher in Gary9-- to cultivatd
and keep an 'organizational apparatus' of some type, stamped with his
political personality and separate from his official role in City Hall.
While organizational apparatuses are generally thought of in tradi-
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tional terms as somewhat 'tainted' in their resemblance to organiza-
tions of machine politics, there are important reasons why a black
mayor needs some special identification with constituents for non-
electoral purposes during his administration's life. One reason
is that the black community is generally disorganized. While cohesion
may appear at election time, the bulk of black voters cease to
participate immediately following the election. In many cases,
momentum generated by electoral politics is of great value to the
communities themselves and should be sustained. Higher levels of
participation on the neighborhood level increases the likelihood
that problems will be addressed.
From the mayor's perspective, too, there is an important advantage in
a personal linkage to voting constituents. In older cities, where
change is slow to materialize, citizens often can assist in justifying
mayoral efforts with a council, state government or recalcitrant
bureaucrats, if there are visible environmental pressures from citi-
zens on him. Such organizations may or may not help in elections.
While it is likely that Gibson avoided creation of a stronger organi-
zation because of his fear of association with 'machine' politics,
primary gains may be less in machine types of vote getting than in
ongoing access to citizen demands and grievances.
2) Learning from Gibson's Successes
A critical issue reviewed in the course of this study which is suggested
as a key to mayoral success is establishment of firm control over
resource allocation in the city. Findings of Gibson's experience
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most useful for other black mayors is that where resources
are scarce, change is absolutely dependent on a strong focus on
(1) generating new resources, where possible and (2) gaining quick
and firm control over conventional resources such as the budget,
appointive authority, personnel policy and, where possible, instruments
which can develop programmatic changes in the city's array. In
Gibson's case, there was an early focus on the first necessity;
Gibson successfully utilized the personal prestige of office and the
uniqueness of Newark to sell the city's critical needs. In the second
case, understanding of the potential took longer. In attacking the
problem of resources several of the mayor's personal strategies appear
to have been influential in accelerating change:
a) capitalizing on being the 'worst'
b) creating 'confidence' and trust
c) mediating and reducing conflict
a) capitalizing on being the 'worst'
Gibson may well go down in history as the only public official in the
U.S. to have successfully 'sold' a disaster. His best known quote,
"wherever U.S. cities are going, Newark will get there first", however,
implies a realistic appraisal of the city's problems and he has
successfully confronted key actors in state and federal government
with these unvarnished facts. While some 'boosters' privately may
complain that this kind of realism hurts the city's business position,
Gibson feels strongly that those who are not prepared to make strong
commitments to the city's real problems are not necessarily in the best
interests of the city. More importantly, however, the strategy has
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achieved considerable success, particularly in raising resources to
more realistic, if still inadequate levels. New taxes have been
generated, >the state's urban aid formula has been changed and the
Federal government has allocated a level of special assistance programs
to the city surpassing that of most other cities. Newark does have
deeper problems than most other cities in the U.S., but without
considerable use of Gibson's personal prestige in 'selling' the city's
needs, it is highly unlikely that much help would have been forthcoming.
b) creating confidence and trust
Along with the technique of selling the city's problems to generate new
resources for solving problems, Gibson's personal style has helped
considerably both in this area, and in Newark and the region in more
general issue raising. By temperament, Gibson lacks charisma and
articulate reform personality which make mayors like Hatcher and Jackson
darlings of the liberal press. Beneath the external presentation,
however, Gibson has cultivated a careful image of honesty and integrity
in government. He projects to Federal and state bureaucrats, to the
local business elites and to the press, an image of clean government
valiantly striving for managerial reforms in the best of American
reform tradition. For many on the state and local levels, he repre-
sents a low 'risk'. Within Newark government and politics, Gibson
stubbornly refuses to bargain or trade in the city's prizes. While
he has probably lost many battles with the council over desired changes,
he has maintained considerable control over resources and kept them
largely in the formal allocation system. There is very little patronage
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in City Hall because Gibson has chosen deliberately not to create it
in the mayor's office.
Outside government in Newark's broader community, Gibson has played a
similar 'clean' role. The image he projects is that of a calm.
deliberate and 'fair' political style, struggling to achieve the
modest goals so many of his constituents seem to value above more
radical goals. In working class black Newark, with its absence of
elites in business or intellectual circles, the style and the objectives
appear to work well. As one observer suggested. "Newark's blacks.are
tired of flashy styles and empty promises. They really need Ken
Gibson's 'steady-eddie' style."
c) mediating and reducing conflict
Gibson's conciliatory role, while admired in some circles, has also
been criticized as conservative, low on risktaking and giving too much
power to those elements insensitive to community needs, such as
hostile civil servants or the business community. At the same time,
however, Newark continues to be a city where tensions both in and out
of government run high. During Gibson's initial four years, despite the
public press posture, Newark has continued to sit on the edge of
violence. In government, tensions are of a somewhat different nature.
Many operations appear to run on 'crisis' and confrontation, with
neighborhoods, service clients and between internal actors themselves.
Much of the tensions both in and out of government have been held in
check by Gibson's success in mediating conflicts.
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In government, Gibson has not so much retreated, as chosen to 'wait
out' many 'crisis' problems. The case of the business administrator
who systematically attempted to undercut the mayor's authority and
exhibited considerable hostility to many service priorities was one
case Gibson successfully waited out at minimal cost. Another case is
represented by the city council. Gibson attempted to convince the
council to act in the city's interest, but that failing in an extreme
situation, ended by ignoring council behavior. Similarly, a crisis
confrontation between HUD and the Newark Housing Authority, extended
through a 'wait out period', ending with Gibson gaining control over
the agency, while preserving the institutional apparatus-and good
relations with tenants. In many of these cases, quick solutions, with
high payoff potential but higher risks were successfully resolved
by a more deliberate and calculated approach.
B. Gibson's Second Term
On balance, Kenneth Gibson's administration has probably scored well
for its first term in office. If the Newark experience is any
measure, blacks will benefit on the whole by electing black leadership
to office. The degree to which black leadership in office can be
successful, however, still depends on a combination of factors outside
the voters control in choosing one personal or political style or the
political skills and determination an individual brings to office. The
fact that Gibson did succeed in making some improvement, in a very
extreme case of resources and pressures, however, suggests that blacks
will probably benefit in most cases.
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In 1974, the Gibson administration was re-elected to extend its tenure
in City Hall for an additional four years. Despite the real doom
predicted for confronting urban problem-solving in the latter part of
the decade of the 1970's, however, it is probable that improvements
started during the administration's first term will continue. Several
changes in the administration's approach are already visible and capi-
talize generally on the first four year's learning. Some changes
reflect changes in Federal policy. Many, however, suggest that in the
experience of the initial term, there will be increased attention to
the centralization of authority in government and to the carrying through
of many changes the administration failed to achieve during the initial
term.
It is likely that the next four years will see continued pressures on
the state and in the Federal arena for reform in the tax structure
and for additional resources to benefit nonwhites in the city. New
money, principally in the form of Federal grants-in-aid in urban
redevelopment and social services have already been centralized under
the mayor's control. There is a new planning system which emphasizes
the setting of central goals for resource allocation, demonstrations
of feasibility for community participation in both input and output
levels and an end to the 'categorical turf system' which characterized
grants in former years. It is likely that nonwhites will benefit far
more than under the previous urban renewal programs. It is also
likely that increased attention will be placed on minority oriented
economic development in the city as well as housing and social service
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areas. Some small starts seeded with city sponsorship have already
begun to take shape. There are several new 'large scale' development
projects under consideration -- including a regional sports complex --
which could .'package' external black capital and capitalize on Newark's
regional position. If such projects do materialize, it is likely
that local nonwhites will be able to gain a substantial share both in
initial investment stages and in later stages in employment. Another
key issue of the past in the physical development area is housing.
Newark still suffers from a chronic shortage of standard housing at
any price; and the older stock is deteriorating at a rapid pace. 'It
is likely that the lifting of the Federal moratoriums will go a long
way towards changing this situation; there is an accumulated backlog
already on housing planned and ready for construction by community based
non-profit groups in the city. Current Federal resources under city
control already have allocated a substantial amount of money for assist-
ance to development of new housing, and a home loan repair revolving
fund is currently being set up.
In addition to capital development, Newark's nonwhites can expect other
gains over the next four years. Black employment in city services will
probably continue its increase, as well as contracting on city generated
projects. In a shrinking job market, increasing nonwhite public
employment can have considerable impact first in closing the city-
wide job gap and secondly in generating other employment from consumer
spending.11  Contracting of public construction to minority contractors,
already started during Gibson's first term, will probably continue. In-
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creasing the use of minority contractors and developers further assures
that black construction workers will get their 'fair share' of employ-
ment, so long denied under the past systems. Other city contracting
-- of services such as health, early child care, recreation and
cultural services -- to community-based sponsor groups will probably
also continue. The city's health department already has plans to open
five neighborhood health care clinics, all under neighborhood board
control, thus decentralizing all the planned service expansion of
health. Continued decentralization of such services may not only
result in qualitative changes in dimensions of services, but expand the
real availability of services in the city.
C. Implications of Newark for Future U.S. Urban Policy
As this study has suggested throughout, Newark's problems are linked
with two general failures in the U.S. system. One is the general
failure to evolve a genuine urban policy which addresses problems of
obsolescence in city physical and institutional systems and the real
roots of poverty in the economic system's failure, under free market
conditions, to provide employment and income adequate to support
demands and requirements for human participationq in urban life. A
second failure also clearly demonstrated in the case of Newark is the
deeper failure of the Federal institutional system, which practically
.prohibits national resource allocation to address standard domestic
service needs of a contemporary society. Until some marginal moves
are made in both these areas, the Newark's of America.will continue
to grow and there will be little the best black administration can do
I S.
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to rebuild them.
In many ways, Newark does epitomize the failure of U.S. urban policy.
Newark has a large inherited past of Federal urban 'solutions' aimed
largely at subsidizing economic interests, at the expense of the human
needs side of the community. In most cases, the vast expenditures of
federal dollars on renewal were frankly designed to 'contain' black
expansion at best under the benevolent control of white ethnic bosses
only slightly higher up the status scale. Federal policies frankly
reflected the sober racism of the U.S. of the 1960's, identified so
strongly in riot commission reports. More importantly, however,
they reflected the strong conservative posture of 'subsidizing' a
market, even when it had to be created as in Newark, to avoid subsidizing
the poor. Current solutions, in the form of Federal programs, do not
appear to have changed this general philosophy, however. In Newark's
case, Federal money will certainly be allocated to assist nonwhites on
a variety of levels, principally because the administration which -sits
in City Hall is black. If Gibson wants to be re-elected, he will have
to spend Federal dollars in ways that benefit his nonwhite constituency.
But the overall aims and goals of Federal programs do not reflect the
probable approach of a Gibson or a Hatcher. The real facts about the
new policy are that they represent more of a continuation of past
biases, and where government is not representative, as was the case in
Newark prior to 1970, such biases are not likely to be challenged by
local government. This essentially means that nonwhites and the
remainder of the urban poor will once again see a flow of subsidies to
real estate developers, and to business and entrepreneurial interests and
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very few improvements in poorer residential neighborhoods.
The assumptions which lie behind both general revenue sharing and the
new urban block programs devoted to urban redevelopment and human
resources are not based on the evolution of a genuine urban strategy
which balances the problems and needs of the nation's poorer citizens.
Further, there are few stated urban goals, or specific guidelines, which
would provide leverage over the use of the programs. The case of
Newark prior to 1970 suggests that without some kind of control to
assure that citizens are protected, it is clear that the poor will
find themselves beating back another stick, or worse, ignored altogether.
A series of cases currently in the courts challenging discrimination in
resource allocation decisions on use of the Federal grants also suggests
that yet another failure is already being felt. 12
A jey problem which must be overcome before any genuine policy over
urban development subsidy can be developed which will help cities -like
Newark is a deep aversion to genuine social program approaches which
cease pretending that there is some 'workable market solution' to every
human need -- from housing to health -- in poor cities, and then
focuses on financing or subsidizing a mythical set of entrepreneurs
in cities. It is this 'entrepreneurial' subsidy approach which
produced the worst failures and scandals or urban renewal housing
development and Federal sponsored economic enterprise in ghettos. The
truth of the matter is there are very few entrepreneurs legitimate or
otherwise in cities interested in making investments and that, in the
absence of this entrepreneurial class, it may be better to instead
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socialize Federal investment to best benefit the poor and those resi-
dents with real stakes in the future of cities.
The second deeper failure visible in Newark is the failure of develop-
ment of a contemporary U.S. institutional framework, which reflects
the current standards of industrialized society, in financing reasonable
levels of domestic urban services by means which are logical and effi-
cient. As currently structured,the rigidly institutionalized system
of fragmentation of responsibility between national, state and local
governments serves to shift major burdens for services with high spill-
out effects on the local level, where financing of these effects are
least possible, and devote major resources to areas where initial
beneficiaries are increasingly narrow, as in agriculture. There is
no question that the approach is unique to human resources areas,
however, and still reflects the overwhelming 18th century conservatism
which pressed maintaining elite control by keeping government small.
Government on the national level, however, is not small and there'are
very large allocations of resources to non human resource areas with
spillout benefits and costs such as the highway program and national
defense. These interest areas are financed appropriately on the
national level, where tax growth is high, where jurisdictional effects
are minimal and where redistribution of income can and does occur.
The fact that public education, health and public assistance have not
followed suggests there are genuine deep structural problems in U.S.
society which inhibit reasonable standards being achieved, even if a
majority -- as in the case of health -- prefer it.
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The problem of the failure to organize and finance domestic services
is increasingly felt not only by the Newark's of the nation, but
increasingly by other localities in metropolitan America, including
urbanized suburbs. Middle income suburbs are increasingly unable
to support basic services such as public education and are therefore
starting some pressures toward transferring costs to state and
regional levels.
For the cities, a key effect of transferring responsibilities for
financing human resources services to the Federal level will be to
relieve burdens from sluggish tax bases with slow revenue growth such
as the property tax. But there are other benefits, particularly for
nonwhite cities. One benefit is the strong ability of the Federal level
to equalize expenditures and resources between regions and redistribute
equitably. Another gain may be in 'imposing' qualitative service
levels which could act to end regional biases which produce inferior
educational programs for nonwhite and rural poor white children.
One valuable service that the new black mayors could make is to take
leadership in some concerted effort on these deeper problems which
promise without some national exposure to accelerate the creation of
future Newarks.
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1. For a critical look at the New Jersey tax system's effects on poorer
households, see: Report of the New Jersey Tax Policy Committee,
Vol. 1. For a more general appraisal of local tax systems, see
Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax, Chapter 5, pp. 86-137
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Areas," Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971.
2. For an appraisal of the punitive effects of urban renewal displace-
ment on non-whites, see Building the American City, Report of the
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62. Report for Action, p. 10.
63. _0p. cit., p. 15.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Interview with Lawrence Coggins, Director of Community Organization,
City of Newark, October 1973.
68. Primary results were as follows:
Addonizio 45,922 Castellano 9,819
Carlin 18,917 Bontempo 2,001
Gibson 16,246 King 1,081
Fred Barbaro, "Political Brokers," Society, Sept./Oct., 1972, p. 45.
69. Report for Action, op. cit. p. 12.
70. Ibid.
71. Ron Porambo, pp. cit., p. 329.
72. Ibid. Two other black candidates, George Richardson and Harry
Wheeler, both of whom had served in various capacities in and out
of city government, boycotted the Convention, accusing its organi-
zers and participants of setting it up as a vehicle for Gibson's
nomination, p. 330.
73. Op. cit., p. 340.
74. Ibid. See also, Barbaro, op. cit.
75. Barbaro, op. cit., p. 50.
76. Ibid. See also Porambo, op. cit., p. 334.
77. Porambo, op. cit., p. 330. Porambo points out Richardson, had
assisted Gibson in forming the Business Coordinating Council, was
I.
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a founder of the United Community Corporation, the city's anti-
poverty group and helped found the Greater Newark Urban Coalition.
While he was personable, involved in community affairs and had
political know-how, Porambo suggests he had offered himself for
sale by looking the other way for slumlords and trading his State
Assembly vote to the corrupt Kenny machine of Jersey City. A
number of black leaders of national reputation, including Shirley
Chisholm, Herman Badillo, Ossie Davis and Gary mayor Richard
Hatcher attempted to dissuade Richardson and Harry Wheeler, another
black candidate, from running to 'split' the minority vote without
success.
78. Barbaro, op. cit., p. 47.
79. p. cit., p. 46.
80. Report for Action, op. cit., p. 14.
81. Barbaro, 2p. cit., p. 51. Barbaro reports Caulfield and his wife
were shoved and kicked on many joint appearances with Gibson by
angry whites. It is riot clear how much Caulfield's endorsement
contributed to Gibson's final victory however, gains in the West
and East Wards can be attributed in part to Caulfield.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U. S. Department
of Justice had considerable evidence, painstakingly collected from
the' early 1960's on organized crime connections in city and state
government in New Jersey -- including Addonizio, presented much
later to Grand Juries in the wake of civil disorders -- and a great
deal of 'common knowledge' over sale of contracts, kickbacks, ex-
tortion, etc. among members of the business community in Newark
collected by investigators in the Justice Department and the state
Commission on Civil Disorders, curiously, it took racial disorders
of 1967 and 1968 to bring these men to trial.
86. Prior to the mid 1960's, the word 'community' was rarely used by
black leadership and hardly in everyday usage; it is today on almost
any street corner in any black area. It generally seems to desig-
nate the sociological definition of 'community,'' denoting social
structure and organization beyond geographic boundaries, but also
incorporated a notion of shared values of black solidarity.
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1. Report for Action, p. 30. The state cannot be resolved from
responsibility for Addonizio's deficit spending pattern which char-
acterized his second term, as well as his failure in enforcing civil
service rules, anti-discrimination in hiring and contracting, etc.
Particularly on the budget side, the state Division of Local Govern-
ments is legally responsible to review both spending and tax plans
before approval of the local ordina.nce. Failure to review and halt
budget plans with glaring and visible inaccuracies by the state can
only be viewed as 'political' decisions not to intervene. See also
Robert Curvin, "Black Power in City Hall," Society, Sept./Oct., 1972
for one view of the state role under the transition government in
Newark.
1A. See Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics for a review of the charter
reform movement and commission governments in Newark during the
1940's and 1950's, Chapter 3, pp. 39-60.
2. Report for Action, 2.. cit.
3. Councilman Dennis Westbrooks, among others, was particularly critical
of the appointment throughout his two terms; he felt strongly that
the office should be symbolically held by a black and fought strongly
for the appointment of the subsequent director Kerr. On the other
hand, he admitted along with other blacks privately that Redden had
done a good job and that Kerr, without strong traditional 'respect'
through seniority in the system by the senior Irish officers --
particularly those like Redden, anxious for an end to the Italian-
Spina system -- was largely ineffectual. Interview, October 1973.
4. Legislative references are contained in NJSA 40A:4-32 "Local Budget
Law." Administrative directives to localities, comprising suggested
budget format for submission, etc., are issues annually by the New
Jersey Department of Community Affairs. See "Budget Manual for New
Jersey Municipalities, Division of Local Government Services, State
of New Jersey, Department of Community Affairs, Trenton, 1973.
5. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, City of Newark, August, 1973.
6. N.J.5.A. 40: 69A: Title 40 Revised Statutes.
7. 'Temporary tax' authorizations were made during 1970 for a three year
period, subject to legislative renewal, for several new taxes, includ-
ing a payroll and parking tax. The temporary action tends to work
havoc with local fiscal planning, since each renewal is made uncer-
tain by political predictions of legislators that the renewals will
t.
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be refused. In 1967, the New Jersey state legislature 'removed'
business personalty as objects of taxation by local governments
and replaced them with a stable 'flat grant'. More recently this
blow has been softened by the initiation of a state urban grant.
The larger older localities were those most hurt by the removal
of personalty tax.
8. See "Fiscal Analysis of the City of Newark," First National Bank
of Boston, 1966.
9. New Jersey Local Government Laws are found in N.J.SA 40: 69A;
Title 40 Revised Statutes. Examples of the special permissions
abound, from Urban Renewal to Office of Economic Opportunity grants.
Most take the form of enabling legislation permitting localities to
receive funds and implement programs. Localities are also required
to file or report funds received in annual budget statements.
10. Formulas may become highly controversial, or not, depending on the
particular issue. Some long established, such as the school aid
formula, are relatively less controversial than 'urban aid' which
is directed to poorer cities, or the highway aid formula, which
can redistribute (based on gas tax collections) from the poorer
localities with the most streets to the-richer localities with
fewer streets. This formula has been fought strongly, according to
a Newark spokesman, on grounds that mileage or use factors are more
equitable than the current 'flat grant' per locality, which measures
neither use nor local costs of a larger share of regional highway
facilities.
11. Robert Wood, 1,400 Governments, Harvard University Press, 1961.
12. On this point, see Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax,
Brookings, 1966, Chapter, IV, pp. 86-116.
13. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, City of Newark, October,
1973.
14. There are multiple cases of actions defended on these grounds during
the budget hearings of 1973. Typical was the response in an inter-
view with the then budget director, during the cycle, In response to
an inquiry regarding the city's capital replacement plan and borrow-
ing -- at the time the city was considerably below its debt service
limit -- the budget director responded "borrowing was mortgaging the
future" and further that one could not be flexible in replacement
because of the state's constraints.
15. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, "A Postwar Construction Program
for Newark, New Jersey, op. cit.
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16. See Arnold Meltsner, Politics of Revenue, Chapter 1, for this view.
17. Classic cases are available in New Jersey, as in other states for
the removal of considerable taxing authority during the post-war
period from localities on various grounds of efficiency, equity,
etc. In fact, however, as the New Jersey Tax Commission reported
in 1971, the removal was piecemeal, probably had much to do with
needs for state support itself, and was riddled with special inter-
ests influence such as veterans, the elderly, certain types of
capital intensive businesses, etc. There has been no systematic
reorganization of the state's tax system for over thirty years and
current court challenges while producing numerous plans, have failed
both with voters and the state legislature.
18. A good case is represented by the 'business personalty replacement'
tax which was shifted to the state in the mid 1960's, but which rate
remained unadjusted to growth which was absorbed by the state itself.
See First National Bank of Boston, "Community Renewal Program:
Fiscal Analysis," 1966, op. cit., p. 14 for an evaluation of state
assessment changes.
19. Newark City Charter, Title IX, Sec. 2.87 as amended.
20. Interviews, Louis Neeley, op. cit. and Dennis Westbrooks, op. cit.
For the effects of dispersal of authority through use of Boards of
Estimate and elected Controllers, see Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert
Kaufman, Governing New York City, Chapter 18.
21. The council may overrule dismissal by a 2/3 vote of the body.
22. Most changes are fairly marginal in nature, but two cases occurred
in the early 1970's under Gibson, one involving restoration of a
recommended elimination of a nursing home, which the state later
shut down on health grounds and one involving restoring employees
eliminated when the new Parks and Recreation Department was created,
In the later case, the administration 'dismissed' the employees
anyway when they refused retirement -- most were over 65 - and in
a court challenge instituted by the employees won when the court
decided they were too old to climb trees.
23. Interview, Neeley, op. cit.
24. Such was the case with OEO funds, with Housing Grants under Addoni-
zio reported in Report for Action, op. cit., p. 90 and with the
Department of Transportation T.O.P.I.C.S. program, a local traffic
management grant-in-aid.
25. Howard Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics, op. cit., pp. 39-46.
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26. Interview, Sam Shephard, op. c i t.
27. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, Assistant to the Business Administrator,
July 1973.
28. Ibid.
29. See Harold Kaplan, op. cit., Chapter 3, pp. 33-60 for a view of tradi-
tional backgrounds of Newark's political leadership and pp. 61 and 62
for views on the lack of interest of Newark's business elite. In the
latter, case, Kaplan suggests, "Throughout the 1940's the city's
corporation executives, lawyers, realtors and educators fled Newark
for suburban residence. While this exodus of upper income, white
Protestants is by no means unique to Newark, it seems to have been
accompanied by an extreme case of political withdrawal. The result
has been a chasm between the city's former civic leaders...and the
politicos, the neighborhood associations, the ethnic societies, the
small merchants' groups and the Catholics...", p, 61.
30. Under Addonizio, the Council's approval record for appointments was
reportedly good but several local shares for Federal grants-in-aid
were disapproved, notably for the poverty program, housing inspec-
tions and traffic management. Under Gibson, the Council systematically
disapproved appointments, including a Police Director, Director of
Health and Welfare and Parks and Recreation. By the latter part of
Gibson's first term, however, the Council shifted somewhat; at one
meeting, the then council president Turco suggested to a city employee
complaining about budget cuts which resulted in losses of jobs, 'the
Council had no authority in the matter and that it was an administra-
tive decision', although. the council does have some authority to
restore cuts. Interviews, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, August 1973
and 'Councilman Dennis Westbrooks, September, 1973. See also Manual
of the Municipal Council of the City of Newark, New Jersey Amended:
"Charter Laws,", Title 46 for limits of council authority.
31. Interview, Councilman Dennis Westbrooks, October 1973.
32. For a description of the evolution of key administrative functions
in Newark under Carlin and Addonizio, see "An Administrative Study
of Agencies Concerned with Urban Renewal in Newark, N.J." prepared
for the Community Renewal Program of the City of Newark by the
Benter for Urban Research, Seton Hall University, South Orange, New
Jersey, 1968.
33. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, Assistant to the Business Administrator,
August, 1973.
34. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, op. cit.
1
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35. Touche Ross and Co., "Operations Review: Department of Public
Works," Newark, New Jersey, December 1970.
36. Interview, Gregory Smith, Budget Examiner, City of Newark, August
1973. Much of this 'servicing' function was visible during the bud-
get cycle meetings for preparation of the 1974 budget; the Police
Department chief clerk, for example, was surprised when informed
that the city Purchase Department had responsibility for advance
costing of inventory of office supplies, for duplication and print-
ing and for maintaining inventories of equipment, furnishings and
common office supplies. Other operating departments insisted that
the purchasing department 'never maintaind inventories of furniture',
though in tact the department did, presumably for citywide use.
37. Report for Action, op. cit., pp. 7 and 8. One exception was the
Budget Officer, referred to earlier, a black accountant who was
passed over for an appointment as Secretary to the Board of Education
by Addonizio in favor of a white political ally.
38. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, op. cit.
39. Booz-Allen Public Administration Services, Inc., "Final Report:
Preliminary Study of Major Planning Units in the City of Newark,"
Mayor's Policy and Review Office, Newark, New Jersey, January 31,
1973.
40. 02 .cit. , p. 7.
41. Interview, Cornelius Bodine, Business Administrator, August 1973.
Bodine's conceptualization of his role in this interview was largely
as providing policy leadership, or a strong managerial veto over the
mayor. He suggested that the city's problems lay in the hostility
of the mayor andother key actors to 'business interests', with whom
they had little rapport. He appeared very- reluctant to recognize
the problem of poverty and blacks in Newark, the ethnic distribution
of power, or the Italian coalition of interests in the Council.
42. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, op. cit. Joseph further suggested that
Bodine's ambitions lay with officeholding with the professional organ-
ization of city managers, the International City Manager's Associa-
tion (ICMA) in which he was very active. Boudine was screened and
chosen by a group of corporate interests in Newark, including the
president of Prudential Life Insurance Company during the period of
transitional government in Newark in 1970. The corporate choice of
the business administrator for the city was a compromise reached
between Gibson and corporate leadership during that period and the
Newark Chamber of Commerce contributed a portion to increase the
position's salary to attract a good man and get around the city
council. As a result of this latter agreement, the business admini-
strator actually earned more than the mayor,
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43. Interview, Howard Gary, 2.p cit.
44. Notable was Public Works Department reforms of several types which
were dropped when the Business Administrator initiated his 'manage-
ment by objectives' program.
45. Interview, Gerald Harris, Director, Newark Institute, July 1973, and
"Final Report: Preliminary Study of Major Planning Units in the
City of Newark," Booz-Allen Public Administration Services, Inc.,
Washington, D.C., January 1973.
46, Ibid. Notably accounting, planning and some policy and program-
matic planning normally assumed by operating service units.
47. According to the ethnic census undertaken by the Human Rights
Commission of a total of 474 persons employed in 1971 by CDA, 387
were black or Hispanic and most of the supervisory and managerial
staff were minority.
48. The Federal grant system was initially consolidated under a program
called 'Planned Variations', a Model Cities based demonstration in
which Newark was one of a few cities selected in the U.S. in 1971.
Subsequently in 1973 and 1974, Department of Housing and Urban
Development grants (the core of Model Cities and Planned Variations)
were collapsed along with various urban renewal and housing programs
(administered previously by the Newark Housing Authority) into the
Community Development Revenue Sharing program.
49. According to the Touche Ross Report, "Operations Review," cit.,
many of the salaries and wage scales paid in Public Works, sub-
stantially exceed prevailing wages in similar categories in the
region, particularly when overtime, 'change in rates' (special
penalties paid for workers doing the work of the next highest
title) and benefits are taken into account. Requirements for
employment in blue collar jobs are very low and high school diplomas
were not required for employment for many years in categories of
work such as sanitation, sewers, streets and building trades.
50. In 1974, for example, the director of public works, with a high
school diploma earned $26,500 compared to the corporation-counsel,
a Yale Law degree holder who earned $28,000.
51. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit. (symbolically, prior to 1970,
there was no single, consolidated 'executive budget' doeument, but
rather a series of spending unit budgets.
52. One observer, Gregory Smith, p. cit., suggested he didn't under-
stand why much of the department's activities wasn't located in
Public Works, since there was so much in common with both staffs.
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53. Robert Curvin, "Black Power in City Hall," Society, Sept./Oct.,
1972, p. 56.
54. Interview, James A. Buford, Director of Health and Welfare, City
of Newark, October 1973.
55. Interviews with David Witcher, Criminal Justice Planning, City of
Newark, October 1973 and Councilman Dennis Westbrooks, October 1973.
56. Joseph Conforti, "Newark: Ghetto or City?", Society. Sept./Oct.
1972, p. 26. Gustav Heninberg,. president of Newark's Urban Coali-
tion, was instrumental in organizing confrontations with public
authorities over construction from the mid-1960's onward through
to the shutdown of the N.Y.N.J. Port Authority New Airport expan-
sion during the 1970's.
57. Interview, Charlotte Adams, Assistant to the Director, Newark Human
Rights Commission, September 1973. Newark initiated a special Con-
struction Compliance Office in 1973 for implementing an affirmative
action plan.
58. Interview, James A. Buford, op. cit.
59. Interview, Dennis Westbrooks, op. cit. Then Councilman Westbrooks,
however, conceded that gaining a council vote of approval on Newark's
first black police director, Edward Kerr, was very difficult and
took fully two months.
60. Ron Porambo, op. cit. See pp. 370-381 for a description of the shift
in composition of the Board of Education and teachers' strike of 1970.
The 1970 strike seems properly identified as an extension of the
strike the previous year and the 'unworkable' settlement by
Addonizio, which effectively stripped the Board of control over the
workforce in the schools and forced an illegal deficit on the city
budget (not approved by the State) of around 4.5 million dollars.
Quite correctly, the Newark Board of Education in 1970 decided the
contract should be renegotiated at its expiration date. The teachers,
however, sensing a struggle with the new board, walked out even before
negotiations began. The teachers were supported only by the Italian
parents (many of whom shut the schools), and the courts found them
guilty of contract violations, fining each teacher $3,000 in salary,
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Porambo, p. cit., pp. 394 and 395.
64. Interview. The complaint bureau, ACTION, was set up in the Mayor's
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office, and in storefronts around the city to take complaints about
city services, housing, etc. Many of the complaints were in the
sanitation area. When questioned about the complaint system for
sanitation, the public works director suggested that most came from
the Mayor's office, but added that the blame lay not with the sani-
tation department, but with the people themselves.
65. Interview, Ira Jackson, Aide to the Mayor, Newark, New Jersey,
April 1972. A report was subsequently published containing the
highlights of investigation findings, which, however, reportedly
skirted some of the legal questions pending decisions on the
receivership.
66. Porambo, op. cit., p. 354 (see also Curvin, pp. cit., p. 56.
67. Curvin, p. cit., p. 56.
68: Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. During the first two years of Gibson's first four year term,
the council was composed as during Addonizio's administration of six
Italians and three blacks.
71. Between 1960 and 1970, the city lost 3.43% of its real property
assessed valuation while additional categories of taxable property
-- personal property notably -- were reclassified by the state.
72. Under New Jersey State law, for example, the city must budget
annually the equivalent to the preceding year's delinquent taxes;
in 1971's budget this amounted to around 5.0% of the budget.
73. Porambo, op. cit., p. 356.
74. Ibid. According to Porambo, Donald MacNaughton, chief executive of
Prudential Insurance and chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, re-
fused to endorse an income tax while other businesses and the
Chamber were equally opposed to the payroll tax. Only the local
press for once supported the Mayor's plea for the income tax. For
Prudential's role in Newark, see Clark Taylor, "Newark: Parasitic
Suburbs" in Society, September/Oc,.tober 1972.
75. Clark Taylor, ibid. Taylor cites research findings of Robert Curvin
on the Bergen-Reiffin Act, passed in the 1940's to relieve business
from paying certain kinds of taxes on property owned in Newark in
which Prudential and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance companies were
in the forefront of lobbying, p. 37.
76. Curvin, op. cit. p. 57.
77. Interview, Junius Williams, oR. cit.
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1. The Addonizio administration 'budgeted down' public assistance
categorical grants during election years, probably to avoid visible
tax rate increases. In 1969, for example, direct assistance was
budgeted for I million dollars, despite the prior year's expenditure
of $3 million. Under Gibson, by contrast, direct assistance in the
city's welfare program (cash grants under general assistance) was
budgeted closer to actual expenditures ranging around 3.5 to 4.0
million over the four year period.
2. The museum was budgeted in 1974 for $850,000, while the library was
budgeted for $2,762,477 of which around 2.2 million comes from city
funds, the remainder supplied by state grants. The museum initially
operated from a small endowment and continues to raise some funds
from fees and voluntary contributions according to the director in
comments made during the 1974 budget hearings. The museum is handi-
capped, however, in that its collection derives its importance from
a relatively obscure uniqueness, that of Tibetian art and that there
are few public grants in aid available to it to permit expansion
into other areas.
3. See Curvin, op. cit. and interview with Anton Jungherr, Finance
Director, July 1973.
4. These taxes have been much criticized, since they redistribute irre-
spective of poverty, tax effort or capacity, or the amount collected
in a locality. In effect, they appear specifically designed to dis-
tribute from the poor to the rich in New Jersey. Notable among them
are five major taxes: the replacement for business personality,
state sales tax; state railroad tax and state aid for school build-
ings. In all but the latter case, Newark and other poorer urban
areas contribute far more than they receive back through apportion-
ment.- For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Report of the
New Jersey Tax Policy Committee, Vol. 1, Trenton, 1972.
5. Newark's effective tax on real property had risen to 9.76 per 100.00
of equalized assessed valuation by 1973; only 1.33, however, was
for municipal expenditure support; 6.26 and 2.17 went for school and
county support respectively. The property tax rate has risen under
Gibson, however, by about 2.00 per $100.00 assessed valuation. Most
of the increase, however, has been absorbed by school budget increases.
Between 1971 and 1973, municipal and county expenditures increased
by about 12 per cent while school spending increased by 21 per cent.
6. See Curvin, op_. cit. and Jungherr, op. cit.
7. Federal grants were used to supplement staff salaries in top admini-
strative positions and much of the support for the planning department
I.
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and for aides in the Business Administrator's Office came from
Federal grant sources. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Director,
op. cit.
8. Curvin, P. cit.
9. Gregory Smith, Interview, op. cit. and Interview, Kenneth Joseph,
. cit. According to Joseph, an assistant to the business admini-
strator who prepared the Health and Welfare Departments Management
by Objectives plan and reorganization program, the council's con-
tinued refusal, either to approve closing of the nursing home, or
approve appropriations to fix it up, was entirely without any ground
and ultimately forced the State to close down the facility. He
suggests the mayor may have welcomed state intervention, given the
absurdity of the council stand.
10. Ibid.
11. The facility, which is structurally deficient, still carries budgeted
personnel of around $120,000 -- in the Health Budget -- devoted to
'maintenance,' because of council opposition to dismissing of these
mainly blue collar Italian employees.
12. Curvin, p. cit.
13. Interview, Sam Shephard, Mayor's Aide, October 1973. This was the
case, according to Shephard, with 'dismissal' of Parks and Recrea-
tion staff, with the nursing home -- where many workers had been
transferred from the City Hospital, when the state refused to rehire
them because of qualifications -- and with the general 'retirement'
problem in the city. For a fascinating view of the blood and
marriage relationships among Italians in New City government, see a
narrative account based on FBI tapes recorded at the hideout of
reputed cosa nostra leader Ray de Carlo, Henry Zeiger, The Jersey
Mob, chapters 1 and 2.
14. In 1970, Parks and Grounds and Baths and Pools maintenance consti-
tuted separate divisions, while Recreation programs were organized
under the Director's Office. There was limited overall program
development, and the largest part of the allocation went to the two
former activities.
15. Touche Ross & Co., "Operations Review," op. cit., p. 40. An addi-
tional 200 persons were added to summer staff for recreation centers.
16. Sam Shephard, Interview, op. cit.
17. Sam Shephard, pl. cit. See also Touch Ross and Co., oP. cit.,
pp. 43-46. According to Shephard, a substantial proportion of the
4.
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workers were over 70 years of age. The Touche -Ross Study gener-
ally confirms the low productivity of the city compared to other
cities; one reason suggested was the city maintenance of trees
for utility rights of way, which was legally the responsibility
of the private utility companies. The report suggested it has
been done by 'habit' over the past 20 years, rather than by any
legal responsibility grounds.
18. Sam Shepahrd, ibid. According to Shephard, the judge ruled in
favor of retirement, after the workers were unable to demonstrate
they could actually climb and trim trees, a basic requirement for
the job. The Council, however, opted for a more gradual retire-
ment plan over several years.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Memo, "Racial Breakdown of City Personnel," Newark Human Rights
Commission, 1973.
22. Interview, Sam Shephard, op. -cit.
23. Interview, Charlotte Adams, Newark Human Rights Commission, Septem-
ber 1973. According to Miss Adams, while a primary motivation to
the office was the affirmative action program on construction pro-
jects, a later named 'construction coordinator' would be more
likely to be involved with implementation of construction site
integration in the city.
24. For a fascinating description of the contracting system on public
works projects in Newark, see Henry Zeiger, The Jersey Mob, New
American Library New York 1975, comprising a transcription by the
author of the FBI tapes of syndicate leaders recorded between 1964
and' 1967, and made part of the court record in the case of the
U.S. v. De Carlo and others.
25. Many of the so-called engineering categories of work in Public
Works were actually 'aides', 'assistants', etc., a system which
permitted advancement of persons without engineering training to
higher salary and work categories. Interview, Lloyd McKessey,
manager, Bureau of Streets and Sidewalks, October 4, 1973.
26. In fact, however, employment allocated to the agency more than
doubled in its first two years.
27. Interview, Howard Gary, Assistant to the Mayor, Newark, New Jersey,
October 12, 1973. Gary and others suggested that there was common
understanding that both units would be 'small' in overall budget
terms. Nonetheless, how large either or both ultimately become
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according to most observers will depend on momentum generated
particularly during the initial five year period.
28. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit.
29. Interview, James Buford, Director, Health and Welfare, October 26,
1973.
30. Ibid. According to Buford, the state was increasingly shifting
the burden for expanded testing programs to the city and further
demanding the city submit samples and results in Trenton, rather
than by report summaries.
31. In functional terms, there was and remains considerable overlap in
the consumer area between health inspectors and inspections
inspectors, with no real distinction visible. One observer sug-
gested that the real distinction was that one (inspections) was
a 'public works' style operation, while the other was a 'health
style' operation.
32. Leonard Duhl, op. cit.
33. Gregory Smith, Interview, op. -ct., August 17, 1973.
34. Ibid.
35.. Ibid. This agreement, to assist the city in meeting budget deficits
of 1970 and 1971, involved retroactive payments for budgeted
deficits in the health institutions budget for prior years. In
1970, the deficits were running approximately $8 million annually.
36. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, op. cit. See also Kenneth A. Joseph,
"Health and Welfare Department: Goals and Objectives 1972-73,"
Newark, New Jersey.
37. Ibid., pp. 11-15.
38. Gregory Smith, Interview, op. cit.
39. James Buford, Interview, p. cit.
40. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. Kenneth Joseph, "Health and Welfare Department Goals and Objectives
1972-73. Generally and in line with other social services units in
I.
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the nation, according to Joseph, the notion was to shift the public
assistance units emphasis from 'counselling' to more of a check-
writing operation, which would have the budgetary impact of reducing
professional labor requirements, but increase the unit's responsi-
bility for systematic means tests and accounting. In the case of
inspections division, the general direction was less well defined
principally because of the complex range of functions, the influence
of federal grants -- particularly in code enforcement, and environ-
mental sanitation areas such as vermin control, lead poisoning,
etc. -- and the inability to establish priorities.
43. Report for Action, op. cit., pp. 22-42.
44. Ibid.
45. Interview, David Witcher, Criminal Justice Planning, September 4,
1972. According to Witcher, several persons contacted out of town
turned down the job and at least three blacks in Newark refused
following Redden's resignation.
46. Ibid. See also Porambo, op. cit. Both Witcher and Porambo suggest
that Redden's personality was a,'hard, cold and egotistical one,'
but probably the only one capable of operating in the police depart-
ment and Newark at the time.
47. Witcher, op. cit.
48. Interview, Thomas Pritchley, Inspector, Head Newark Tactical Squad,
September 20, 1973 (Pritchley suggests that one of the important
functions of the tacticals was monitoring -- particularly in
external behavior -- police behavior in the community, and under-
cutting potential police riots or participation in community demon-
strations, etc.
49. Report for Action, op. cit., p. 24 and Newark Human Rights Commis-
sion, "Racial Breakdown of City Personnel," 1973.
50. Witcher, pp. cit. The planning thrust was one geared less to the
internal police discipline problems than external coverage and
police distributional problems, or the type of programming attempted
in New York City by N.Y.C. Rand and the Mayor's office under Lindsay.
For a good critique of the Rand operations and failures see
51. Witcher, og. cit.
52. Ibid. According to Witcher, Redden resigned several times but each
time was persuaded to return by Gibson. The final resignation, how-
ever, had to be accepted owing to the tension over a housing project,
I.
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Kaiwieda Towers, which had generated a community conflict, exacer-
bated by the presence of substantial numbers of off duty police-
men. The situation became impossible to control and public opinion
literally forced the Mayor to accept Redden's responsibility for
failure to keep order during the demonstrations. The next police
director, a black captain on the force, proved largely incapable
of establishing order and finally was removed after a year and
replaced by the present director, a black with considerably more
forcefulness.
53. Pat Lauber, "Gibson and Newark: 1,000 Days," Newark!, May
1973.
54. Interview, Neeley, op. cit.
55. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit.
56. Interview, Ronald Woodford, Budget Examiner, October, 1973.
According to Woodford, a key problem with the categorical grant
system was the different pay periods, which corresponded poorly to
city tax and budget periods and represented mainly whim of parti.-
cular grantors; this forced continuous advance 'drawdowns' on the
general fund, and increased need for short term borrowing.
57. During 1973 budget hearings, there was considerable discussion
of the problems of integration of federal employees to the city
payroll, benefit and civil service classification system. Federal
grants generally provided for superior hospitalization benefits,
but paid no retirement though pay scales were generally higher.
Many differences of course reflected the city's own fragmented
benefit system in which differentials are great among employee
work categories.
58. The director, Junius Williams, challenged the mayor's assistant
business administrator over intervention and hiring policy in
CDA, and what Williams perceived as 'patronage' purposes over-
ruling qualifications. One particular position Williams felt
strongly about was an information systems planner, whom he had
found a qualified candidate. Conflict issued when another candi-
date was identified and the mayor backed the assistant business
administrator. Williams suggest.-in an interview it was more
than an isolated incident or misunderstanding, but rather, a
conflict over what was best for the city in developing an agency
which reflected strong technical-planning orientation where this
was required. Interview, October 1973.
59. For a critique on MPDO changes and effects of categorical grants,
see Booz-Allen Public Administration Services, Inc., "Preliminary
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Study of Major Planning Units in the City of Newar,", Washington,
D.C., January 31, 1973.
60. Actually, Model Cities, Planned Variations and Community Develop-
ment Revenue Sharing could be considered from the city's administra-
tive perspective quite separate programs, with separate implementa-
tion guidelines, criteria, etc.
61. City Charter of the City of Newark, New Jersey, op. cit. In 1974,
this comprised city departments of Public Works, Police, Fire,
Finance, Business Administration, Parks and Recreation, Law, and
Health and Welfare.
62. In the case of the Board of Education and Housing Authority, these
are citizen boards with overlapping 6 to 8 year appointive terms
with authority to select administrative directors of the agencies;
there are inevitably lags in changing composition and difficulty in
shifting directors. Board of Education shifts and top administra-
tion changes were undertaken more quickly than in the Housing
Authority, primarily because composition of the board had changed
prior to the Gibson election and pressures were stronger on the
education system itself through the board. Community pressures
on the Housing Authority utilized Federal, State governments and
the courts far more than the institution itself.
63. Newark City Charter, op. cit., Article 39.
64. Ibid. The Charter states "Department heads shall appoint subordin-
ate officers and employees within their respective departments and
may, with approval of the mayor, remove such officers and employees
subject ot the provisions of the Revised Statutes, Title 11, Civil
service...."
65. Interview, Sam Shephard, op. cit.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. While theoretically department heads have authority to appoint
chiefs of bureaus and division heads, the Public Works Director
retained several from Addonizio in key areas. Further, much of the
administrative control continued'to be fragmented to lower levels
and little in the way of a central administrative staff developed.
The weakness of the director was further visible in domination of
the department by the sanitation manager, who was eventually named
'deputy assistant to the director', a man equally lacking in admini-
strative interest or background. These impressions are based on
interviews with head of public works, Sam Friscia, and the sanita-
11
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tion manager, William Tedesco, as well as observations during
budget hearings on Public Works during the 1973 budget cycle.
69. One exception was William Walls, appointed as corporation counsel
from a position gained during the Addonizio addministration as a
municipal court judge. Walls, however, was not an associate of
Addonizio, but rather a black lawyer recruited to satisfy demands
for integration of the court system in the city.
70. Interview, Charlotte Adams, Assistant to the Director, Newark
Human Rights Commission. One primary complaint was the very slow
speed of integration in the fire department which lagged far behind
other divisions in the city. While the Newark Police Department
increased the proportion of nonwhites between 1971 and 1973 from
11.9 to 27%, the fire department's beginning level was lower at
4.3 in 1971 and was only raised to 4.7% by 1973.
71. Interview, Howard Gary, Assistant to the Business Administrator,
pp. cit. Gary suggested that Public Works represented the best
example of 'mayoral undercutting' in the city because of entrenched
power interests. See also Robert Curvin, op. cit. for assessments
of the general problem of racial hostility in Newark.
72. Sam Shephard, Interview, op. cit.
73. Interview, Dennis Westbrooks, Newark City Councilman, p. cit.
Westbrooks, who as a councilman was privy to internal meetings over
appointemtns suggested that spoils, bargaining and deals dominated
behavior of the Italian members, making reasonable compromise
impossible since there was little available to give out under Gibson.
74. Interview, Junius Williams, Former CDA Director, September 1973.
75. Interview, Gregory Smith, Budget Examiner, op. cit. (Smith, a young
white M.P.A. recruited in 1970, suggested his motivation like that
of others was to work for a black mayor in a situation of dire
social need. His disillusion, he suggested, was similar to that of
others; the traditional civil service, hostility to the mayor, lack
of commitment on the part of top staff, general disorganization,
and the failure for any change to the 'system', all eroded his
interest in continuing in the city.
76. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, Assistant to the Business Administrator,
op. cit.
77. Ibid. One clear case was the recruitment of an inexperienced budget
director -- who was later dismissed -- while overlooking a black
experienced in budget planning who had been recruited for a position
of assistant business administrator..
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78. Approximately 60% of the Public Employment Program employees were
scheduled to be added to the city payroll during 1974, according to
departmental budget requests. The impact was minimal, however,
since most added workers replaced normal attrition and came in at
lower salary scales.
79. Interview, Cornelius Bodine, Business Administrator, pp. cit.
80. See John Cunningham, Newark, op. cit., New Jersey Historical Society,
Newark,1966, p. 226. See also Leo Troy, Organized Labor in New
Jersey, pp. 40-60.
81. Much of this influence flows historically from state laws which
established considerable state legislative control over municipal
police in larger jurisdictions -- i.e. class 'A' cities, over
specific population, frequently to include the two largest, Jersey
City and Newark- possibly to back interests both of local busines
elites and rural populations over urban community populations during
large scale immigrations beginning in the last century. In post-war
years, however, the fraternal organizations became active in lobby-
ing along with veterans' groups for special benefits such as veter-
ans' preferences in hiring, pension plans, resident (and now non
resident) requirements. Many of these trends are visible in the
layering of state laws.
82. Interview, Hcward Gary, 9p. cit.
83. See Porambo, op. cit., pp. 370-381 on the 1970 teachers' strike.
84. Interview, Howard Gary, op. cit. arid Cornelius Bodine, op cit.
85. Robert Curvin, op. cit. In 1971, according to the Newark Human
Rights Commission census data, around 8-% of the administrative and
clerical staff were white.
86. Interview, Cornelius Bodine, op. ci-t.
87. Interview, Lloyd McKessey, Manager, Division of Streets and Sidewalks.
88. Interview, Howard Gary, op cit. One example is the 1971 contract
with a Teamster's local for the sanitation workers, where an intend-
ed 'incentive' program reducing time input and substituting per-
formance was negated by the failure of the division to re-district
workers. As a result, some workers worked less time, then were
permitted to draw overtime pay assisting workers in heavier work-
load districts. See Touche Ross & Co., Operations Review, op. cit.
89. Interview, Howard Gary, op. cit.
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90. Report for Action, oR. cit., pp. 22-27 gave some estimates, includ-
ing 25% nonwhites on a teaching staff of 3,500; 11.0% on a police
department of 1,300. The report suggested that it encountered
extreme difficulties in ascertaining racial breakdowns of employees,
including the police. It was not until 1971 that an ethnic census
of city employment was undertaken in Newark by the city's division
of Human Rights.
91. Interview, David Witcher, Criminal Justice Planning, op. cit.
Witcher explained the problem as 'deliberate obstructionisim by
police officers of the department.
92. Interview, Charlotte Adams, Newark Human Rights Commission, og. cit.
93. Interview, Alphonso Kittrels, Newark Personnel Director, September,
1973.
94. Interview, Charlotte Adams, o cit. Also see 20th Annual Report,
Newark Human Rights Commission, Office of the Mayor, Newark, New
Jersey, 1972.
95. Newark Human Rights Cormission,- "Racial Breakdown of City Personnel"
and "Memo," Charlotte Adams to Daniel Blue, Jr., Executive Director
"Racial Breakdown -- Follow-up Survey," March 29, 1973.
96. Compiled from city budget data. There were considerable press;ires
exerted on division heads to budget in PEP employees, once the
program terminated. Theoretically, PEP employees must pass civil
service examinations eventually, but hiring proceeded pending ex-
aminations.
97. City Budget Data, 1973-1974 budgets.
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1. For a good summary of the literature with a particular focus on
city budgeting and a case presentation of Oakland, California's
budgetary process, see Arnold Meltsner and Aaron Wildavsky, "Leave
City Budgeting Alone!" in J. P. Crecine and L. Mascotti (eds),
Financing the Metropolis.
2. This was the perception of budget office staff in several interviews.
One examiner suggested, "I don't think the mayor really cares about
the budget. Of course it's an election year and he has a lot of
aides running around...."
3. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Officer, op. cit. According to
Neeley who worked for the State Finance Office of New Jersey in
Trenton, the city's cycle is more elaborate and sophisticated from
a public administration perspective than that of the state.
4.' See Arnold Meltsner, op. cit., p. 161-185 and John Crecine, Govern-
mental Problem-Solvin:T- Chapter 2.
5. See Municipal Finance Administration, International City Managers
Association, Chicago, 1958, chapters 4, 5, pp. 61-142.
6. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, October 1973.
7. Interview, Anton Jungherr, Finance Director, July 1973.
8. Interview, Kenneth Joseph, Assistant to the Business Administrator,
oR. cit
9. Information in this chapter, unless otherwise specifically identi-
fiei, is based on observations during the budgetary decision process
in Newark between June and November 1973 which resulted in prepara-
tion of the 1974 Operating Budget for the City of Newark.
10. See Aaron Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, op. Cit.,
for a classic description of the budgetary siili-culture in public
decisionmaking.
11. This view is expressed in Arnold J. Meltsner and Aaron Wildavsky,
"Leave City Budgeting Alone!", in J. P. Crecine and L. H. Mascotti
(eds.), Financing the Metropolis, ,Los Angeles 1970.
12. Interview, Cornelius Bodine, op. cit. Bodine suggested that the
business community's interests should be the interests of the city
and further implied that the city administration did nothing but
'chase' them out.
13. Interview, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, August 8, 1973.
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14. Comment, Louis Neeley, Budget Director, at a meeting October 1973.
15. Interview, Howard Gary, oR. cit., and Kenneth Joseph, pp. cit.
16. Ibid.
17. Interview, Howard Gary, October 12, 1973.
18. Interview, James Buford, Director of Health and Welfare, op. cit.
Another observer, Judge Hazelwood, head of the municipal courts
suggested that the 'pressures' were very heavy from civil service
to promote people in house to the chief clerk position.
19. Interview, Gregory Smith, Budget Examiner, op. cit.
20. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit. Smith suggested it was his
impression that the mayor'had very little interest in the budget,
but did have an interest in getting control over the process'.
21. Interview, Howard Gary, op. cit.
22. Ibid.
23. Interview, Howard Gary, pp. cit.
24. *rouche Ross and Company, Operations Review, op. cit., pp. 26-34.
25. "Working Draft: Motors Division Department of Public Works, Newark,
New Jersey," Administrative Assistance Unit of the Department of
Community Affairs, October 1, 1973, pp. 2 and 3.
26. Ibid.
27. "Memo on Cost Analysis of Police Vehicle Leasing," from division of
police administration to the Police Director, October 1973. The
memo suggested that leasing would probably exceed the costs quoted
by the state report of $275/month and suggested further that there
might be no takers. Another argument was the 'special specifica-
tions' needed by the police. Very probably loss of control, the
existing purchase contracts the police enjoyed as well as scrutiny
over specifications were considered a loss.
28. Interview, Sgt. Thomas Prichley, October 1973. During the budget
hearings, similar remarks were made by police officials over the
'horse' budget, but a story was then told over a recent backfiring,
when a horse purchased by the mounted police from a ranch in southern
New Jersey brought into Newark traffic for the first time bolted
and jumped over a car badly damaging it and sending the driver into
shock. The horse, though a 'bargain. was returned to the ranch.
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29. "Five Year Vehicle and Equipment Plan," Division of Central
Purchase, City of Newark, 1973.
30. The remainder of the equipment purchases were consolidated into
the city's reorganized capital budget, a five year bollowing plan.
The capital program automatically provided for closer scrutiny
and evaluation of the scheduling of vehicle replacement, repair
schedules, etc. by the budget and finance officer, or user depart-
ments, mainly public works and fire.
31. The city's Central Purchase division was an old line Italian
dominated unit with a large, undifferentiated clerical staff, and
laborers responsible for 'moving' inventory around. There was
reportedly little or no managerial system in contemporary terms,
Specifications on vehicles and equipment were unknown to the divi-
sion and in many cases simple purchases -- small equipment, materi-
als, supplies -- were not closely or systematically monitored by
the division.
32. Interview, Gregory Smith, op. cit.
33. The general philosophy of the police department is thiat most of the
miscellaneous codes should be available for transferring to discre-
tionary program desired by the top staff. This includes the
cameras and other photo equipment, guns and ammunition, communica-
tions hardware, furniture, office equipment, etc. An instance of
'error' was an attempt to budget slack consisting of 400,000 worth
of uniforms which in fact were scheduled to be paid from a Federal
grant. Other uniform allowances cut were for 'civilian' personnel
who do not wear uniforms, but who have collected the money anyway
over the years.
34. Interview, Louis Neeley, op. cit.
35. Interview, Sam Shephard, op. cit.
36. According to the manager responding to various suggestions about
lot cleaning, increases in federal grants for increased services,
altering work shifts and implementation of a long planned off-
street parking program, nothing really could be done. In response
to the problem of the off-street parking program, for example, he
sug.gested that the motorbroom men had refused to be deputized to
ticket parked cars to enforce alternate side of the street parking
on grounds of 'fears of local irate residents'.
37. Interview, Kenneth Joseph and Louis Neeley, op. cit. Most city
participants were in agreement that the council knew and partici-
pated little in budgetary review, depended heavily on staff and
focussed attention on pet grievances or personnel,
38. Interview, Councilman Dennis Westbrooks, November 1973.
I.
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39. Interview, Howard Gary, op. cit.
40. Ibid. Gary suggests that disorganization in the black community
accounts for the low sensitivity to the budget and tax matters.
He reported that in 1972 Imamu Baraka's group tried to generate
some interest by publishing and circulating a community leaflet
on the budget, but it generated little interest.
41. Included in addition to the Public Employment Program (PEP) were
various union sponsored apprentice programs in Buildings Depart-
ment and Inspections; the Federal Work Incentive Program for welfare
recipients; and some specialized grant-in-aid categorical programs
slated for termination. Not all gains in low skilled new employ-
ment are represented in the tables following, even for categories
represented since budgeted unfilled jobs and attrition also ab-
sorbed eligible workers.
42. This: is visible in budget office recommended cuts and those recom-
mended by the ad hoc group. Much of the budget office analysis
was devoted to cutting, but little justification other than 'im-
pressionistic' inefficiencies were available for support. In the
case of the ad hoc group, orientation was much more towards the
work organization, identified and fairly visible problem areas
where units were somewhat more vulnerable. The pro-forma cuts
appeared to gain less agreement from spending units than well iden-
tified and controversial spending areas.
43. Interview, Charlotte Adams, p. cit. Without centralization, the
new contract office set up in 1973 would have little to work with.
4.
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1. See Roger M. Williams, America's Black Mayors: Are They Saving
the Cities?", Saturday Review World, May 4, 1975.
2. Roger M. Williams, pp. cit.
3. "Black Voting Age Population,' Joint Center for Political Studies,
Washington, D.C. 1972.
4. Roy W. Bahl and Alan K. Campbell, "Differential Fiscal Performance in
Cities with Large Black Populations," Draft, Maxwell School, Syracuse
University, 1975.
5. Roger M. Williams, op. cit., p. 66. See also William E. Nelson,
Jr., "Black Politics in Gary: Problems and Prospects,". Joint Center
for Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, Washington, D.C. for a
similar discussion.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Jeffrey Pressmen, "Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership. American
Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, June 1972, p. 522.
9. See William E. Nelson, Jr., "Black Politics in Gary: Problems and
Prospects," Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington, D.C.,
1972.
10. Interview, Larry Coggins, Director of Community Organization, op.
cit.
11. Centaur Management Consultants, Inc., op. cit., p. 11-23, for
future estimates of Newark's job gap. According to this report,
Newark's 1970 job gap among nonwhites exceeded 10,000 and given
current employment and population workforce growth, may double by
the end of the decade. This does not count current 'underemployment'
or employment in marginal or seasonal sectors, nor wage-earners who
have household incomes below poverty levels.
12. For a review of current challenges to Federal general revenue
sharing and new glock grants by nonwhites, see Morton H. Sklar,
"Revenue Sharing: What Sharing for Minorities?", Focus, Joint Center
for Political Studies, March 1975, pp. 4 and 5. For a fuller discus-
sion of economic and income distribution aspects of revenue sharing,
see James Hefner and Marguerite Barnett, "Implications of Revenue
Sharing for Black Political and Economic Goals," in Review of Black
Political Economy, Summer 1972, pp. 74-93.
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